The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • Geiger Readings for August 9, 2013

    Ambient office = .115 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .137 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = .083 microsieverts per hour

    Iceberg lettuce from Costco =  .150 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .074 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .054 microsieverts per hour

  • Radioactive Waste 52 – Santa Susana Field Laboratory History – Part 1 of 3

         Part 1 of 3     

                  I have been blogging a lot lately about problems with radioactive contamination in Seattle and at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Many other states have their own problems with contamination left over from nuclear research and processing. However, I was astonished at the casual attitude that governed the handling of nuclear materials and radioactive waste at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) near Santa Monica, California.

                 The Santa Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL) near Santa Monica, California was established by North American Aviation (NAA) in 1947 to test fire liquid fuel rocket engines for the U.S. space program. Virtually all the major rocket engines used in the space program were developed there. They also carried out research on nuclear reactor design and operation there between 1953 and 1980. NASA acquired some of the acreage from the US Air Force in 1973. The U.S. Department of Energy was also involved in work at SSFL.

                  Atomics International (AI) was created as a division of NAA for nuclear research at SSFL in 1955 and the rocket research was made a separate division under the name of Rocketdyne. Both divisions were sold to Rockwell International in 1955. Boeing bought Rockwell International in 1967.

                 AI carried out work on the first commercial nuclear power plant in Area IV of SSFL and they also worked on the first nuclear power source launched into space. A sodium reactor was constructed and operated from 1957 to 1964. It was the first commercial reactor to experience a core meltdown which was covered up by the U. S. Department of Energy (USDOE) for ten years. There were no accurate records of the disposal of the resulting radioactive materials and tons of sodium coolant disappeared. There was also a sodium burn pit where sodium contaminated objects were burned in the open air.  Twenty two of twenty seven men who worked the burn pit died of cancer. They fished in a terribly polluted pond and one of them once said that all seven wells on the site were contaminated. There were explosions at the burn pit.

                  Altogether, ten nuclear reactors operated at SSFL over the years along with fuel fabrication facilities for plutonium and uranium carbide. Fuel rods from the onsite reactors as well as rods from other U.S. government run reactors were cut apart and inspected in what is known as a “hot lab.” There were fires at some of the reactors. Partial meltdowns occurred three times between 1959 and 1971 where an undisclosed amount of radioactive materials were released into the environment. Four of the ten reactors suffered damage to large percentages of their fuel rods. Because the onsite reactors were experimental, there were no containment vessels enclosing the reactor buildings. Barrels of highly radioactive waste were set out and blown full of holes with rifles. There were many other incidences of criminal negligence in the handling of radioactive waste at SSFL over the years.

                In 2005, Rocketdyne was sold to Pratt Whitney but Boeing kept the SSFL facilities. In that same year, wildfires raged thought the area and damaged some of the SSFL buildings. Large amounts of radioactive contamination were released by the fires but that release was denied by the State of California. 2006, the facility was shut down permanently.

    Target Practice at SSFL:

  • Geiger Readings for August 8, 2013

    Ambient office = .117 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .087 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = .096 microsieverts per hour

    Hass avacado from Costco =  .138 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .097 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .094 microsieverts per hour

  • Radioactive Waste 51 – August Update on the Magnuson Park Cleanup

               Following the last meeting in July on the radium contamination at Magnuson Park, I was given to understand by the Washington State Department of Ecology (WSDOE) that the period for public comments was being extended to August 31st. However, I found out last Saturday that the Navy’s period for public comments had quietly ended the day before on July 26th. The WSDOE has shown reluctance to challenge the Navy and it looks like the Navy may just proceed with its original plan.

               There has been a lot of confusion over the past few months about who has the ultimate authority at Magnuson Park. It appears from Federal and State laws that WSDOE has to sign off on the cleanup. From what I have been told at the meetings I attended, WSDOE does not have the ability or maybe just the will to prevent the Navy from proceeding with their original plan absent environmental impact statements and other documents required by law or regulation. After the current cleanup is executed, WSDOE can go to the Navy and say that they have not done enough. Whether or not the Navy would respond with further work, only the future knows.

                The Navy has not investigated the gravel and soil around the drain pipe from the radium room. They have checked the pipe to the point where it enters other pipes that are in use and they claim to have found no radioactive contamination. However, it turns out that there are Navy records of tests on the drain pipe that do show radioactive contamination. They say that they couldn’t investigate the rest of the pipe out to Lake Washington because it was still in use and full of water. The drain pipes are surrounded by gravel to allow drainage at flanges between the sections of pipes. Water flowing through the pipes would carry most contamination away but contaminated water that leaked into the gravel would not move quickly through the soil so it should concentrate any contaminants near the pipe.  There has also been no testing of the soil at the bottom of Lake Washington where the pipe system drains into the lake at the boat dock and swimming area. The excuse given was that rocks had been dumped on the bottom and that made it very difficult to suck up silt for testing. There is also the problem of hot spots of strontium and cesium at the park. The Navy has no idea of where they came from and I have not heard of a plan to clean them up.

               The Navy has made reference to the US Department of Energy (USDOE) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cleaning up of part of the Hanford Nuclear Reservation to a level of fifteen milliRems in justifying its plan to clean up Magnuson Park to 15 milliRems. That could result in almost one extra cancer per one thousand park users from long term exposure. Apparently the Navy is not aware that the public was told in the recent Hanford 300 Area briefing in Seattle that the USDOE and EPA no longer considered the fifteen milliRems level to be safe for public use areas. The Federal standard is one cancer per ten thousand people and the WSDOE standard is one cancer per one hundred thousand people.

               The Navy has been displaying arrogance, a reluctance to share important information and a distinct lack of concern for Federal and State laws and regulations concerning such cleanups. Let us hope that the WSDOE holds the Navy to a higher standard in the cleanup of Magnuson Park than the Navy hold itself.

  • Geiger Readings for August 7, 2013

    Ambient office = .087 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .077 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = .077 microsieverts per hour

    Red seedless grape from Costco =  .137 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .072 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .048 microsieverts per hour

  • Radioactive Waste 50 – USDOE Hanford 300 Area – Part 4 of 4

    Notes on public meeting held at the Seattle University Heights Center on July 31, 2013 by the United States Department of Energy (USDOE) at Hanford to explain planned cleanup of Hanford 300 Area and solicit public comment.

    Part 4 of 4

              I mentioned that I had worked with the Yakima Indian Nation around 1980 on finding a nuclear contractor to help them monitor the Hanford cleanup and that USDOE were still fumbling around trying to clean up the mess thirty years later. I said that the USDOE at Hanford had been dishonest, incompetent and had repeatedly broken the law. I mentioned the mess with the leaking tanks of waste and the vitrification plant project that had to be halted because of poor design. I pointed out that after all these years they are still not sure of exactly what is buried under Hanford and what other surprises like the rising uranium levels might be waiting for us down the road. I insisted that five years was too long to wait to see if their wonderful solution worked and that the situation needed to be monitored constantly. There were echoes of the Magnuson Park arguments with respect to the safe levels to leave in the soil. I suggested that the USDOE and the EPA should have a chat with the Navy and point out that they didn’t believe that the level the Navy wants to leave at Magnuson Park was safe for human beings. I finally said that I had no confidence in their planning, their execution and their honesty with respect to this cleanup plan.

              Representative Gerry Pollet was the last person who had signed up to comment. He went over some of the important issues such as the safe level of radiation after a cleanup. While the Hanford rep insisted that they were working at the one cancer in ten thousand level, Gerry pointed out that their published documents still had the eight cancers in ten thousand level. He said that the state planned to permanently raise the level of Columbia and that there was no mention of the problem of more uranium being released by the higher level. There are rules about having industrial levels closer than two hundred feet from a recreation use riverbank and yet the designated industrial area in the 300 Area was much closer than that. He also took issue with the idea that the only way to control the dust and insure the safety of the workers would be to spay large amounts of water on the ground. He said that there were other ways of controlling dust that would not result in washing more uranium into the soil and he asked why none of them had been mentioned or explored. He also complained that the definition of the industrial area was much too broad and covered parts of the 300 Area that were not eligible.  He asked about a consultation with state officials that the Hanford people were not able to provide. He remarked that the EPA had made earlier statements with respect their authority to override USDOE plans at Hanford and that he was disappointed that the EPA had apparently abandoned their position and accepted the USDOE plans.  In closing, he insisted that this plan was not well-thought out and that it should be seriously reconsidered and revised before implementation. He lamented the fact that the Washington State Department of Ecology was not participating in the meeting other than as moderator and expressed the hope that the WSDOE would step in and exert their legal authority with respect to the clean up. He also said that the Hanford USDOE plan failed to meet state legal standards as required by Federal law.

            I got a real sense of déjà vu all over again as I watched the meeting proceed. Just as at the Magnuson Park meeting, a department of the Federal Government failed to publicize a meeting well, failed to allow adequate time for their presentation and public questions and comments, failed to answer pointed and relevant questions adequately, left important information out of their presentation, failed to explain why they were not following the state and Federal laws with respect to such cleanups and really seemed to be conducting the meeting more to reassure the public that all was well as opposed to sincerely wanting public input to their process. 

    For more information on 300 Area at Hanford:

    Article from Hanford USDOE about 300 Area

    Article about Hanford 300 Area from EPA

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory article about Hanford 300 Area

    Video of 300 Area cleanup plan

  • Geiger Readings for August 6, 2013

    Ambient office = .064 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .083 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = .115 microsieverts per hour

    Red seedless grape from Costco =  .168 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .088 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .066 microsieverts per hour