The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • Nuclear Reactors 79 – Nuclear Breeder Reactors20 – History of Japanese Breeder Reactors 2

              My recent posts have been about breeder reactors which generate more fissile material than they consume. There is renewed global interest in breeder reactors for the production of nuclear fuel and the destruction of nuclear waste. Today’s post is  second in a series about the history and current status of breeder reactors in Japan.

                 The sodium spill and subsequent fire at the Monju reactor in 1995 had a major impact on the Japanese fast breeder reactor program. A special committee was appointed following the accident to review fast breeder plans. The committee was made up of nuclear and non-nuclear experts. It decided that while fast breeder technology should continue to be pursued, it should no longer be considered the ultimate goal of the Japanese nuclear program. They also called for periodical reviews of fast breeder R& D which would consider the practicality of the technology and realistic estimates of the costs of such reactors. It was also suggested that other nuclear alternatives to fast breeder reactors be studied. The JAEC Long Term Plan for the year 2000 took into account these recommendations.

              The Long Term Plan published by JAEC in 2005 was renamed the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy. It formally announced a target for commercial fast breeder reactors of 2050. The Japanese government agency in charge of energy took the Framework and created the Nuclear Energy Plan which included explicit policy measures which would support the realization of the 2005 Framework. The Plan included a call for the construction of a demonstration fast breeder reactor to be operational by 2025. There was also a section of the Plan that compared different types of reactor designs and fuel cycle technologies. Sodium cooling and what is called “PUREX” or “wet” fuel reprocessing were chosen as the most economical processes. These estimates were not based on engineering cost estimates but rather were targets chosen to come as close as possible to matching the cost of energy produced by light water reactors. To make the Plan more attractive, it was suggested that the government and utilities share the cost of a demonstration fast breeder reactor. The utilities would not be asked to contribute more than the cost of a light water reactor.

             The budget for fast breeder research was increased for the first time in a decade in 2007. The new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership created by the United States contributed to this new support for fast breeder technology in Japan. There are several reasons that Japan has continued to support fast breeder research even though their research programs has not gone smoothly or been very productive. The Japanese government has created a series of institutions devoted to fast breeder technology and it is not always easy to dismantle government agencies. The Japanese government pours money into areas that host nuclear facilities. The extra income becomes very important in the economics of such regions and there would be great public resistance to the closing of such facilities. Finally, it has been difficult for the government to find suitable locations for permanent nuclear waste repositories. Since the spent fuel pools of Japan’s nuclear reactors are being filled to capacity, the ability of fast breeders to burn reprocessed spent nuclear fuel has become more attractive.

              The JAEC has been very supportive of nuclear research and development and fast breeder reactors. Given that it has made fast breeder reactors an import priority in Japanese nuclear development plans, it is improbable that the government will withdraw its support for such projects any time soon.

               On the other hand, Japan currently has a lot of separated plutonium and will have even more due to the new Rokkasho reprocessing plant. There is little reason to build breeder reactors that produce plutonium. There are issues involving the choice of reprocessing technologies that may make breeder reactors less attractive. There are big question about how much breeder reactors will ultimately cost and exactly how the costs will be distributed between government and utilities. And, finally, Japan is working to increase the life span of light water reactors to sixty to eighty years. If this is achieved, the need for fast breeder reactors in 2050 may disappear. The lost of support for the GNEP by President Obama and the U.S. Congress may also diminish Japanese enthusiasm for the pursuit of fast breeder technology.

    Monju fast breeder reactor:

     

  • Geiger Readings for October 31, 2013

    Ambient office = 141 nanosieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = 112 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 85 nanosieverts per hour

    Apple from Top Foods =  155 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 101 nanosieverts per hour

    Filtered water = 94 nanosieverts per hour

  • Nuclear Reactors 78 – Nuclear Breeder Reactors 19 – History of Japanese Breeder Reactors 1

              My recent posts have been about breeder reactors which generate more fissile material than they consume. There is renewed global interest in breeder reactors for the production of nuclear fuel and the destruction of nuclear waste. Today’s post is the first in a series about the history and current status of breeder reactors in Japan.

              In 1956, the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) published the first Japanese Long Term Plan for nuclear energy. In the plan, fast breed reactors with their closed fuel cycle were chosen for serious research and development (R & D). Light water reactors from the United States were chosen for power generation.

