Part 2 of 5 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
     The first thing to consider about the SMRs is that they are not particularly small. The nuclear power plant at Wylfa in north Wales generated about four hundred and sixty megawatts when it was operational. The four hundred and sixty megawatt SMRs would be bigger than all the Magnavox type nuclear reactors in the U.K. (except for Wylfa). They are comparable to Advanced Gas-cooled reactors. (I have a problem with even calling the reactors being developed by the U.K. SMRs because according to the common definition of SMRs, they are not supposed to generate over three hundred megawatts.)
      The question of where the SMRs will be manufactured is still open. Derby is the home of the Rolls Royce company which is involved in the development of the SMRs. The U.K. government is already using the funds of the Department of Housing and Communities (DHC) to finance the construction of a new advanced manufacturing center in Derby. The Department of Business and Energy (BEIS) was asked why their funds were not being used to construct the new center. A spokesperson replied that the current funding scheme was part of “levelling up regeneration money”, whatever that means.
     Maybe the BEIS was reluctant to commit its funds to such a project. Spending money on such a “risky prospect” betrays “an irrationally cavalier attitude” according to Andrew Sterling who is a Professor of Science & Technology Policy at the University of Sussex Business School. He also said that “implausibly short time” was being allocated for the development and construction of an untested nuclear reactor design.
     Stirling says that the only justification for this decision to proceed with SMRS is that it is supporting the U.K. nuclear weapons program. “Even in a worst case scenario, where this massive Rolls Royce production line and supply chain investment is badly delayed (or even a complete failure) with respect to civil reactor production, what will nonetheless have been gained is a tooled-up facility and a national skills infrastructure for producing perhaps two further generations of submarine propulsion reactors, right into the second half of the century. And the costs of this will have been borne not by the defense budget, but by consumers and citizens.”
     The U.K. defense policy is fulling committed to the use of nuclear power for military applications. The very roots of the U.K. civil nuclear power program are embedded in the Cold War rush to develop nuclear weapons even though the British public was told that the production of electricity via nuclear power would be “too cheap to meter.”
      The core of the post-Brexit mentality is the legacy of empire and the desire to continue to be perceived as having important world status. The English political elite cannot imagine that this status could be maintained without the U.K. being in the nuclear nations club and being able to maintain the threat of nuclear deterrence. Dr. Paul Dorfman works at the Energy Institute of the University College of London. He said, “The civil-military link is undisputable and should be openly discussed.”
Please read Part 3 next