The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • Nuclear Treaties – 6 – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

                   The NATO forces in Western Europe had enjoyed clear military dominance over the Soviet Union up to the late 1970s. The U.S. and other NATO forces bombers and missiles were clearly superior to the old Soviet missiles and bombers. The Soviets moved to balance the NATO arsenal by development and deployment of a new more power generation of mid-range nuclear missiles called SS-20 and Tu22M.

                   NATO countered with deployment of new nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing ballistic missiles. They also sought negotiations with the Soviet over the build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe. These discussions had begun in Geneva, Switzerland in 1980.

    During the first half of the 1980s, there was a chilling of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union with U.S. President Reagan repeatedly accusing the Soviets of violating the provisions of the SALT II Treaty which had been signed by both sides but never ratified in the U.S. Congress. In 1981, the U.S. had suggested the complete elimination of all intermediate range nuclear weapons on both sides. There was a disagreement over the inclusion or exclusion of British and French nuclear weapons and the Soviets withdrew from the negotiations in 1983. In 1984, the U.S. began deployment of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe despite public protests.

    Negotiations began again in 1986 with a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, including those in Europe by 2000. The U.S. declined this offer and instead counter-offered a staged reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons to zero by 1989. The British and French arsenals were not part of the discussions. Discussions continued in Reykjavik, Iceland between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev over nuclear disarmament. The final text of the treaty that was hammered out was influenced by the decision of the West German Chancellor to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany.

                The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed in Washington, D.C. in December of 1987. The Treaty set a deadline of 1991 and by that time, thousands of intermediate range nuclear weapons had been removed and destroyed from the European theater. Both sides were able to inspect the military installations of the other side.

                 The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and the Russian Federation inherited their nuclear arsenal. The Russian Federation abided by the Treaty that the Soviets had signed until 2007. In that year, The RF President Putin stated that he had decided that it was no longer in the interest of the RF to adhere to the INF Treaty. The Russians were concerned about U.S. plans to deploy missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic that would be aimed at Russia. They said that their decision to continue with the INF or to withdraw from it would be strongly influenced by the U.S: deployment of the planned missiles in Eastern Europe.  Ultimately the U.S. dropped the plans for Polish and Czech missile deployment.

    Signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from a U.S. Stated Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 5 – Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II

                  Following the success of the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, a second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was carried out between 1972 and 1979. In the Salt I agreement, the U.S. and the Soviets agreed to freeze the combined number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at the number they possessed in 1972 when the Interim Agreement was signed for a period of five years.

                The SALT II goal was to limit the total number of all categories of delivery vehicles on either side to only two thousand two hundred and fifty. This would include missile warheads launched from either land based facilities or submarines as well as bombs dropped by aircraft. The proposed SALT II treaty also required that both sides not develop any new missiles. The intention to ultimate reduce nuclear arsenals was also part of the conversation. Major provisions of the Interim Agreement were to be carried forward into the new agreement which was to last until 1985.

                 The two sides disagreed on many particulars of a possible agreement. The old problem of U.S. presence in Europe and Soviet mid-range weapons aimed at Europe was a major sticking point in the discussions.  A first draft of a possible agreement called the Vladivostok accord was made in 1975 where many of the points of dissention were ironed out. However, disagreement about U.S. cruise missiles and a new generation of Soviet bombers called Backfire were still a major problem.

                 At the start of the Carter Administration in 1977, a thorough review was made of the SALT II progress. Calls for additional reductions in nuclear weapons were added to the previous proposals and an offer to defer the cruise/Backfire problems to a third series of talks. The Soviets refused both of these new proposals by the U.S.

                 Eventually an agreement was reached that included several sections. The first part was a short term (3 year) agreement on cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs, and ICBM reductions. A framework was established for future negotiation. And, the Vladivostok accord was to be integrated into the final Treaty.

                 In mid-1979, U.S. President Carter and Soviet Premier Brezhnev signed the Treaty but the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the agreement. Neither leader was able to obtain the changes that Congress was demanding. Senator Joe Biden, now Vice President of the United States, managed to obtain the changes that were required.

                 Six months after the Treaty was signed but before it had been ratified by the U.S. Congress, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It was also made public that there was a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba. These actions and revelations angered the U.S. government and people so much that the Treaty was never formally ratified. However, in 1982, U.S. President said that he would abide by the SALT II terms even without ratification. The Soviet Premier agreed that he too would abide by SALT II. Reagan later accused the Soviets of deviating from the SALT II provisions but pledged that the U.S. would continue to follow the SALT II framework.

