The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • U.S. Nuclear Reactors 25 – LaSalle, Illinois

             The LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station is located eleven miles southeast of Ottawa, Illinois and serves the Chicago area. The plant contains two twelve hundred megawatt General Electric boiling water reactors. Unit One was put into operation in 1982 and Unit Two was put into operation in 1984. The reactor uses LaSalle Lake, a man-made two thousand acre lake, for cooling. The plant was built by Commonwealth Edison Company. Exelon Corporation currently owns and operates the plant.

             The population in the NRC plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of ten miles around the plant contains about seventeen thousand seven hundred people. The NRC ingestion pathway zone with a radius of fifty miles around the plant contains about one million nine hundred thousand people. The NRC estimates that there is a extremely risk of an earthquake that could damage the plant.

            In April of 1994, LaSalle was fined by the NRC for failing to deal with problems involving electrical circuit breakers. In May of 1994, the NRC fined LaSalle for improperly handling radioactive materials.

            In February of 1995, a problem with the main steam isolation valves was discovered when Unit Two was being shut down for refueling. Later, one of the isolation valves for Unit One failed to operate correctly.

             In June of 1996, there were problems in the water system with strainers that experienced increased pressure. The problem was blamed on sandblasting material clogging the strainers but the same problem recurred and this time it was blamed on foam used for repairs clogging the intake system. Unit One had to be shut down because of the foam in the intake system               

             In July of 1996, the NRC sent a special inspection team to LaSalle because of a two year trend of declining performance in the water system. The NRC was concerned that the system could not operate safely in case there was an accident. The operators had been given repeated warnings and had repeatedly promised to deal with the problems. Unit One was shut down because of the intake being clogged and Unit Two was shut down for refueling. The operators had to address the problems reported by the NRC before they could restart either Unit. Resolving problems with both Units required over two years to resolve.

               In 2006, Unit One was being shut down for refueling when the control system for the turbine malfunctioned. This caused an automatic insertion of control rods to halt power generation. When the instrument panel indicated that three of the one hundred and eighty five control rods had not been fully inserted into the core, a site area emergency was declared. After a reset, only one rod appeared to have failed to insert. The emergency was cancelled in a few hours with no release of radioactivity. Review of the incident found that the problem lay in the sensors and that all the rods had actually been inserted correctly when the automatic shutdown occurred.

              Although there were no major accidents at LaSalle, there were repeated problems with equipment that were not addressed by the operators despite repeated warnings by the NRC.  

  • Geiger Reading for April 2, 2013

    Geiger Counter Readings in Seattle, WA on April 2, 2013

    Ambient office = .106 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .082 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain = .120 microsieverts per hour

    Sliced mushrooms from local grocery store .106 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .116 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .099 microsieverts per hour

  • U.S. Nuclear Reactors 24 – Fort Calhoun, Nebraska

               The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station is located between Fort Calhoun and Blair, Nebraska near the Missouri River. There is one four hundred and eighty four megawatt Combustion Engineering pressurized water reactor at the plant. The reactor began operation in 1973 with a forty year license which expired in 2003. At that time, the plant was relicensed until 2033. The plant is owned by the Omaha Public Power District and currently operated by Exelon Nuclear Partners. It has been shut down since April of 2011 because of serious problems.

               The population in the NRC plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of ten miles around the plant contains about twenty thousand seven hundred people. The NRC ingestion pathway zone with a radius of fifty miles around the plant contains about nine hundred and nine thousand people. The NRC estimates that there is a low risk of an earthquake that could damage the plant.

               In 2009, a flood threat assessment by the NRC concluded that the plant could not handle a flood that 1014 feet above sea level as mandated by NRC regulation.  In 2010, a key electrical part failed during a test at the plant. Also in 2010, serious concerns were raised about the ability of the plant to deal with flooding of the nearby Missouri River. The NRC said that that the plant “did not have adequate procedures to protect the intake structure and auxiliary building against external flooding events” and that the plant was not prepared for a “worst-case flooding scenario.”  Vulnerabilities to potential floods were identified and changes were made by the plant owners.

               In April of 2011, the reactor was shut down for routine refueling. However, a number of problems had been identified at the plant including the use of Teflon for cable insulation which tends to break down in high radiation environments. Structural problems were identified when inspections were made in preparation for installing extra equipment to boost power output.     

               On June 7th, 2011, there was a fire in an electrical switch room at the plant that briefly knocked out power to the cooling system for the spent fuel pool. Power was restored in ninety minutes. A backup generator was ready to take over supplying power to the cooling pumps if necessary but the main system was repaired and the backup pump was not used. It turned out that a breaker had failed that had been replaced eighteen months earlier.

                In late June of 2011, the Missouri River flooded and area remained flooded for weeks. Sandbags and berms were placed around the plant as a precaution and, although the flood waters surrounded the plant, the reactor itself was not flooded. A berm collapsed and external power was shut off but emergency generators supplied power to the cooling system. A no fly zone was put in place for the air space above the plant and there were wild rumors of a major disaster but no nuclear accident was caused by the floor. There was widespread damage to the area that did require extensive repairs.

              The plant has remained closed since the refueling shut down in April 2011 for repairs related to the flooding in 2011 and for repairs and work on a number of other problems at the plant. A 2013 report stated that the NRC had added to the checklist of problems that must be solved before the plant can be restarted. Electrical rates have already risen in the area to help pay for the necessary repairs.

  • Geiger Readings for April 1, 2013

    Geiger Counter Readings in Seattle, WA on April 1, 2013

    Ambient office = .099 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .130 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain = .138 microsieverts per hour

    Romaine lettuce .093 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .093 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .077 microsieverts per hour

  • U.S. Reactors 23 – Watts Bar, Tennessee

              The Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant is located between Chattanooga and Knoxville, Tennessee.  There is one operating one thousand one hundred megawatt Westinghouse pressurized water reactor at the plant. Two reactors were originally commissioned and construction began in 1973. The Unit One reactor was completed in 1996 after twenty three years and eight billion dollars. Work on the one thousand one hundred megawatt Unit Two was halted in 1988 when eighty percent of the work had been done. The official reason given for halting the work was that the demand for electricity in the region had gone down. Work resumed in 2007 and it was estimated that the reactor should be able to start operating in 2015 with a total cost of two billion five hundred million dollars. In 2012, the project was behind schedule and the estimate had risen to over four billion dollars. The plant is own and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.

               The population in the NRC plume exposure pathway zone with a radius of ten miles around the plant contains about twenty eighteen thousand five hundred people. The NRC ingestion pathway zone with a radius of fifty miles around the plant contains about four hundred and sixty five thousand people. The NRC estimates that there is a moderate risk of an earthquake that could damage the plant.

               In 2011, the NRC identified problems with the process that the TVA had implemented to catalog, inspect and test components to insure that they complied with the NRC safety standards. A new NRC report just issued expressed increased concern about TVA lapses in guaranteeing the safety of over six thousand parts that were processed by the TVA from 1995 to 2011. Some of these questionable components were used to construct the new Unit Two reactor. Other components have been shipped to other reactors owned and operated by the TVA. The TVA claims that the components in question will not threaten the safety of the new Unit Two reactor and other TVA reactors. They say that the issue is just one of documentation and that the components are safe.

                  In the past, companies constructing nuclear reactors ordered parts from manufacturers who had been certified by the NRC with respect to their inspection and testing of components. As the orders for new nuclear reactors fell off over the past few decades, more and more of these certified manufacturers allowed their certifications to lapse. Currently, the construction of new reactors requires the builders to rely on commercial grade components which are not subject to the same standards that were required by the NRC for the certified manufacturers. The TVA failed to report problems with insuring the reliability of commercial grade parts and did not respond adequately when initially notified of the concerns of the NRC.

               Although there has not been a major accident yet at Watts Bar, the issue of substandard components that may have been used in construction of the new Unit Two reactor makes it more probable that there will be breakdowns when it goes into operation. The problem of use of commercial grade components in new U.S. reactors is a very troubling issue that goes far beyond the TVA and Watts Bar. Also, the doubling of the estimated cost for the Unit Two reactor in just a few years suggests that the cost of nuclear reactors will continue to increase sharply making them much less attractive for power generation.

  • Geiger Readings for March 31, 2013

    Geiger Counter Readings in Seattle, WA on March 30, 2013

    Ambient office = .085 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .108 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain = .102 microsieverts per hour

    Redleaf lettuce .089 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .063 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .045 microsieverts per hour

  • Geiger Readings for March 30, 2013

    Geiger Counter Readings in Seattle, WA on March 30, 2013

    Ambient office = .110 microsieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = .087 microsieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain = .072 microsieverts per hour

    Vine ripened tomato from grocery store  = .079 microsieverts per hour

    Tap water = .054 microsieverts per hour

    Filtered water = .033 microsieverts per hour