The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
Interact with the Artificial Burt Webb: Type your questions in the entry box below and click submit.
Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Ambient office = .093 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .078 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .088 microsieverts per hour
Fresh ground coffee from specialty store= .103 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .094 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .073 microsieverts per hour
I have written a number of posts about the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant and the political struggle in Vermont to close the plant. Vermont Yankee is located in Vernon, Vermont and its General Electric boiling water reactor generates about thirty five percent of the electricity used in Vermont. It began operating in 1972 and its original license expired in 2012. The NRC extended the plant license for an additional twenty years in 2011. Entergy, the company that owns the plant, has just announced that they are going to permanently close the plant in 2014.
In 2006, Entergy applied to the NRC for a twenty year license extension for the plant to continue to operate. One hundred demonstrators protested outside the offices of Entergy Nuclear and some were arrested. In 2007, part of the west cooling tower collapsed because of corrosion of bolts and rotting timber. The NRC concluded that there was no public danger and Entergy promised to do a better job of inspecting the facility. Governor Jim Douglas felt that the accident raised serious questions about the safety of the plant. A review by a panel appointed by the Vermont Senate concluded that the plant was being run safely and the NRC agreed.
In 2009, there was a claim that groundwater had been contaminated by the reactor. A spokesman for Entergy said that there was no contamination. In early 2010, tritium was found in the groundwater under the plant and the levels rose above the safe limit. By mid-February, a leak that had been found in some steam pipes was repaired. Cesium-137 was also found in the soil. It was thought to have been left over from fuel rod problems in the 1970s and was not considered a serious threat to public health. One hundred and fifty activists marched from Montpelier’s city Hall to the Vermont State House to present a petition of twelve thousand signatures in favor of closing Vermont Yankee.
In 2010, Entergy requested that Vermont issue a new state certificate of public good. One hundred and seventy five anti-nuclear activists marched one hundred and twenty six miles from Brattleboro to Montpelier to block the relicensing of the plant. The state legislature voted against even allowing the Vermont Public Service Board to consider issuing the state certificate to allow the plant to continue to operate. Peter Shumlin, a staunch opponent of Vermont Yankee was elected Governor of Vermont in November of 2010. Analysts have suggested that his opposition was a key factor in him winning a very close election. Right after the election, Entergy tried to find a buyer for Vermont Yankee.
In early 2011, tritium was again discovered at higher than normal levels in the groundwater and Governor Peter Shumlin expressed concern. In March of 2011, six hundred people spent a weekend protesting outside the Vermont Yankee plant.The NRC concluded review of Vermont Yankee in March and issued the requested twenty year extension. A month later, Entergy filed a lawsuit against Vermont to keep the plant in operation. Entergy won in court in 2012. An appeal to a higher court by Vermont failed in 2013. The court said that only the Federal government had the authority to determine whether or not the plant would be allowed to continue to operate.
Entergy has just announced that it is closing the Vermont Yankee plant permanently in 2014 because low cost natural gas from fracking was making the plant unprofitable to operate, especially in view of the rising maintenance and operating costs. As I have said in the past, ultimately, the end of nuclear power will be tied to fact that it is just not an economical power source. Unfortunately, public safety is a secondary concern to people who operate these plants.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant:
A CEO Bill Johnson said layoffs at the Bellefonte nuclear plant have begun under a plan announced this spring to put the reactor completion project on hold. nuclearstreet.com
Ambient office = .094 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .094 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .103 microsieverts per hour
Celery from Costco = .093 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .123 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .106 microsieverts per hour
There is nothing particularly mysterious about coincidences. Probability theory demands them. But every now and then, a specific coincidence seems to be amazingly appropriate. I just finished a series of post about the new report of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention from the University of Texas on nuclear power plant security and reactions to the report. Now I see a news item that fits so perfectly with my postings that I just had to add it to the series.
In criticisms of the report, it is pointed out that there are exercises called “force on force” where mock attacks are staged on nuclear power plants to test the security. This is all very good and well, but the problem is that the exercises are classified so it may be difficult to assess just how well the plant security performs. Nonetheless, we do know that a recent federal force on force exercise at a nuclear power plant did not work out so well for the plant operators.
Beaver Valley Nuclear Generating Station is about thirty miles north of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. It is operated by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Corporation which is a holding company for six utilities in that area. There are two Westinghouse pressurized water reactors in operation at Beaver Valley. The NRC defines two danger zones around nuclear reactors, a zone ten miles in diameter for danger of inhalation of airborne particles and a zone fifty miles in diameter where the danger is from drinking liquids and/or eating food that has been contaminated with radioactive particles. There are over three million people within the fifty mile danger zone of Beaver Valley.
FirstEnergy representatives have just requested and been granted a closed door meeting with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The topic of discussion will be the failure of the Beaver Valley security forces to perform adequately in a force on force mock attack held last April. During the force on force attack, a paramilitary squad tried to breach plant security and sabotage the reactor. “Armed with laser-type weapons, they attack at night, try to defeat plant security teams, breach walls and other barriers to invade the most protected areas of the plant, which contain the reactor, spent fuel storage and other critical equipment.” The task of the plant security is, of course, to prevent this attack from succeeding. Because the security and force on force exercises are classified, we don’t know exactly how the security team at Beaver Valley failed. We do know that the NRC considered the failure “serious” and is considering issuing a citation for the failure.
The NRC is currently carrying out its assessment of security and safety at all the nuclear power plants in the United States and will issue a report in September. It will be very interesting to review a plant by plant assessment of adequate security. The critics of the NPPP study on nuclear plant security bragged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of Homeland Security said that U.S. nuclear plant security was excellent and the public had nothing to fear from terrorists. I pointed out that nuclear plant operators have often been found to violate regulations with respect to safety and security. Right on cue, here is a news item about a nuclear plant security team that failed to protect the plant. I wonder how many more of the nuclear power plants in the U.S. have failed the force on force exercises.
Beaver Valley Nuclear Generating Station:
Ambient office = .107 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .116 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .111 microsieverts per hour
Fresh ground coffee from specialty store= .101 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .126 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .110 microsieverts per hour
My last three posts have dealt with the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project report on U.S. nuclear plant security and critical reactions to it. This post contains some of my thoughts on the report and nuclear plant security in the U.S.
One of the problems with nuclear plant security involves the state of alertness of those providing security at nuclear plants. It is just not possible for human beings to maintain a state of hyper-vigilance for long periods of time. Recent reports of the failure of U.S. forces manning missile silos to carry out correct procedures suggest that over time, nuclear plant security could become lax.
There are numerous reports of poor training, poor management and failure to follow safety protocols at U.S. Nuclear plants. Are we supposed to believe that nuclear plant security is immune to these staff problems? After all, these nuclear facilities are, for the most part, owned by corporations or utilities whose first priority is to raise profits and lower costs. Plant security is just another overhead cost to many of these owners.
We are constantly reassured that government agencies are confident that nuclear plant security is adequate but government agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have been aware of situations where nuclear power plants have not adhered to government regulation and have let the situation slide or merely issued mild rebukes. How can we be so sure that the U.S. government will maintain proper vigilance over security measures at nuclear power plants?
The United States does not have the resources to protect every nuclear power plant against any possible attack. This is a sad but simple truth. Therefore, we choose the most vulnerable plants for the best protection that we think we can afford. As far as protection related to other critical infrastructure, there were attempts to improve security after 911 at chemical storage facilities that could also threaten millions of people if they were breached and the chemical industry lobbyists soon put a stop to those plans. I would not want to use the lack of security at such facilities as a point of comparison for nuclear plant security.
There is no doubt in my mind that a well-armed and well-trained force could seize control of a U.S. nuclear power plant regardless of the security that is now in place. Mortars, 50-caliber machine guns, shoulder-fired missiles, rocket propelled grenades, grenade launchers, armed drones and other heavy weapons could cut through nuclear plant security like a hot knife through butter. Once in control of a plant, terrorists could breach the containment vessel, institute a meltdown, and/or drain the spent fuel rod pool. Such action could release vast amounts of radiation. Considering how many nuclear plants are in heavily populated areas, millions of people could be under threat.
Perhaps nuclear power plants are not so attractive to terrorists because the radiation that would spread out is invisible and the damage to lives can take years if the exposure does not kill immediately. Terrorists tend to prefer spectacular attacks where a lot of people are killed and maimed immediately, like the recent bombing of the Boston marathon. We can only be thankful that no terrorist group has yet had the weapons and the will to seize one of our nuclear plants.
Is Fukushima tainting Pacific salmon, one of Alaska’s most valuable resources? juneauempire.com
The Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant will cease electricity production by the end of next year and will then be decommissioned, Entergy has announced. world-nuclear-news.org
Operators powered down unit 1 at the Salem nuclear plant in New Jersey Thursday because of a small leak in the reactor coolant system. nuclearstreet.com
Ambient office = .087 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .118 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .111 microsieverts per hour
Sunrise Energy Bar from Costco = .092 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .157 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .122 microsieverts per hour