    SALT II signing photo from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties 7 – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I

                  During the early 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a series of talks about strategic arms reduction. Although the U.S. President Reagan had repeatedly accused the Soviets of violating the terms of the SALT II treaty, he was still willing to propose a reduction in all warheads at Geneva in 1982. The discussions that followed were originally referred to as SALT III but ultimately came to be called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or START I. IN the first phase, Reagan called a limit of all warheads on missiles to five thousand and a limit of warheads on ICBMs of two thousand five hundred. Only eight hundred and fifty ICBMs would be allowed per side and a limit of about one hundred of the heaviest class of ICBMS. In the second phase, there would be negotiations on the number of warheads carried by heavy bombers.

                 At the time, the U.S. had a clear advantage in long range bombers which could reach Russia although the Soviet air space was well defended and the targets spread over the huge territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviet fleet of bomber were unable to reach the U.S. for the most part and were mainly intended for conflicts in Europe and Asia. The Soviets had a clear advantage in heavy ICBM so by starting with ICBM reduction, the U.S. would benefit more than the Soviets from the first phase of Reagan’s proposal.

                In 1983, Reagan announced the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was a shift of U.S. policy from the mutually assured destruction (MAD) of the prior decades when it was assumed that it was not possible to win a nuclear war with the Soviets and that if either side started one, both sides would be totally destroyed. The SDI was intended to shift U.S. policy to defending the U.S. against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union with land and space based defense systems. This shift in U.S. policy alarmed the Soviets because they realized that if the U.S. could possibly stage a first strike against the Soviet Union and withstand a retaliatory strike from the Soviets. The Soviets withdrew from negotiations during the mid 1980s and the strategic arms race accelerated. Although SDI was viewed by many experts as being an impossible plan, billions of dollars were squandered on it in the 1980s.

                By the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of the nuclear arms race of the 1980s, both sides had more than ten thousand nuclear warheads. The START I treaty was signed in 1991 by the U.S. President Bush and the Soviet Premier Gorbachev to halt the increase in warheads. There were also limits set for fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and attack helicopters. The U.S. destroyed three hundred and sixty five B-52 bombers to comply with the treaty. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the Russians inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the Treaty. Other countries that had been part of the Soviet Union sent their nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to become nuclear free countries. When the SALT I treaty expired in 2009, the U.S. State Department reported that the Russians were not in compliance with the terms of the Treaty but gave no specific details of violations.

    Signing of the START I in 1991 from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 6 – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

                   The NATO forces in Western Europe had enjoyed clear military dominance over the Soviet Union up to the late 1970s. The U.S. and other NATO forces bombers and missiles were clearly superior to the old Soviet missiles and bombers. The Soviets moved to balance the NATO arsenal by development and deployment of a new more power generation of mid-range nuclear missiles called SS-20 and Tu22M.

                   NATO countered with deployment of new nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing ballistic missiles. They also sought negotiations with the Soviet over the build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe. These discussions had begun in Geneva, Switzerland in 1980.

    During the first half of the 1980s, there was a chilling of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union with U.S. President Reagan repeatedly accusing the Soviets of violating the provisions of the SALT II Treaty which had been signed by both sides but never ratified in the U.S. Congress. In 1981, the U.S. had suggested the complete elimination of all intermediate range nuclear weapons on both sides. There was a disagreement over the inclusion or exclusion of British and French nuclear weapons and the Soviets withdrew from the negotiations in 1983. In 1984, the U.S. began deployment of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe despite public protests.

    Negotiations began again in 1986 with a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, including those in Europe by 2000. The U.S. declined this offer and instead counter-offered a staged reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons to zero by 1989. The British and French arsenals were not part of the discussions. Discussions continued in Reykjavik, Iceland between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev over nuclear disarmament. The final text of the treaty that was hammered out was influenced by the decision of the West German Chancellor to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany.

                The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed in Washington, D.C. in December of 1987. The Treaty set a deadline of 1991 and by that time, thousands of intermediate range nuclear weapons had been removed and destroyed from the European theater. Both sides were able to inspect the military installations of the other side.

                 The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and the Russian Federation inherited their nuclear arsenal. The Russian Federation abided by the Treaty that the Soviets had signed until 2007. In that year, The RF President Putin stated that he had decided that it was no longer in the interest of the RF to adhere to the INF Treaty. The Russians were concerned about U.S. plans to deploy missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic that would be aimed at Russia. They said that their decision to continue with the INF or to withdraw from it would be strongly influenced by the U.S: deployment of the planned missiles in Eastern Europe.  Ultimately the U.S. dropped the plans for Polish and Czech missile deployment.

    Signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from a U.S. Stated Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 5 – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II

                  Following the success of the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, a second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was carried out between 1972 and 1979. In the Salt I agreement, the U.S. and the Soviets agreed to freeze the combined number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at the number they possessed in 1972 when the Interim Agreement was signed for a period of five years.

                The SALT II goal was to limit the total number of all categories of delivery vehicles on either side to only two thousand two hundred and fifty. This would include missile warheads launched from either land based facilities or submarines as well as bombs dropped by aircraft. The proposed SALT II treaty also required that both sides not develop any new missiles. The intention to ultimate reduce nuclear arsenals was also part of the conversation. Major provisions of the Interim Agreement were to be carried forward into the new agreement which was to last until 1985.

                 The two sides disagreed on many particulars of a possible agreement. The old problem of U.S. presence in Europe and Soviet mid-range weapons aimed at Europe was a major sticking point in the discussions.  A first draft of a possible agreement called the Vladivostok accord was made in 1975 where many of the points of dissention were ironed out. However, disagreement about U.S. cruise missiles and a new generation of Soviet bombers called Backfire were still a major problem.

                 At the start of the Carter Administration in 1977, a thorough review was made of the SALT II progress. Calls for additional reductions in nuclear weapons were added to the previous proposals and an offer to defer the cruise/Backfire problems to a third series of talks. The Soviets refused both of these new proposals by the U.S.

                 Eventually an agreement was reached that included several sections. The first part was a short term (3 year) agreement on cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs, and ICBM reductions. A framework was established for future negotiation. And, the Vladivostok accord was to be integrated into the final Treaty.

                 In mid-1979, U.S. President Carter and Soviet Premier Brezhnev signed the Treaty but the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the agreement. Neither leader was able to obtain the changes that Congress was demanding. Senator Joe Biden, now Vice President of the United States, managed to obtain the changes that were required.

                 Six months after the Treaty was signed but before it had been ratified by the U.S. Congress, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It was also made public that there was a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba. These actions and revelations angered the U.S. government and people so much that the Treaty was never formally ratified. However, in 1982, U.S. President said that he would abide by the SALT II terms even without ratification. The Soviet Premier agreed that he too would abide by SALT II. Reagan later accused the Soviets of deviating from the SALT II provisions but pledged that the U.S. would continue to follow the SALT II framework.

    SALT II signing photo from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 4 – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I

                  One of the main points of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was the requirement that those states which currently possessed nuclear weapons work towards nuclear disarmament. The two world super powers at the time, the United States and the Soviet Union both possessed nuclear arsenals. The U.S. possessed about one thousand inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and about six hundred and fifty  submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) in 1969. The Soviets had around one thousand ICBMs as well hundreds of SLBMs in 1969.

                By that time, the Soviets had installed an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) around their capital, Moscow, Russia. The U.S. had announced plans to protect twelve sites but only built one ABM system to protect a missile base in North Dakota. The U.S. and the Soviets were also working on warheads that contained multiple nuclear bombs. These multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, referred to as MIRVs, were a response to the work on anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs).

                  These new developments in the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviets increased international pressures for work towards nuclear disarmament. The first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks known as SALT I began in Helsinki, Finland in late 1969. These bilateral disarmament talks between the U.S. and the Soviets went on for two years of hard negotiating at meetings which were held alternately in Helsinki, Finland and Vienna, Austria.

                    The Soviets wanted to negotiate over U.S. bombers in Europe while the U.S. wanted to negotiate over Soviet mid-range nuclear weapons aimed at Europe. Both sides dropped these positions in favor of only negotiating an interim agreement on ICBMs and ABMs.In May of 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed two agreements, one to deal with anti-ballistic missile systems and another dealing with limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

                    The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limited both sides to having only two site protected by ABM systems. The U.S. dismantled their single ABM system a few years later. The ABM system around Moscow is still in use.

                    The other treaty signed by the U.S. and the Soviets as a result of the talks was called the Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This agreement was to be in force for five years. Strategic ICBMs were to be frozen at 1972 numbers. No new ICBM silos could be built. Signatories were allowed to build new SLBMs if their number was balanced by a equal reduction in the number ICBMs. Some allowance was made for modernizing launchers.

                    The U.S. had basically frozen its missile deployment program during the talks while the Soviets added 50% to their ICBM numbers and quadrupled their SLBMs.

    Start of the SALT I negotiations from NATO photo archive:

  • Nuclear Treaties 3 – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

                  Following the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union continued negotiating on nuclear issues. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was drafted and opened for signing in 1968. It went into effect in 1970, recognizing US, the UK, France, China and the Soviet Union as the only officially recognized states openly possessing nuclear weapons. (The Russian Union inherited the NPT recognition when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. China and France signed the Treaty in 1992.) These five nuclear states are also the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

                The purpose of the treaty was to work against the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the nations which currently possessed them, encourage the world-wide peaceful use of nuclear power and to move towards disarmament of all nations of nuclear and conventional weapons. The core of the agreement is to have “the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

                 Many believe that the most important aspect of the NPT and the one which should be emphasized over other provisions of the NPT is the Non-Proliferation issue. The enormous power of nuclear weapons and the fact that the damage and fallout from even a limited nuclear exchange could easily spread beyond the borders of the combatants makes the spread of nuclear weapons a very important global issue. Under the Treaty, The states with nuclear weapons agree not to give nuclear weapons to states which don’t have them or to encourage or assists such states in acquiring them. The states which don’t have nuclear weapons agree not to make them or try to acquire them or assistance to make them. There is also provision in the Treaty for the International Atomic Energy Agency to put into place safe guards and to monitor  states without nuclear weapons to insure that such states are not diverting resources from peaceful nuclear facilities towards weapons production.

                The section that deals with disarmament in the Treaty encourages the signatory nuclear weapons states to work in good faith toward ending the nuclear arms race and eliminating the arsenals of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons.  There has been a debate over the meaning of the section between the countries that have nuclear weapons and those that do not. The nuclear weapons nations claim that they are only obligated to work toward some disarmament agreement some day and that they have been carrying out reduction of warheads and missiles. The countries without nuclear weapons claim that the section requires that the nuclear weapon countries need negotiate a comprehensive disarmament treaty as soon as possible and that they are failing to move forward on such a treaty. Arguments continue over the linkage of non-proliferation to disarmament and the possible unexpected side-effects of the disarmament which has occurred.

                The non-nuclear states are entitled to assistance in developing peaceful nuclear power under the Treaty. One of the big concerns with this issue is the fact that enriched uranium is required for fueling many reactors. The fuel must either be purchased on the international market or enriched inside the country with the reactor. Some non-nuclear weapon nations have enrichment capabilities that could be turned to production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Iraq was sanctioned by the U.N. for violation of NPT obligations. North Korea never fully complied with its NPT requirements and eventually left the Treaty to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Iran is currently being criticized and heavily sanctioned for non-compliance to NPT inspection requirements.

              Despite many problems and criticisms over the years, the NPT is generally regarded as the most important and successful international treaty on nuclear weapons. Only four countries are not signatories to the agreement. North Korea withdrew and has developed its own nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have never signed the Treaty and both have nuclear arsenals and missile delivery systems. Israel has not signed the Treaty. It has not acknowledged that it possesses nuclear weapons but it is assumed to have a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems.

    United States signs the The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons from americancorner.org.tw:

     

  • Nuclear Treaties 2 – Outer Space Treaty

                   With the Soviet lunch of the Sputnik satellite in 1959, the world was thrust into the Space Race. The ability to launch objects into obit above the Earth was more than just a scientific opportunity. In the history of warfare, who ever holds the “high ground” is at an advantage. If weapons platforms were placed in orbit above the Earth, the nation that launched the platforms would have the ability to rain down destruction on its enemies in a matter of minutes anywhere in the world. With the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and the rapidly developing arsenals of nuclear weapons, the early 1960s saw the rise of concern that either or both of the military superpowers might place nuclear weapons in orbit.

                In 1967, a treaty was drafted that dealt with various aspects of the exploration and exploitation of space. The official name of the treaty is Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Informally, the Treaty is known as the Outer Space Treaty. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union drew up the Treaty, signed it and put it into effect as of October 10, 1967.

                The Treaty bans the signatories from sending nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction into orbit around the Earth. It also bans the placement on such weapons on the Moon, any other celestial bodies or anywhere else in space. The Treaty states the Moon and other celestial bodies may only be used for peaceful purposes and specifically states that there can be no use of such bodies for the testing of weapons of any kind, building of any military bases or fortification or for any military maneuvers. However, the Treaty does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit. There has been research and proposals for weapons tailored for use from orbit that would be very fast and destructive but which might fall under the category of conventional weapons.

              The Treaty also states that all signatories shall recognize space and all celestial bodies as belonging to the whole human race and free for exploration and exploitation by all nations. The Treaty states that “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”. On the other hand, any object launched by any nation remains the responsibility of the launching nation and that nation is responsible for any damage or pollution caused by the object they launched. 

               Provisions were included for signatory nations to request information about and the right to consult on any intended launch by any other signatory nation. As of 2011, 100 countries have signed the Treaty and another 26 nations are in the process of ratifying and signing.

