Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
     Visual evidence of testing preparations includes both before and after satellite images of the test site. Imagery taken on the morning of September 20th shows many vehicles present on a launch pad at the base. One of the trucks had a trailer that appears to correspond to the dimensions of the missile. A weather shelter that typically covers the specific launch site had been shifted about fifty feet. By the afternoon after the test, the trailer was gone, and the shelter had been moved back to its original position.
     Additional satellite imagery that was captured on September 28th shows the launch pad active again. There was a similar trailer at the site and the weather shelter had again been shifted.
    On August 31st, Russian authorities issued an aviation notice for a “temporary danger area”. The notice advised piloted to avoid part of the Barents Sea off the coast and twelve miles from the launch site, Known as Pankovo. The notice has since been extended several times. It was scheduled to be in force through October 6th. Russia had issued a similar notice before a Burevestnik test in 2019.
     Two Russian aircraft specifically utilized for collecting data from missile launches were parked about one hundred miles south of the launch site in early August. The aircraft were at the Rogachevo air base, according to analysis of satellite images by Bellona, a Norwegian environmental organization. The aircraft are owned by Rosatom which is the Russian atomic energy company. They stayed at that air base at least through September 26th, according to satellite imagery. During the Burevestnik tests held in 2018, the same type of aircraft were also in the vicinity.
     A U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft called a RC-135W Rivet Joint flew at least two missions off the coast of the Arctic island where the launch site is located on September 19th and September 26th according to the tracking platform known as Flightradar24. These two missions represent a slight increase from usual known activity.
     The highly secretive nature of the Burevestnik missile initiative and the remote launch location make it hard to determine if a test is coming soon or if the missile may have already been recently retested. Launch tests of the Burevestnik have been conducted at the Arctic base in the past. Russia could also have tested just the missile’s rocket motor or a component of the missile itself.
     The U.S. government declined to comment on the report of Burevestnik testing.
     Experts said that the Burevestnik is dangerous not only because of its ability to carry a powerful nuclear warhead but in its potential to release harmful radioactive emissions if the missile were to explode or malfunction during a test.
     If it were actually deployed, the Burevestnik would be considered part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This would make it subject to a nuclear arms reduction treaty signed in 2011. That treaty limits the total number of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles that Russia is allowed to deploy.
     The treaty is known as New START. It is set to expire in February of 2026. The Burevestnik could contribute to “the leading edge of an uncontrolled arms race” if no new agreement were to replace the expiring treaty, according to Kimball. Ultimately, he stated, a test of the missile would be “sign that Russia is moving in the wrong direction.”