Workers have shut down a nuclear reactor in southern New Jersey after a leak was detected in the containment building. therepublic.com
Should Fukushima’s radioactive water be dumped at sea? newscientist.com
The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Ambient office = .054 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .096 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .087 microsieverts per hour
Dried blueberries from Costco = .088 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .089 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .076 microsieverts per hour
Yesterday, I blogged about a new report on U.S. reactor security by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas. In the report, the authors said that they were concerned that the U.S. reactors and other nuclear facilities were not secure against a major terrorist attack on the scale of 911. Reactor security is currently based on something called “design basis threats.(DBT)” Today, I am going to dig into what that means. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines DBT as “a basis for designing safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material” based on the perceived capabilities of adversaries.
The first concern mentioned in the official definition of DBT is “radiological sabotage.” Here the issue is the possibility that attackers might be able to reach and disable or destroy critical equipment in a nuclear facility that might result in the release of massive amounts of radiation.
To prevent sabotage, facilities must be protected against one or more attackers attempting entry by violence or stealth at one or more points. The attackers are assumed to be well trained, ready to kill or be killed and knowledgeable enough to recognize equipment and facilities that are important targets. They may have assistance from staff inside the plant in the form of information or active assistance in gaining entry. They could have both short range and long range automatic weapons. They will probably be carrying tools and explosive that will allow them to breach internal barriers. They will have land and/or water vehicles to carry them and their supplies.
There is also danger of internal sabotage by staff, land vehicle bomb attacks, waterborne vehicle bomb attacks and/or cyber attacks on the facilities’ computer systems. These other threats may or may not be coordinated with an external assault.
The other primary concern of the DBT definition has to do with the possibility that attackers could breach facility security, obtain and carry off quantities of radioactive materials sufficient to create a dirty bomb or an actual nuclear bomb. The attackers are assumed to have the same set of capabilities, equipment, knowledge and vehicles detailed above in the section on sabotage.
The next portion of the definition deals with facilities such as reactors, laboratories and waste storage facilities that are covered by the security required in the DBT definition. Also included is specification of the types of nuclear materials covered by the DBT definition such as nuclear fuel, medical isotopes, and nuclear waste. Quantities that are significant and transportation issues are then mentioned.
Finally, the definition includes reference to the transfer and protection of DBT information to relevant parties, required notification of import and export of nuclear materials and the process of issuing certification of compliance with DBT regulations.
The DBT framework is a step in the right direction for nuclear reactors, laboratories and waste storage site security but a major attack involving hijacked planes, hijacked drones, cruise missiles, heavy artillery and/or other types of heavy weapons would not be stopped by the DBT framework. Of additional concern is the fact that the National Institute of Standards in Washington, D.C. which is only twenty five miles from the White House is not subject to DBT security.
Ambient office = .095 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .143 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .094 microsieverts per hour
Zante currants from local grocery store = .125 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .109 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .089 microsieverts per hour
There has always been a close connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. A great deal of the motivation for launching the commercial nuclear power industry was to provide more support for the nuclear weapons programs in the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As other nations developed their own nuclear weapons programs, a global movement arose to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Treaties were created to limit nuclear arsenals and to restrict the flow of nuclear weapons technologies and materials to countries which did not yet have their own nuclear weapons. As nuclear arsenals have been reduced in the major nuclear nations, other efforts have been aimed at insuring that facilities for fueling nuclear reactors are not used for refining weapons grade nuclear materials. There are stringent internationals sanctions against Iran right now over the fear that they are developing nuclear weapons under the guise of commercial power reactor development and fueling. Another fear is that terrorists might attack commercial nuclear reactors with the intent of causing a nuclear accident or stealing nuclear materials to be used for dirty bombs or refined into weapons grade materials.
The Nuclear Proliferation Preventing Project is a program at the University of Texas that “engages in research, debate, and public education to ensure that civilian applications of nuclear technology do not foster the spread of nuclear weapons to states or terrorist groups.” They receive funding from the Department of Defense. Recently they released a report on the vulnerability of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors to terrorist attacks. The report was released on August 15, 2013 and is titled Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Re-assessing the Current “Design Basis Threat” Approach.
The report concluded that all one hundred and seven commercial reactors in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Eleven reactors that were especially vulnerable were highlighted. Eight reactors that were said to be unprotected from attack by sea were Diablo Canyon in California, St. Lucie in Florida, Brunswick in North Carolina, Surry in Virginia, Indian Point in New York, Millstone in Connecticut, Pilgrim in Massachusetts, and the South Texas Project. In addition, the three U.S. commercial reactors that are fuelled with nuclear weapons grade uranium were also said to be particularly vulnerable. These three reactors are located at the University of Missouri in Columbia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the National Institute of Standards in Washington, D.C.