              Another Long Term Plan produced by JAEC in 1967 stated that fast breeder reactors should be the basis for future nuclear power generation. The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) was created as the main R & D organization to pursue fast breeder reactor technology. The intention of the plan was to build an experimental fast breeder reactor in the 1970s and to have the first commercial fast breeder power reactor operational by the end of the 1980s.

              The experimental Joyo fast breeder reactor was the first such reactor built in Japan. It went critical in 1977 at the Nuclear Cycle Development Institute’s Oarai Engineering Center. A new core design was installed and went critical in 1982. In the same year, there was R & D on reprocessing spent fuel from Joyo. Joyo was a test system for irradiating fuels and construction materials from 1983 to 2000. Then a third core design was installed and the Joyo continues to operate.

              In light of problems with funding, design and construction of fast breeder reactors, in 1987 the JAEC pushed back the commercialization of fast breeder reactors to the 2030s and affirmed that light water reactors would be the source of commercial power generation for the near future.

               Monju is a fast breeder reactor prototype that was designed in parallel with Joyo  but due to construction problems, it did not go critical until 1994.  In late 1995, there was a severe sodium leak at in the Monju reactor that led to a fire when the sodium reacted with oxygen outside containment. The fire was so hot that steel structures melted. Unfortunately, PNC covered up the accident. When it was finally revealed, there was a serious backlash from the Japanese public.

               A plan to build a six hundred and sixty megawatt demonstration fast breeder reactor for commercial power generation was unveiled by Japan Atomic Power Company in 1994. After the problems and public concern with Monju, the demonstration reactor project was cancelled in the late 1990s.

             The Recycle Equipment Test Facility was constructed by PNC starting in 1995. It was the prototype reprocessing facility to extract fissile materials from spent fuel from Joyo. PNC worked with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the U.S. under a nuclear cooperation program between Japan and the U.S. The first phase of construction ended in the year 2000  but the expected completion date has not yet been announced.

             PNC repaired Monju and applied for a new license which was  granted in late 2002. Legal challenges to the granting of the new license resulted in a Japanese court reversing the original approval of the construction of the plant in 1983. After two years of appeals, the Japanese Supreme Court threw out the withdrawal of approval and ruled in favor of PNC restarting Monju. PNC intended to restart Monju in 2007 but it has still not been restarted.

            While the commitment of the Japanese government to the development of fast breeder reactors has remained firm, the funding for such reactors and the public support has declined steadily from the 1960s to the 2000s. The commercialization of fast breeder reactors is now projected to be in 2050s.

    Joyo experimental fast breeder reactor:

  • Geiger Readings for October 30, 2013

    Ambient outside = 53 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 93 nanosieverts per hour

    Apple from Top Foods =  135 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 128 nanosieverts per hour

    Filtered water = 111 nanosieverts per hour

  • Nuclear Reactors 77 – Nuclear Breeder Reactors 18 – History of Soviet-Russian Breeder Reactors 3

              My recent posts have been about breeder reactors which generate more fissile material than they consume. There is renewed global interest in breeder reactors for the production of nuclear fuel and the destruction of nuclear waste. Today’s post is the third in a series about the history and current status of breeder reactors in the Soviet Union and Russia.

              At the U.N. Millennium General Conference in 2000, Russian President Putin revealed his intentions to expand the fleet of Russian nuclear reactors. Although light water reactors were the primary focus,  work on fast breeder reactors was also part of the new program. The first stage of the fast breeder project was going to be the construction of a few reactors based on the BN-800 design. There were four goals for the fast breeder project:

                “1. Develop a closed uranium-plutonium fuel cycle;

                2. Produce chain-reacting uranium-233 from neutron capture in thorium

                blankets as a potential fuel for thermal-neutron reactors;

                3. Fission the minor transuranics, neptunium, americium and curium; and,

                4. Significantly reduce highly radioactive waste volume for a final geological

                repository.”

    In 2005, the Russian Duma received a proposal for the construction of ten fast breeder reactors to create fuel to replace diminishing uranium reserves in Russia.

               A lot of experiments were performed in Russia over the years to test fast breeder reactor design. Safety was a primary concern. After much work on the sodium cooling system, it was decided that the addition a secondary cooling loop was necessary. This made the cost of construction of the BN-600 about fifty percent more than a conventional light water reactor. The cost estimations for the BN-800 were around two and a half billion dollars which is about ten percent higher than the cost of a light water reactor. The cost of electricity generated by the BN-800 will be much greater than the cost of electricity generated by the light water reactors. Construction of the first BN-800 reactor started in 2006 but had continuing problems with funding. It was originally intended to replace the BN-600 which is slated to be shut off permanently in 2020. The BN-800 is still under construction with operation slated to begin in 2015.

              In 2010, the head of Russian state company Rosatom suggested an international cooperation program for fast breeder technology. “I would like to propose that the states concerned launch an international program of multilateral cooperation in the research and development of fast-breeder reactors, including safety concerns. Plans were outlined for a multifunctional fast breeder research reactor for “broad cooperation, both on a multilateral and bilateral basis” which could be built by 2017.

               In 2012, the BN-1200 fast breeder reactor was approved for construction at Beloyarsk. It will be based on the BN-800 design and it will replace the BN-600. Also in 2012, the Chinese contracted to buy two BN-800 units from the Russian company Rosatom. They are to be built in the city of Sanming in Fujian Province.

               Russia currently plans to construct eight fast breeder reactors and an advanced fuel reprocessing facility. This will allow Russia to become a source of fuel for the world’s nuclear reactors as the world’s production of uranium declines. While this will be beneficial for Russia it may not be so beneficial for the rest of the world. Russia has already reduced gas and oil supplies to European countries during international disputes. If Russia becomes the source of nuclear fuel for the world, it might decide to punish other countries by cutting off supplies of nuclear fuel.

    BN-800 reactor construction:

  • Geiger Readings for October 29 2013

    Ambient office = 117 nanosieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = 129 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 105 nanosieverts per hour

    Apple from Top Foods =  178 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 68 nanosieverts per hour

    Filtered water = 63 nanosieverts per hour

  • 409 – Nuclear Reactors 76 – Nuclear Breeder Reactors 17 – History of Soviet-Russian Breeder Reactors 2

       My recent posts have been about breeder reactors which generate more fissile material than they consume. There is renewed global interest in breeder reactors for the production of nuclear fuel and the destruction of nuclear waste. Today’s post is the second in a series about the history and current status of breeder reactors in the Soviet Union and Russia.

              Before the BN-350 reactor began operations in 1972, the Soviets were working on a second fast neutron reactor with a higher power capacity. This reactor was called the BN-600 because it was intended to deliver six hundred megawatts. The Soviets wanted to use their experience with the BN-350 early operations to help refine their design for the BN-600. The BN-350 and the BN-600 reactors were seen as prototypes that would lead to commercial fast breeder power reactors.  

               The BN-600 was designed with a second sodium cooling system between the primary core cooling system and the steam generator. The heat exchangers, the piping, the coolant pumps and the reactor all sit in a pool of liquid sodium. The fuel mixture for the BN-600 was uranium enriched to about twenty percent. The common fuel enrichment in the regular Soviet reactors was about four percent. There is no separate containment vessel for the whole system. During construction and testing up to 1997, there were twenty seven sodium leaks with fourteen sodium fires. There was damage to the plant but no fatalities. The reactor was put into full operation in 1980 at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Station.

               Design work on the next reactor in the series, the BN-800, began in 1983. It followed the designs for the BN-350 and BN-600 which had worked satisfactorily. After the Chernobyl disaster in 1987, the design for the BN-800 was completely revised. It was also revised extensively in the 1990s as standards for reactor design evolved. One major change between the BN-600 and the BN-800 had to do with the fuel mix. The BN-800 was going to burn natural uranium mixed with weapons grade plutonium from old warhead in a closed fuel cycle. They said that there was no intention to reprocess the fuel. The Soviet Union had planned to construct five BN-800s in the Urals. After the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the Soviet nuclear program went into decline.

              After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian economy was in serious trouble and could not afford to put money into new reactor construction. In addition, fast neutron reactors just could not compete economically with Russia’s light water and thermal neutron reactors for power generation. There were discovery of new deposits of high grade uranium in the Soviet client states during the 1960s and the 1970s that also reduced the interest in the development of fast neutron breeder reactors to supply nuclear fuel. In the 1990s, the prospect for commercial fast neutron breeder reactors being built in Russia faded.

    The Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Station: