The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • Geiger Readings for July 04, 2022

    Ambient office = 67 nanosieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = 107 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 106 nanosieverts per hour

    Tomato from Central Market = 82 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 101 nanosieverts per hour

    Filter water = 91 nanosieverts per hour

  • Geiger Readings for July 03, 2022

    Ambient office = 94 nanosieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = 107 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 104 nanosieverts per hour

    Red onion from Central Market = 92 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 108 nanosieverts per hour

    Filter water = 98 nanosieverts per hour

  • Geiger Readings for July 02, 2022

    Ambient office = 129 nanosieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = 156 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 57 nanosieverts per hour

    Red bell pepper from Central Market = 56 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 108 nanosieverts per hour

    Filter water = 89 nanosieverts per hour

    Dover Sole from Central = 111 nanosieverts per hour

  • Nuclear Weapons 785 – Europeans Debate The Need For A European Nuclear Arsenal – Part 2 of 2 Parts

    Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
         Moreover, the French nuclear arsenal just isn’t adequate for the job of protecting Europe. France has about three hundred nuclear warheads. If a major war broke out in Europe, an enemy like Russia which possesses thousands of warheads might be able to destroy the French arsenal in a pre-emptive first strike. Deterrence only works if swift and thorough retaliation is assured.
         In addition, French nuclear weapons are the wrong type. They are strategic which means that each warhead is capable of causing many Hiroshima’s worth of devastation. They are only meant to be used in a total-war scenario to utterly destroy entire cities in the homeland of the enemy.
         If Russia were to escalate a war in Eastern Europe such as the current Ukrainian war, it would employ tactical nuclear weapons. These are smaller warheads that can be deployed at short ranges to frighten an enemy into submission or to win specific battles. It is just not thinkable for France or anyone else to retaliate for a limited tactical nuclear strike by going directly to strategic retaliation and nuclear Armageddon.
         The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that all Western nuclear powers must add more tactical nuclear weapons to their arsenals, to keep up with Russia and become capable of flexible responses to its agressions. The European Union, led by Germany and France, could collaborate on this effort. Even if that came to pass, the Europeans would still have to resolve the old questions about command structure.
         Alternatively, countries like Germany could develop their own nuclear warheads. However, in order for Germany to do that, it would have to first withdraw from the international treaty against nuclear proliferation and the agreement that allowed its reunification. In addition, Germany would have to turn its entire post-war political culture upside down. Many of its current leaders grew up protesting against the stationing U.S. missiles and nuclear warheads in general.
         For the time being, the most realistic answer to Russian aggression is to retain and patch the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The only language understood by Russia and China is more U.S. tactical nukes, in more places and deliverable in more ways. Following this course of action is probably the only way to slow the pace of other countries, allies or enemies, going nuclear. However, the entire U.S. political class, on both sides of the aisle must underwrite the U.S. commitment to its allies regardless of whether Trump or another like him comes to power in the U.S.
         Unfortunately, no conclusion could be more depressing. It amounts to entering a new tactical nuclear arms race. It goes in the opposite direction of  the vision behinds the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, signed by eighty-six non-nuclear countries and meant to ban these horrible weapons altogether. Instead of eliminating all nuclear weapons, we’d have to look for new ways of deterring their use. Putin is to blame for all of this. He attacked Ukraine twenty eight years after Russia guaranteed Ukraine’s security in return for Ukraine giving up its own arsenal of Soviet-era nuclear weapons. He broke the long term taboo against threatening nuclear escalation in conventional warfare. In all these ways. The European Union must prepare for its own self-defense.
    Emblem of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces:

  • Geiger Readings for July 01, 2022

    Ambient office = 123 nanosieverts per hour

    Ambient outside = 91 nanosieverts per hour

    Soil exposed to rain water = 97 nanosieverts per hour

    Pineapple from Central Market = 985 nanosieverts per hour

    Tap water = 130 nanosieverts per hour

    Filter water = 117 nanosieverts per hour

  • Nuclear Weapons 784 – Europeans Debate The Need For A European Nuclear Arsenal – Part 1 of 2 Parts.

    Part 1 of 2 Parts
         The recent Russian attack on Ukraine rekindle an old debate about whether Europe needs its own nuclear arsenal to deter a possible Russian nuclear attack. During most of the Cold War and the years since, the debate seemed to have been settled. The European NATO members are meant to be covered by the nuclear “umbrella” of the United States. The U.S. established “nuclear sharing” with five partner countries. These include Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Altogether, these five countries host about one hundred U.S. nuclear weapons. If Russia attacked, these five countries could retaliate by employing these warheads.
          Aside from those “shared nuclear weapons,” France and the U.K. also have their own nuclear arsenals. France has always keept its nuclear weapons outside of the joint strategizing of the Western alliance. It is the only country among NATO’s thirty members to not participate in the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.
         Before Russia’s attack on Ukraine this year, some Europoean nations were concerned that the U.S. nuclear umbrella was becoming less reliable. By definition, this makes it less of a deterrent. The U.S. has shifted its geopolitical focus from the Atlantic theater to the Pacific theater. The main concern is to contain China which is currently expanding their nuclear arsenal and delivery systems.
          The U.S. has to hold up two nuclear umbrellas and plan for two simultaneous wars. Maximilian Terhalle in Germany and Francois Heisbourg in France are two nuclear analysts who have been warning that if the U.S. is forced to choose between the two theaters, it would probably give top priority to its commitments in Asia including allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
         To make matters worse, former U.S. president Trump caused Europeans great concern when he questioned NATO’s mutual-defense clause. He even considered taking the U.S. out of the alliance. Trump is gone from the Whitehouse but he or someone like him could become president in the future. In the long run, the U.S. seems to be less dependable as a protector than it used to be.
         In addition to all these issues, Russian President Putin has been dropping direct threats that he might use nukes in the Ukrainian war or against Western nations who send aid to Ukraine. For now, the consensus is that Putin is bluffing. If he is not, Europeans would like to have a fallback plan if they cannot rely on the U.S.
         One scenario that is being discussed is to have France extend its nuclear umbrella to the whole of the European Union. French President Macro often talks about achieving European “autonomy” by which he appears to mean independence for the U.S. This indicates that he should be amenable to the extension of the French nuclear umbrella.
          Unfortunately, in practice, the French are neither willing or able to extend their umbrella. Since the time of Charles de Gaulle, France has been adamant about total sovereignty over its nuclear arsenal and all decisions pertaining to it. Visions of a Europeanized “force de frappe” as the French call their nuclear arsenal suffer from the same problem as ideas about a European Army. Without a United States of Europe, it is not clear who would be in command, where and how.
    Please read Part 2 next