The report made reference to the 911 attack of 2001. The authors charge that none of the commercial reactors in the U.S. are protected against an attack of the scale of 911. It is thought that the 911 hijackers considered flying a plane into the Indian Point Reactor near New York City but decided against it because they were certain that such an important target would be protected by anti-aircraft missiles. Fortunately for citizens on New York City and surrounding area, the hijackers were mistaken.
In general, U.S. commercial reactors are designed and staffed against smaller scale attacks known as “design basis threats”. Some are better protected that others which are considered to be less attractive to attack or less dangerous. However, those protecting the reactors don’t really know exactly how terrorist would evaluate potential targets and it is hard to know exactly what harm a particular reactor attack could cause. The report recommends that all U.S. commercial reactors be hardened against the maximum credible terrorist threat.
Uranium miners face new hurdles as Fukushima disaster worsens. newsdaily.com
Fukushima Diary author invited to participate in BBC radio program on Fukushima and then was given 0 minutes to talk on the air. fukushima-diary.com
A public meeting is planned to discuss the eventual decommissioning of Three Mile Island reactors. stateimpact.npr.org
Ambient office = .112 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .137 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .123 microsieverts per hour
Mango from local grocery store = .103 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .081 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .066 microsieverts per hour
I have expressed concerns about the way that the United States Department of Energy has handled accidents and other problems involving nuclear materials. Past blogs have detailed their lack of transparency, dishonesty, incompetence and violations of regulations and laws at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in the State of Washington. Today I am going to talk about the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).
The Idaho National Laboratory is located near the town of Idaho Falls in Eastern Idaho. This federal research facility was first opened in 1949 to test nuclear reactors. The facility was under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission until 1977. In 1977, when President Carter created the Department of Energy, the facility was named the Idaho National Laboratory. In 1997, the Laboratory was renamed the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory but is still often referred to as the Idaho National Laboratory. Over fifty different experimental reactors have been built and tested at the Laboratory over the years since it was established.
In November of 2011, there was an accident at the Laboratory. Sixteen workers were removing plutonium fuel plates from storage containers and repackaging them. They found a couple of storage containers that had “unusual labels” that suggested that there might be something odd about the plates inside the containers but there was no warning of any danger. They opened the containers found that one of the plutonium plates inside the container had been wrapped in plastic and tape. When they unwrapped the plate, a black powder spilled out. All of them breathed in the black dust and seven of them got the powder on their skin. Testing verified that the black powder was highly toxic plutonium-239. A video camera was operating during the work and recorded all the events leading up to and following the release of the plutonium powder.
The INL announced that “none of the workers suffered adverse health effects” because of the plutonium exposure. However, the INL refused to release the records of the individual radiation exposure for the workers. Two of the workers later filed a law suit saying that they had suffered “symptoms of radiation poisoning including nausea, vomiting, confusion, diarrhea, and high blood pressure, which lasted for months” following the accident.
The INL also claimed that the video tape reveals that the workers had displayed noncompliance with proper procedures and that there were management deficiencies. The INL says that these facts absolve the Laboratory of any responsibility for what happened but they refuse to release the video tape to the lawyers of the workers who filed suit. The INL claims that there are privacy concerns but the plaintiffs lawyers counter that the need to know exactly what happened during the accident out-weight any such privacy concerns. The plaintiffs have filed a Freedom of Information suit to force the Laboratory to surrender the video tape.
This pattern of behavior by the DOE and the INL is all too familiar. The INL claims that no one was injured but there is serious evidence to the contrary. The INL says that the tape shows that the workers were at fault but will not allow anyone to see the tape. There is currently a major push to build new reactors being pushed by the nuclear industry and the U.S. government. However, it is obvious that we cannot trust the U.S. government to protect its citizens and natural environment from nuclear accidents that occur at its facilities and to honestly inform its citizens when accidents occur. And we cannot trust the U.S. government to provide the regulation and oversight necessary for the safe use of nuclear power.
China expresses “shock” as Japan’s nuclear crisis deepens. reuters.com
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) has reached a settlement with Nordion over its decision in 2008 to abandon the two MAPLE isotope production reactors before they began operation. world-nuclear-news.org
The cancellation of the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Repository by the NRC was a violation of law. mariettatimes.com