Tritium contamination rose sharply in a single week in seawater off the Fukushima plant. ajw.asahi.com
Blog
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Geiger Readings for August 25, 2013
Ambient office = .080 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .113 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .065 microsieverts per hour
Frozen farmed salmon from Costco = .094 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .088 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .083 microsieverts per hour
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Geiger Readings for August 24, 2013
Ambient office = .054 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .096 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .087 microsieverts per hour
Dried blueberries from Costco = .088 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .089 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .076 microsieverts per hour
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Nuclear Weapons 38 – US Nuclear Plant Security Report 2 – Design Basis Threat
Yesterday, I blogged about a new report on U.S. reactor security by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas. In the report, the authors said that they were concerned that the U.S. reactors and other nuclear facilities were not secure against a major terrorist attack on the scale of 911. Reactor security is currently based on something called “design basis threats.(DBT)” Today, I am going to dig into what that means. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines DBT as “a basis for designing safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material” based on the perceived capabilities of adversaries.
The first concern mentioned in the official definition of DBT is “radiological sabotage.” Here the issue is the possibility that attackers might be able to reach and disable or destroy critical equipment in a nuclear facility that might result in the release of massive amounts of radiation.
To prevent sabotage, facilities must be protected against one or more attackers attempting entry by violence or stealth at one or more points. The attackers are assumed to be well trained, ready to kill or be killed and knowledgeable enough to recognize equipment and facilities that are important targets. They may have assistance from staff inside the plant in the form of information or active assistance in gaining entry. They could have both short range and long range automatic weapons. They will probably be carrying tools and explosive that will allow them to breach internal barriers. They will have land and/or water vehicles to carry them and their supplies.
There is also danger of internal sabotage by staff, land vehicle bomb attacks, waterborne vehicle bomb attacks and/or cyber attacks on the facilities’ computer systems. These other threats may or may not be coordinated with an external assault.
The other primary concern of the DBT definition has to do with the possibility that attackers could breach facility security, obtain and carry off quantities of radioactive materials sufficient to create a dirty bomb or an actual nuclear bomb. The attackers are assumed to have the same set of capabilities, equipment, knowledge and vehicles detailed above in the section on sabotage.
The next portion of the definition deals with facilities such as reactors, laboratories and waste storage facilities that are covered by the security required in the DBT definition. Also included is specification of the types of nuclear materials covered by the DBT definition such as nuclear fuel, medical isotopes, and nuclear waste. Quantities that are significant and transportation issues are then mentioned.
Finally, the definition includes reference to the transfer and protection of DBT information to relevant parties, required notification of import and export of nuclear materials and the process of issuing certification of compliance with DBT regulations.
The DBT framework is a step in the right direction for nuclear reactors, laboratories and waste storage site security but a major attack involving hijacked planes, hijacked drones, cruise missiles, heavy artillery and/or other types of heavy weapons would not be stopped by the DBT framework. Of additional concern is the fact that the National Institute of Standards in Washington, D.C. which is only twenty five miles from the White House is not subject to DBT security.
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Radiation Readings for August 23, 2013
Fukushima operator pleads for international help as the radiation crisis deepens. Rt.com
South Korea saw its already dwindling power reserves dip Wednesday afternoon as another reactor shut down unexpectedly. nuclearstreet.com
Nuclear deterrence is overrated because the real risks and costs of having these weapons, both monetary and human, far outweigh their security benefits. nuclear-news.net
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Geiger Readings for August 23, 2013
Ambient office = .095 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .143 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .094 microsieverts per hour
Zante currants from local grocery store = .125 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .109 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .089 microsieverts per hour
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Nuclear Weapons 37 – U.S. Nuclear Plant Security Report 1 – The Report
There has always been a close connection between nuclear weapons and nuclear power. A great deal of the motivation for launching the commercial nuclear power industry was to provide more support for the nuclear weapons programs in the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As other nations developed their own nuclear weapons programs, a global movement arose to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Treaties were created to limit nuclear arsenals and to restrict the flow of nuclear weapons technologies and materials to countries which did not yet have their own nuclear weapons. As nuclear arsenals have been reduced in the major nuclear nations, other efforts have been aimed at insuring that facilities for fueling nuclear reactors are not used for refining weapons grade nuclear materials. There are stringent internationals sanctions against Iran right now over the fear that they are developing nuclear weapons under the guise of commercial power reactor development and fueling. Another fear is that terrorists might attack commercial nuclear reactors with the intent of causing a nuclear accident or stealing nuclear materials to be used for dirty bombs or refined into weapons grade materials.
The Nuclear Proliferation Preventing Project is a program at the University of Texas that “engages in research, debate, and public education to ensure that civilian applications of nuclear technology do not foster the spread of nuclear weapons to states or terrorist groups.” They receive funding from the Department of Defense. Recently they released a report on the vulnerability of U.S. commercial nuclear reactors to terrorist attacks. The report was released on August 15, 2013 and is titled Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Re-assessing the Current “Design Basis Threat” Approach.
The report concluded that all one hundred and seven commercial reactors in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Eleven reactors that were especially vulnerable were highlighted. Eight reactors that were said to be unprotected from attack by sea were Diablo Canyon in California, St. Lucie in Florida, Brunswick in North Carolina, Surry in Virginia, Indian Point in New York, Millstone in Connecticut, Pilgrim in Massachusetts, and the South Texas Project. In addition, the three U.S. commercial reactors that are fuelled with nuclear weapons grade uranium were also said to be particularly vulnerable. These three reactors are located at the University of Missouri in Columbia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the National Institute of Standards in Washington, D.C.
The report made reference to the 911 attack of 2001. The authors charge that none of the commercial reactors in the U.S. are protected against an attack of the scale of 911. It is thought that the 911 hijackers considered flying a plane into the Indian Point Reactor near New York City but decided against it because they were certain that such an important target would be protected by anti-aircraft missiles. Fortunately for citizens on New York City and surrounding area, the hijackers were mistaken.
In general, U.S. commercial reactors are designed and staffed against smaller scale attacks known as “design basis threats”. Some are better protected that others which are considered to be less attractive to attack or less dangerous. However, those protecting the reactors don’t really know exactly how terrorist would evaluate potential targets and it is hard to know exactly what harm a particular reactor attack could cause. The report recommends that all U.S. commercial reactors be hardened against the maximum credible terrorist threat.
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Radiation Readings for August 22, 2013
Uranium miners face new hurdles as Fukushima disaster worsens. newsdaily.com
Fukushima Diary author invited to participate in BBC radio program on Fukushima and then was given 0 minutes to talk on the air. fukushima-diary.com
A public meeting is planned to discuss the eventual decommissioning of Three Mile Island reactors. stateimpact.npr.org
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Geiger Readings for August 22, 2013
Ambient office = .112 microsieverts per hour
Ambient outside = .137 microsieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = .123 microsieverts per hour
Mango from local grocery store = .103 microsieverts per hour
Tap water = .081 microsieverts per hour
Filtered water = .066 microsieverts per hour