Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 2)
Commercial nuclear power reactors have to be refueled every eighteen to twenty-four months. During the shutdown of the reactors for refueling and maintenance, human inspectors can check the reactor. Some of the new reactor designs will not have to be refueled for up to thirty years. The simulations run by Erickson and her team show that their new monitoring technology could be used to check on the operations of sodium cooled reactors. The signatures of the antineutrino fluxes from sodium reactors will be different than the fluxes from common pressurized-water power reactors.
Further challenges include making the antineutrino detectors small enough to fit into a vehicle. A vehicle equipped with such an antineutrino detector could be driven past a nuclear reactor to check antineutrino flux. Erickson also wants to increase the directionality of the detectors so they can be kept focused on emission from the reactor core. This should allow them to detect even small changes.
The principle of the detector can be compared to that of a retinal scanner that is used for identification. During a retinal scan, an infrared beam moves across the back of a person’s retina over the blood vessels. Blood vessels absorb more of the infrared light than the tissue around them and everyone has a unique pattern of blood vessels in their retinas. In order for such a system to work, the retinal signature of the person being scanned must already be in the device’s database. Following the scan, it is matched to the scans in the database to verify identity.
A nuclear reactor constantly emits antineutrinos that vary depending on the flux and spectrum generated by the particular type of fuel isotopes that are involved in the fission process in that particular reactor. Some antineutrinos generated in the reactor are detected by in inverse beta decay. The specific signature from a particular reactor can be matched with signatures drawn from previous scans of the same reactor and stored in a database.
If the signature of an operating reactor matches the stored signature for the same reactor, that means that there has been no significant alteration in the isotopes being fissioned in the reactor. On the other hand, if there is a marked change in the signature, that might mean that the reactor has been diverted for use in making nuclear materials for bombs.
When a reactor switches from burning uranium to burning plutonium, the rate of emission of antineutrinos at different energies changes with operating lifetimes. The signature from a commercial reactor burning regular uranium fuel will show a repeating eighteen or twenty-four months cycle with a three month gap while fuel is being changed. If an ultra-long cycle fast reactor is burning plutonium, the signature would show continuous operation except for brief maintenance breaks. Many different agencies and individuals are working on this and other projects to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Erickson said, “It goes all the way from mining of nuclear material to disposition of nuclear material, and at every step of that process, we have to be concerned about who’s handling it and whether it might get into the wrong hands. The picture is more complicated because we don’t want to prevent the use of nuclear materials for power generation because nuclear is a big contributor to non-carbon energy.”
“One of the highlights of the research is a detailed analysis of assembly-level diversion that is critical to our understanding of the limitations on antineutrino detectors and the potential implications for policy that could be implemented,” she said. “I think the paper will encourage people to look into future systems in more detail.”