The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Today I am going to blog about problems with the military handling of nuclear materials in the United Kingdom.
In 2010, the MoD reported that there had been sixteen crashed involving U.K. nuclear submarines since 1988 with half of the accidents occurring in the waters off Scotland. Critics in Parliament demanded to know why there were repeated groundings of nuclear submarines and suggested that the MoD was not learning from its failures. In addition to the submarine crashes, the report discusses the handling of over two hundred Trident warheads which has been “plagued by confusion, shortcomings and non-compliance with regulations” according to MoD internal safety agents.
The reports were produced between 2005 and 2006 and the MoD had been trying to keep them secret. They cover dozens of problems “ensuring the safety of the weapons program.” The worst problems were at the Faslane nuclear submarine base and the Coulport nuclear bomb storage facility in Argyll. Shortage of resources were mentioned as well as “an apparent lack of understanding of the needs of regulators.” There were difficulties with replacing key warhead components and the use of a controversial lift system for raising submarines out of the water.
A recent report from the Ministry of Defence mentions on two hundred and sixty two safety incidents that have been reported at the Clyde naval bases on the coast of Scotland over the past five years. The reported incidences occurred at the Faslane nuclear submarine base and the Coulport nuclear bomb storage facility in Argyll. More than three quarters of the incidence involve human error. Although the MoD report does not give details on the incidences, previous reports have mentioned radioactive contamination, small fires, and failure to follow safety rules. The report does not give any numbers for incidences directly involving nuclear weapons. However, the report does mention “false alarms and systems failures” with an “environmental hazard detection system” for the warheads.
The Scottish National Party (SNP) which supports independence from the United Kingdom and is strongly opposed to nuclear weapons jumped on the report to bolster their call for the removal of the Clyde naval bases from Scotland. A spokesman said that the report was “chilling” and “shocking.” He said that it showed that the report showed that safety at the naval bases was not sufficient. He criticized plans to increase the number of submarines at Faslane by seven Astute-class subs as irresponsible in view of their inability to safely deal with the submarines that are already based there. If Scotland votes for independence, the SNP will demand that the Clyde naval base be shut down and all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons infrastructure be removed from Scottish soil. The MoD has warned that that would be very difficult.
United Kingdom Astute Class nuclear submarine:
Last week I wrote a couple of posts about the public presentation by representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy and Washington State with respect to the cleanup of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. In the blog posts, I mentioned that there was a serious legal conflict between the U.S. DoE and Washington over the cleanup of all the radioactive wastes polluting the site from decades of work on nuclear weapons for the United States arsenal.
In 2010, a Federal Court consent decree had set strict milestones for the cleanup. Since then, the U.S. DoE has said that the required actions could not be carried out on the required schedule because of the scientific complexity of the situation at Hanford. It proposed that the hard deadlines for specific action in the consent decree be replaced with “future unspecified milestones to be set on an open-ended rolling basis.” Washington State had been threatening to take the U.S. DoE back to court to force the U.S. DoE to carry out the work on the schedule set by the court. Washington State also proposed a new set of deadlines and demanded that all cleanup work be carried out by 2047.
On Friday of last week, the State and the Federal government rejected each other’s proposals. The U.S. DoE proposal had requested the elimination of many of the deadlines included in the Federal Court decision. This was totally unacceptable to the State and the State rejected the U.S. DoE proposal. Later in the day, the U.S. Justice Department sent a letter to the Washington State Department of Ecology. In the letter, the Justice Department rejected the Washington State proposal to accelerate the cleanup. The U.S. DoE had said that the Washington State proposal ignored technical realities and budget problems at the U.S. DoE.
One major problem at Hanford concerns the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) which I have covered in previous blog posts. The Waste Treatment Plant is intended to incorporate the waste from the underground tanks in glass logs which will then be buried. Construction on the plant was halted because the original design did not take into accounts corrosion in the pipes and hydrogen gas buildup. There has been extensive redesign for the plant including the creation of whole new processing stages and alternative processing pathways. The consent decree requires that the WTP be fully operational by 2022.
The U.S. DoE has said that ” setting deadlines that likely will be missed creates false expectations in the community and with the State, and erodes confidence in the cleanup work.” The cleanup has been in process for decades and has been repeatedly plagued by incompetence, illegal behavior on the part of U.S. DoE, accidents, lies and missed deadlines. At this point, I don’t think that there is much confidence left in the community and the State. Washington State has the option of invoking a forty day process of negotiation as provided for in the consent decree. If an agreement between U.S. DoE and the State of Washington cannot be reached in such negotiations, then Washington State may request that the Federal Court order the U.S. DoE to adhere to the State proposal. Given the history of Hanford, I would not be surprised to see this case back in Federal Court.
