A proposed nuclear plant in Utah has withstood a significant legal challenge as a judge upheld the validity of water rights for the project. nuclearstreet.com

The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
My last blog about the history of the North Korean nuclear program ended with the collapsed of the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea in 2002. Following the collapse that was caused by both sides accusing the other of violating the terms of the Framework, North Korea threw out the U.N. inspectors and proceed to ramp up its development of plutonium production and nuclear weapons. The U.S. and South Korea held military exercises as North Korea threatened pre-emptive strikes on U.S. forces in South Korea and fired missiles into the Sea of Japan to intimidate other nations.
During 2003, there were many diplomatic initiatives to try to improve relations between N.K. and the rest of the world. There were bilateral talks between the U.S. and N.K. The mainland Chinese government was approached to try to get them to exert leverage on N.K. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Russia and other nations tried to establish a dialog with N.K. N.K.’s major focus was to demand major concessions from the U.S. before it would consider ending its nuclear weapons program. Six party talks including N.K., the U.S., Russia, China, Japan and South Korea were held in Beijing.
During 2004, the diplomatic efforts continued with new rounds of the six party talks as N.K. continues to produce plutonium and issue belligerent threats. They say that they need nuclear weapons to deter the threat of U.S. and S.K. military action. In the fall of 2004, N.K. claims that it has turned plutonium from reprocessed fuel rods into nuclear weapons.
Diplomatic talks, threats, claims of breakthroughs, demands that the U.S. supply the power reactors that were promised in the Agreed Framework, demands for food, and N.K. work on its own reactors and plutonium processing continue in 2006. An estimate is published that N.K. may have enough plutonium for a dozen nuclear bombs. N.K. test fires a number of missiles including a new long range version. In the fall of 2006, N.K. states its intention to test fire a nuclear bomb. The U.S. says that “it can have a future or it can have these weapons but not both. The U.N. Security Council issues a statement calling for N.K. not to test a bomb. N.K proceeds with an underground test as registered by seismographs. There was some debate about whether the test was a failure or a fraud.
The six party talks continued into 2007 without producing any significant results. N.K. maintains its belligerent attitude while participating in the talks. N.K. finally agrees to shut down the Yongbyon reactor in exchange for being supplied with fifty thousand metric tons of fuel oil. Following the delivery of six thousand tons of fuel oil from S.K., N.K announces that it was shutting down the Yongbyon reactor. IAEA inspectors confirm that the reactor has been shut down as more fuel oil is delivered to N.K. The U.S., Russia and China send inspectors to the Yongbyon site to study the best way to permanently shut down fuel reprocessing and plutonium production.
2008 saw N.K. supplying documentation on its nuclear operations to the U.S. and allies. A U.S. State Department expert on the Koreas, managed to obtain thousands of pages of classified N.K. documents on their nuclear program. N.K. destroys a cooling tower for Yongbyon’s main reactor. It appeared that progress was finally being made in ending N.K.’s nuclear weapons program.
Yongbyon cooling tower destroyed:
Today I am going to continue blogging about North Korea’s nuclear program. Yesterday, I covered their history from the beginning in 1956 with help from the Soviet Union up to the end of the Cold War in 1991. Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center is the main location for nuclear research in N.K. It contains facilities for fabricating nuclear fuel, a small research reactor, a facility for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel and a reprocessing facility to recover uranium and plutonium from spent fuel. These are the requirements for what is called the Magnox nuclear reactor fuel cycle. Magnox is a name for a particular type of magnesium alloy that is used as the cladding material for fuel rods of unenriched uranium fuel. It is a old design that is inefficient and requires fuel rods that are expensive to manufacture. The spent fuel cannot be stored for long but it is easier to reprocess. The construction of a fifty megawatt Magnox reactor began in 1985 and the construction of a two hundred megawatt reactor at Taechon also began in the late 1980s.
N.K. had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 which included granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permission to inspect its nuclear facilities. N.K.’s first report on nuclear activities was submitted to the IAEA in 1992. The IAEA began inspections of nuclear facilities in N.K. It was determined that the North Korean report did not match the findings of the IAEA with respect to plutonium stockpiles. The IAEA requested permission to visit two additional sites which N.K. denied. The IAEA reported the violation of the NPT to the U.N. Security Council. In March of 1993, N.K. declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The U.N. countered with Resolution 285 calling for N.K. to reconsider withdrawing from the NPT and to allow the two contested sites to be inspected. In June of 1993, N.K. announced that it was “suspending effectuation” of its withdrawal from the NPT.
The United States and N.K. signed the “Agreed Framework” in 1994 after N.K. requested bilateral negotiations with the United States. The Framework was intended to put a stop to the indigenous nuclear power program in N.K. and to make nuclear proliferation more difficult. N.K. would allow IAEA inspectors back. Spent nuclear fuel stockpiles in N.K. would be disposed of instead of being reprocessed. The original five megawatt research reactor and both Magnox reactors under construction would be replaced by light water reactors financed by South Korea by 2003. In the meantime, the U.S. would supply oil for heating and electricity production. The U.S. and N.K. would work towards resolution of all political and economic dispute. The U.S. stated that it would not use nuclear weapons on N.K. N.K. suspended work on the two new reactors under construction.
Congress refused to reverse economic sanctions and restore diplomatic relations as promised by the White House. Bids were not tendered for construction of the light water reactors until 1998 which frustrated N.K. Construction of the light water reactors started in 2000 but fell behind schedule and work was halted in 2002. The U.S. was concerned that N.K. was continuing its nuclear weapons program covertly. Following a report by the CIA that N.K. was installing centrifuges to enrich uranium in violation of the Framework, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State confronted N.K. The North Koreans claimed that no evidence had been presented and denied the claims of the U.S. With both sides hurtling charges at each other, the Framework fell apart in 2002.
Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center: