Just how dangerous are the Fukushima leaks? Popularmechanics.com

Female astronauts have fewer opportunities to fly in space than men partially because of strict lifetime radiation exposure restrictions. space.com

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) announced today the commissioning of two secure radiological transportation vehicles as part of a broader cooperative effort to help combat nuclear and radiological terrorism in the Philippines and around the world. yournuclearnews.com

Dongfang Electrical Machinery Co. Ltd (DFEM), a major Chinese power generating equipment manufacturer, has completed construction of a 1,750 MW nuclear generator and started transporting it to a nuclear power plant in south China on Saturday. yournuclearnews.com

Ambient office = .107 microsieverts per hour

Ambient outside = .116 microsieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = .111 microsieverts per hour

Fresh ground coffee from specialty store=  .101 microsieverts per hour

Tap water = .126 microsieverts per hour

Filtered water = .110 microsieverts per hour

         My last three posts have dealt with the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project report on U.S. nuclear plant security and critical reactions to it. This post contains some of my thoughts on the report and nuclear plant security in the U.S.

         One of the problems with nuclear plant security involves the state of alertness of those providing security at nuclear plants. It is just not possible for human beings to maintain a state of hyper-vigilance for long periods of time. Recent reports of the failure of U.S. forces manning missile silos to carry out correct procedures suggest that over time, nuclear plant security could become lax.

        There are numerous reports of poor training, poor management and failure to follow safety protocols at U.S. Nuclear plants. Are we supposed to believe that nuclear plant security is immune to these staff problems? After all, these nuclear facilities are, for the most part, owned by corporations or utilities whose first priority is to raise profits and lower costs. Plant security is just another overhead cost to many of these owners.

         We are constantly reassured that government agencies are confident that nuclear plant security is adequate but government agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have been aware of situations where nuclear power plants have not adhered to government regulation and have let the situation slide or merely issued mild rebukes. How can we be so sure that the U.S. government will maintain proper vigilance over security measures at nuclear power plants?  

       The United States does not have the resources to protect every nuclear power plant against any possible attack. This is a sad but simple truth. Therefore, we choose the most vulnerable plants for the best protection that we think we can afford. As far as protection related to other critical infrastructure, there were attempts to improve security after 911 at chemical storage facilities that could also threaten millions of people if they were breached and the chemical industry lobbyists soon put a stop to those plans. I would not want to use the lack of security at such facilities as a point of comparison for nuclear plant security.      

        There is no doubt in my mind that a well-armed and well-trained force could seize control of a U.S. nuclear power plant regardless of the security that is now in place. Mortars, 50-caliber machine guns, shoulder-fired missiles, rocket propelled grenades, grenade launchers, armed drones and other heavy weapons could cut through nuclear plant security like a hot knife through butter. Once in control of a plant, terrorists could breach the containment vessel, institute a meltdown, and/or drain the spent fuel rod pool. Such action could release vast amounts of radiation. Considering how many nuclear plants are in heavily populated areas, millions of people could be under threat.

        

         Perhaps nuclear power plants are not so attractive to terrorists because the radiation that would spread out is invisible and the damage to lives can take years if the exposure does not kill immediately. Terrorists tend to prefer spectacular attacks where a lot of people are killed and maimed immediately, like the recent bombing of the Boston marathon. We can only be thankful that no terrorist group has yet had the weapons and the will to seize one of our nuclear plants.

Is Fukushima tainting Pacific salmon, one of Alaska’s most valuable resources? juneauempire.com

The Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant will cease electricity production by the end of next year and will then be decommissioned, Entergy has announced. world-nuclear-news.org

The Pilgrim nuclear plant shut down and multiple safety systems initiated Thursday when a problem with its feedwater pumps briefly caused the water level in the reactor to drop. nuclearstreet.com

Operators powered down unit 1 at the Salem nuclear plant in New Jersey Thursday because of a small leak in the reactor coolant system. nuclearstreet.com

Ambient office = .087 microsieverts per hour

Ambient outside = .118 microsieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = .111 microsieverts per hour

Sunrise Energy Bar from Costco =  .092 microsieverts per hour

Tap water = .157 microsieverts per hour

Filtered water = .122 microsieverts per hour

           In my last two posts, I talked about a new report from the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas that claimed that United States nuclear power plants are not safe from the threat of serious terrorist attacks. As might be expected, the reaction of the nuclear industry and its supporters was swift and negative.

            The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the nuclear industry trade association, quickly responded to the NPPP report. The NEI states that U.S. agencies such as the FBI and DHS agree that US nuclear power plants are the best defended facilities among the critical infrastructure of our country. They mention that the security staffing for nuclear power plants has grown by sixty percent since 911. Regular drills are held where mock attacks are staged to test nuclear power plant security. The NEI questions how terrorists could possibly remove fuel rods from a reactor or spent fuel pool and make off with them. A final point is made that a major terrorist incursion into the United States is the responsibility of the U.S. military forces and not something that an electrical power plant can be expected to deal with. These are all valid points.

           In response to the NEI statements, it sounds good to say that they are the best defended of the U.S. critical infrastructure but that does not address how well defended other infrastructure is. If the general level of infrastructure security is poor, then just because the nuclear power plant security is better does not mean that it is adequate. They also fail to mention that not all plants have equal protection. In addition, while they stage mock attacks to test security, it is impossible to stage real severe attacks that could overwhelm defenses. While they discount the threat of theft of nuclear materials, they pass over the point in the report that sabotage of a nuclear power plant could endanger millions of people in the surrounding area.

            A Forbes blogger named Jim Conca soon added his opinion to the conversation about the NPPP report. He attacks the report itself by criticizing the source materials for the study and the lack of any contradictory points of view in the report. He also says that the press on the NPPP report implies that the Department of Defense requested this report when, in fact, the DoD just funds the NPPP at the University of Texas and does not get involved in the specifics of NPPP work such as the report. Conca says that there was no peer review and that the report relies on speculations of the principle author. He says that the authors confuse nuclear weapons with nuclear energy and have no direct knowledge of the actual security measures at such plants because that information is highly classified. These are all valid points.

           On the one hand, Conca criticizes the report for lacking sufficient source material and on the other hand he says that they could not possibly know about details of plant security because all that information is classified. If the details of plant security are so difficult to access, then how do Conca and the NEI really know that it is so good? Of course a report on possible attacks will have to include speculation. This report was generated by a group that is dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I don’t think that they are necessarily bound by peer review requirements and the need for a thorough review of contradictory positions. There are certainly many individuals and groups ready and willing to tell us how great nuclear plant security is.

What you need to know about Fukushima. Rense.com

Fukushima raises disturbing questions in Saudi Arabia. saudigazette.com.sa

The water tanks built to hold contaminated water at Fukushima are poorly constructed and are leaking. fukuleaks.org

A local government official in Fukushima says that the world will sue Japan for the radiation spreading from the Fukushima disaster. Enenews.com

Ambient office = .095 microsieverts per hour

Ambient outside = .065 microsieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = .051 microsieverts per hour

Banana from Costco =  .112 microsieverts per hour

Tap water = .120 microsieverts per hour

Filtered water = .112 microsieverts per hour

Tokyo Electric Power Co. on Friday started digging up soil tainted with highly radioactive water discharged from a storage tank at its Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant to test its radiation levels. japantimes.co.jp

Tritium contamination rose sharply in a single week in seawater off the Fukushima plant. ajw.asahi.com

Two weeks ago the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, promised that his government would take a more active role in Fukushima cleanup, but questions have been raised over how seriously he has taken that pledge. nytimes.com

Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s revelation that massive amounts of radioactive water are flowing into the Pacific further raised fears about the harm to marine life. japantimes.co.jp

Ambient office = .080 microsieverts per hour

Ambient outside = .113 microsieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = .065 microsieverts per hour

Frozen farmed salmon from Costco =  .094 microsieverts per hour

Tap water = .088 microsieverts per hour

Filtered water = .083 microsieverts per hour