My Geiger counter is in the shop for maintenance.

The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
My Geiger counter is in the shop for maintenance.
My Geiger counter is in the shop for maintenance.
I have often posted articles about the threat of nuclear war. The United States and Russia each have thousands of nuclear missiles pointed at each other and ready to launch in minutes. Since the end of the Cold War, these facilities and launch systems have been in decline in both countries. Funds have been cut for maintenance and training has declined in quality. There have already been a couple of incidents since the end of the Cold War that almost resulted in nuclear war. With the seizure of Crimea by Russia, relations between the U.S. and Russia have cooled. Now members of the U.S. Congress are proposing a law that could move us closer to nuclear war with Russia.
Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn) has introduced the Russian Aggression Prevention Act (RAPA) bill in the U.S. Congress. The bill “provides major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova for purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services. In essence RAPA would make Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova de facto members of NATO. Under the provisions of this bill, the new non-NATO major ally status would allow the U.S. to move substantial weapons, supplies and troops into these countries without having to seek NATO approval. This is a crucial point because Germany has been strongly opposed to the U.S. request to make these countries official members of NATO.
When the Soviet Union fell, the Western powers make a deal with Russia and her neighbors. In return for removing nuclear weapons from countries in the old Soviet Union, NATO would not take countries that neighbored Russia in Easter Europe into NATO. This was also part of the negotiations to scale down the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Some members of the U.S. Congress would like to bring NATO to Russia’s doorstep. We here in the U.S. cannot imagine what it was like to be invaded by a neighboring country and have millions of its citizens slaughtered. Russia is understandably paranoid.
The civil war in Ukraine is already close to becoming a Ukraine-Russian war. If the U.S. moves troops and serious military hardware such as the Ballistic Missile Defense system into Ukraine, this will be seen as a major provocation by Russia. If Ukraine and Russia go to war in such a circumstance, it will be very difficult for the U.S. not to be drawn into the conflict. A state of war between the U.S. and Russia would result in nuclear forces in both countries going to high alert. Both countries have plans for pre-emptive nuclear strikes on the other country if it appeared that a nuclear attack was imminent. The possibilities for misunderstandings and accidents triggering a full scale nuclear war would be raised. As I have said often before, a full scale nuclear war would be the end of human civilizations and lead to the death of billions of people. This bill is a very bad idea that would make a dangerous international situation much worse.
Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn)
My Geiger counter is in the shop for maintenance.
(Pease read Part 1 if you haven’t.)
Yesterday, I began a blog post about complaints over the plans that Southern California Edison has to select a vendor and purchase spent fuel canisters and dry casks in the near future for storing the fuel being removed from the San Onofre reactors. This is the second part of my post on this topic.
The NRC is working on developing an aging management plan because new regulations require spent fuel temporary storage systems to last at least one hundred years. Previously, they only required that spent fuel temporary storage systems last at least twenty years because they expected there to be a permanent geological repository in the U.S. for spent nuclear fuel. Since the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository project was canceled in 2009, it is now estimated that there will not be such a repository in the U.S. before 2050. The NRC is not issuing any license renewals at nuclear plants until this aging issue is resolved. However, they are going to allow the NUHOMS 32PTH2 canisters that SCE is considering to be included under the existing license for the San Onofre plant.
The NRC has not extended licenses past twenty years for what is known as current high burnup nuclear fuel because not enough is known about storing and transporting this type of fuel. It is more than twice as radioactive and much hotter than low burnup fuel that used to be burned in U.S. reactors. The NRC has been allowing the use of this high burnup fuel without requiring research to show that it is safe to store and transport. The protective cladding material that forms the tube that contains the nuclear fuel is vulnerable to heat and can become brittle and crack which increases the risk of radiation release.
There are currently twenty four fuel assembly canisters at the San Onofre plant. They are what are called Failed Fuel Cans. The NRC has required that current spent fuel temporary storage systems be designed so that damaged fuel assemblies can be removed and placed in other storage. The thirty six new fuel assembly canisters of the NUHOMS DSC-PTH2 type that SCE is considering are not designed for easy removal of spent fuel like the existing canisters at San Onofre. There are a lot of damaged fuel assemblies at the San Onofre plant that need to be dealt with.
The NRC has been considering allowing spent fuel from spent fuel temporary storage systems to be returned to a spent fuel pool if the temporary storage fails. That will not be possible at San Onofre because SCE plans to demolish the spent fuel pool there after the nuclear fuel has been moved to a spent fuel temporary storage system. ROSE has pointed out that spent nuclear fuel needs to spend years cooling in the spent fuel pool before it can be moved to a spent fuel temporary storage system. They say that this means that selection of a spent fuel temporary storage system can be delayed while better designs are being considered and that there is no need for SCE to purchase a system now. ROSE wants SCE to delay their selection and purchase of spent fuel canisters and to reopen their bidding process for a spent fuel temporary storage system. Considering the dangers in the use of the old style temporary storage systems, ROSE’s suggestion make a lot of sense.
Cast iron type spent nuclear fuel canister:
New report says that Fukushima might be gaining traction as the worst case of nuclear pollution in history. enenews.com
Poland will reduce dependence on brown and black coal by introducing nuclear power and renewables, according a draft energy policy to 2050 released for consultation. world-nuclear-news.org
My Geiger counter is in the shop for maintenance.
I have often mentioned the lack of storage for spent nuclear fuel rods in the United States. It is estimated that all the spent fuel pools in U.S. reactors will be full of spent fuel within five years. If new storage is not created for spent fuel, the reactors will have to be shut down. I have also blogged about the steam generator fiasco at the California San Onofre nuclear power plant that has resulted in the permanent shut down of the reactors at that plant. Although that plant is no longer generating electricity, they still have to decide exactly what to do about the spent fuel.
The Chief Nuclear Officer at the San Onofre plant says that Southern California Edison (SCE) has allocated over four hundred million and is going to decide either this month or next month on which vendor to purchase spent nuclear fuel canisters and dry casks from. A public citizen group called Residents Organized for a Safe Environment (ROSE) is pressuring the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) to delay funding the construction of spent fuel storage at the San Onofre power plant until critical issues are resolved.
ROSE pointed out that the design of the spent nuclear fuel canisters and dry casks that SCE is considering may fail within thirty years according to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The stainless steel in the walls of the proposed canisters is from one half to five eights of an inch thick and is especially vulnerable to corrosion in costal environments. These canisters are not inspected once they are inserted into the concrete housing. The stainless steel canisters do not block gamma radiation. It is extremely difficult to remove one of them to check for aging and cracking. The NRC is going to give the nuclear industry five years to develop such technology but only one canister will have to be monitored at each nuclear power plant every five years. The concrete structures called dry casks housing the canisters also have aging issues that are exacerbated by the coastal climate.
ROSE has suggested that SCE should use ductile cast iron canisters in place of stainless steel canisters because of the effects of the coastal environment . There is a nickel coating inside of cast iron canisters and an epoxy resin coating on the outside. They are not prone to corrosion and cracking and do not require the concrete dry cask that is required to house the stainless steel canisters. Instead of the fraction of an inch thickness of the stainless steel, cast iron canisters can be up to twenty inches thick.
This cast iron type of canister is in wide use in the rest of the world for storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel. However, the U.S. nuclear industry rejected it in favor of stainless steel because of the greater cost of cast iron. With the current lower costs for ductile cast iron, the difference in price between stainless steel and cast iron is much smaller. These cast iron canisters have pressurized lid monitoring which can detect gas build up and increases in temperature.
(See Part Two)
NUHOMS stainless steel spent nuclear fuel canister design being considered by SCE: