Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
The NRC summary says that drones would not add any capabilities to take advantage of security vulnerabilities for nuclear reactors or other facilities that handle radioactive materials to the capabilities already available to terrorists. It may be true that small drones with small payloads would not individually be able to do major damages to safety structures and equipment. However, there are many ways that attackers could use small drones to assist a multi-pronged attack.
While individual small drones would not have much destructive power, there is a great deal of research being carried out on the development of swarm intelligence that would allow a group of small drones to closely coordinate their behavior during an attack. This would serve to multiply the destructive power of the individual small drones to the point where the swarm could inflict major damage on a nuclear facility.
This attack assistance could include the delivery of weapons, explosives and other equipment to protected areas of a nuclear facility that would be difficult for an invading force to physically carry into the facility. Drones could also be used to confuse and distract security forces and to interfere with their response to an attack. They would also be very useful for feeding real time aerial images to the attackers during the attack.
Drones are being developed that can carry payloads of hundreds of pounds. This would allow individuals to fly over and into a nuclear power plant carried by drones. The destructive potential of a drone carrying hundreds of pounds of plastique explosives would be huge. There are also nuclear weapons that only weigh a few hundred pounds and could easily be carried by the new generation of drones.
Lyman said, “Many companies are developing technologies to protect critical infrastructure from drone attacks through early detection, tracking, and jamming. If the NRC were to add drones to the design basis threat, nuclear plant owners would likely to have to purchase such systems. But plant owners are loath to spend more on safety and security at a time when many of their facilities are struggling to compete with cheap natural gas, wind and solar.”
Lyman also said, “The NRC seems more interested in keeping the cost of nuclear plant security low than protecting Americans from terrorist sabotage that could cause a reactor meltdown. The agency needs to remember that it works for the public, not the industry it regulates.”
Drone technology is advancing at such a pace that it is difficult to keep track of expanding threats from drones for all important infrastructure, not just nuclear power plants. And the pace of drone development will just keep increasing as time passes. The potential for both the constructive and the destructive capabilities of drones must be monitored and factored into U.S. defensive capabilities for national infrastructure. In terms of asymmetrical warfare, drone technology could allow a small determined band of terrorists to inflict major damage on U.S. infrastructure.