    Soviet Sputnik satellite:

  • Nuclear Treaties 1 – Partial Test Ban Treaty

               By 1963, various nuclear powers had conducted multiple tests of nuclear bombs  in the atmosphere, on the ground and under water. The United States was conducting powerful thermonuclear devices during the 1950s and the Soviet Union exploded its first thermonuclear bomb in 1961. International concern over the effects of radioactive fallout out from these tests had been growing during the 1950s.

               The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had been negotiating on nuclear weapons under the auspices of the United Nations Disarmament Commission during the 1950s. Various offers were made by both sides on nuclear disarmament, nuclear testing restriction and conventional weapons. Around 1960, the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. finally decided to detach the issue of nuclear testing from the general disarmament discussion.

                A major topic of debate was how to verify compliance. Underground testing was a special problem. The blast created a shock wave which could be confused with the shockwave generated by an earthquake. The U.S. and the U.K. wanted to have inspectors at nuclear facilities in all three countries. The U.S.S.R. felt that seismographs outside each country should be able to detect underground tests without the need for onsite inspectors. Finally, in 1963, Premier Khrushchev agreed to a test ban that would not include underground tests. After a decade of debate the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R in August of 1963.

              In 1965, the U.S.S.R was working on developing nuclear bombs for peaceful use such as creating artificial lakes, rerouting rivers and other big earthmoving projects. A shallow underground test was carried out with a one hundred and forty kiloton bomb. Most of the radioactive fallout that escaped above ground fell inside the U.S.S.R. but a small amount drifted east and was detected over Japan. The U.S. and other signatories complained because the Treaty stipulated that any radioactivity escaping from an underground test could not leave the territory of the country which conducted the test.  The matter was ultimate dropped.

             In 1970, the U.S. conducted a test of a ten kiloton atomic bomb at a depth of 900 feet at the Yucca Flat test range in Nevada. The explosion ruptured the soil in a way that had not been anticipated and a plume of radioactive dust and smoke escaped into the air. Radioactive fallout was carried over California, Idaho, Washington and Oregon and, ultimately, to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.

             Following the drafting of the Treaty by the U.S., U.K. and the U.S.S.R., other countries signed the Treaty as time went by. One hundred and twenty three nations have signed the Treaty. Another ten nations have ratified the Treaty but have not official signed it. Three nations, France, China and North Korea, have exploded nuclear bombs but have not ratified or signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

     Signing of the Treaty from www.cbto.org:         

  • United States Atoms for Peace Program

              In 1953, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a speech titled “Atoms for Peace” to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. In the speech, Eisenhower  mentioned nuclear warfare but mainly focused on the potential for peaceful used of nuclear energy. He announced new U.S. program to supply equipment and information to institutions and nations worldwide to assist in nuclear research. Eisenhower reassured the world that the U.S. was dedicated to peace and letting other countries choose their way of life. He mentioned the problem of nuclear stalemate and affirmed that the U.S. would be dedicated to using its creativity for constructive purposed and not destruction.

              A propaganda campaign was launched by the U.S following the speech and it continued for years. Some analysts said that the main intention of the speech and the media campaign that followed was to counteract the public fear and horror triggered by the atomic bombing of Japanese cities. As the Cold War set in between the U.S. and Soviet Union and the Soviet Union developed its own atomic bomb there was increasing discussion of a possible nuclear war with the Soviets. The U.S. government  was moving ahead with nuclear weapons development and some say that development of commercial reactor for power generation were supported because they aided the weapons program.

              Another theory about the Atoms for Peace program is that it was aimed at our European allies. With fears of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and the huge cost of defending Europe with conventional weapons and troop, the Eisenhower administration wanted to sell the Europeans on a cheaper nuclear defense shields against Soviet aggression. Convincing them that nuclear power was a safe economical alternative to convention fossil fuels for power generation would help in soothing their concern about U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

              In spited of the positive tone of the speech, the official position of the Eisenhower administration was that only a massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would deter the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union adopted the same policy with respect to the U.S. Under Eisenhower, the U.S. nuclear arsenal rose from about one thousand warheads to over twenty thousand. Although his speech did result in exploration of peaceful uses for atomic energy and the creation of a world wide system of nuclear reactors for commercial power generation, many countries that did not have nuclear expertise acquired it and, in some cases, went on to create nuclear weapons.

              Ironically, the Atoms for Peace program helped both Iran and Pakistan develop nuclear research programs and nuclear reactors. Pakistan now has nuclear weapons and the world is worried that Iran will soon have them. In the end, it would have to be said that whatever the intent of that initial speech, the resulting impact that the program had on the world was to promote both the peaceful use of atomic energy and also to stimulate the creation of nuclear weapons in some belligerent countries that are destabilizing the international situation.