Denver company sues over changes to nuclear workers’ access to care. Kdvr.com
The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Ambient office = 74 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 88 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 89 nanosieverts per hour
Avocado from Central Market = 52 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 97 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 76 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient office = 70 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 77 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 75 nanosieverts per hour
Pineapple from Central Market = 133 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 78 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 70 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient office = 74 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 66 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 65 nanosieverts per hour
Carrot from Central Market = 114 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 70 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 63 nanosieverts per hour
Halibut – Caught in USA = 84 nanosieverts per hour
A couple of days ago, I blogged about the San Onofre nuclear power plant where transfer of spent nuclear fuel into dry canisters for underground storage has been halted because there have been multiple violations of NRC regulations. One of the issues raised has been that the surface of some of the stainless-steel canisters have been scratched as they were being lowered into the Holtec International storage bunker. Critics fear that these scratches could result in corrosion and cracks which may release radioactive materials. The NRC has refused to allow the transfer of any more spent fuel into the storage bunker until the possible danger of the scratches can be properly assessed.
The final safety analysis for the Holtec UMAX dry canisters said that when the transfer was carried out, “There will not be scratches on the canisters.” However, the NRC license issued to Southern California Edison, the owner of the San Onofre nuclear power plant, authorizing the use of the Holtec UMAX canisters only says that the system and process must comply with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers specifications. These specifications do permit some scratching on the canisters.
Scott Morris is the Region IV administer for the NRC. He said that, “Clearly, there’s an inconsistency between these two documents that has to be rectified. Edison has to resolve this. But you can’t just say, ‘It’s OK to have scratches.’ There has to be a technical basis for it. You have to have an analysis that says why it is OK. Give me the calculations. Give me the data.”
SCE and Holtec first tried to allay the NRC concerns by providing calculations that showed that the scratches were not a problem. After the NRC rejected that work, SCE and Holtec stress tested the metal of the shells of the canisters but this called into question the original calculations. Linda Howell is the deputy director of the NRC’s Division of Nuclear Materials Safety. She said, “How do you know what you have scratched? You have to actually look. Actually look at an actual canister, instead of at these surrogates.”
Holtec speeded up the development of a robotic inspection system in order to comply with the NRC demands for seeing the actual scratches on the canisters. Last week, a flat square robot equipped with 3D cameras began crawling around on a few of the dry canister and inspecting the scratches to determine how deep and wide they are. So far, the robot has been able to inspect ninety five percent of the chosen canister exteriors. It checked the surface of three of the canisters that have already been loaded into the storage bunker. Two of the inspected canisters were involved in the problems covered in my previous post. The robot also inspected the surface of a random canister.
The 3D camera on the robot can see scratches that are only one one thousandth of an inch deep. The robot has documented scratches that are twenty-six one thousandths of an inch deep. Morris says that if these are the deepest scratches, then they are well within acceptable tolerances. Tom Palmisano works for SCE. He said at a public panel that the deepest scratches are about the width of a credit card. He added that the oxide layer on the exterior of the canisters should reform quickly so there is no danger that there will be any corrosion.
The NRC is waiting for SCE to provide the data on the robotic inspection. They will then decide if the work and analysis of the canister scratches are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the NRC. There are twenty-nine canisters in the Holtec storage bunker with forty-three more canisters waiting for NRC permission.
Ambient office = 70 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 69 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 66 nanosieverts per hour
Beefsteak tomato from Central Market = 73 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 72 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 66 nanosieverts per hour
I have blogged before about the U.S. interest in selling nuclear power reactors to Saudi Arabia. One of the problems with such sales is the fact that some technologies that can be used to support nuclear power reactors can also be used to help construct nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to commit to assurances that it will not use U.S. nuclear technology on any weapons projects. The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has said that Saudi Arabia will construction nuclear weapons if Iran restarts its nuclear weapons program. This has impeded progress in U.S. nuclear technology transfer to Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration has pushed strongly for sales to Saudi Arabia while some members of Congress have pushed back against such sales.
It has just been announced that Rick Perry, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, has approved six secret authorization that will permit companies to sell nuclear power technology to Saudi Arabia. These approvals are known as Part 810 Authorizations. They will allow nuclear companies to conduct preliminary work on the construction of nuclear power reactors in Saudi Arabia before contracts are signed but they will not be able to actually ship nuclear power components to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reported that it was the nuclear companies that requested that the Trump administration keep the approvals secret. Previously such Part 810 Authorizations had been made available to the public on the Energy Department’s website.
The NNSA said “In this case, each of the companies which received a specific authorization for (Saudi Arabia) have provided us written request that their authorization be withheld from public release.” A spokesperson for the U.S. DoE said that the requests all went through a multi-agency approval process and that one of the reasons for the secrecy was because the authorizations contained proprietary information.
There has been a great deal of opposition to the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia because there are fears that it may lead to a nuclear weapons race in the Middle East. Following the slaying of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia, there has been an international backlash against Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince. This has had a strong influence on the discussion of nuclear technology sales to Saudi Arabia.
Representative Brad Sherman asked Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, to release the names of the companies which had received the Part 810 Authorizations. Pompeo said that he would “look into it.” Sherman accused the Trump administration of trying to exclude Congress from involvement in the discussions for sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia.
A few weeks ago, Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives claimed in a report that they had warned the White House that it might be breaking the law as it worked with a nuclear industry group called IP3 in support of a multibillion dollar plan to build nuclear power reactors in some Middle Eastern countries including Saudi Arabia. The report said that the warnings were ignored.
On Wednesday of this week, the U.S. General Accountability Office received a request from a Republican Senator and a Democratic Senator for a probe of the Trump administration’s negotiations over a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia.