Part 1 of 2 Parts
       Nuclear deterrence depends on being able to detect the launch of nuclear missiles from an enemy as quickly as possible. Long range radar can provide some warning but the best detection system depends on satellites. The military also expects to rely on satellites for global command, control, and communication to coordinate military activities. Analysts say that these two critical satellite systems are vulnerable in the short term.
        A few weeks ago, the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies and the MITRE Corporation distributed a report that said, “when it comes to nuclear modernization, NC3 [nuclear command, control and communications] is the least expensive, yet perhaps the most critical.” Regardless of the number of nuclear warheads possessed by the U.S. as compared to the nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, if our military satellites are destroyed, we would be deaf, dumb and blind. This would not be of any assistance in convincing an enemy that we have a functional system of nuclear deterrence.
       The report also says that the, “most disturbing and profound [vulnerability] is the end of space as a sanctuary domain – space is likely to be a battleground, with space assets vulnerable to attack.” A year ago, U.S. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson visited the Mitched Institute. At that time she commented that the big Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites that provide early warning on missile launches are vulnerable to electronic and kinetic attacks. Air Force Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) which are critical for military communications in a nuclear-disrupted environment are also vulnerable.
        The SBIRS and AEHF satellites constellation consist of only six satellites each. They are big as school buses and very expensive at almost two billion dollars each. New versions of both of these types of satellites are in the planning stages and are scheduled to be launched around 2030. This means that the current constellations of SBIRSs and AEHFs must be protected from kinetic and electronic attacks for the next decade.
       In 2007, China successfully tested its ground-based direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT). China also launched a missile to simulate an ASAT flight profile that flew almost to geosynchronous orbit. This is worrying to the U.S. because the U.S. SBIRS and AEHF satellites constellation are in geosynchronous orbit.
       Just this week, India made a surprise launch of an ASAT that successfully destroyed an Indian satellite. It was a direct kill kinetic weapon that collided with the target satellite, causing it to disintegrate. Such actions increase the orbital debris field.
       In the early 2020s, Russia, China, the U.S. and the E.U. will be launching orbital robots for peaceful missions that include removing space debris from orbit and maintaining satellites. The problem with this is that these maintenance satellites could also be used to rendezvous with a U.S. military satellite and disable or destroy it. So the U.S. must have ways to protect its military satellite constellations from such automated maintenance systems.
Please read Part 2

Ambient office  =  74 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 88 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 89 nanosieverts per hour

Avocado from Central Market = 52 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 97 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 76 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient office  =  70 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 77 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 75 nanosieverts per hour

Pineapple from Central Market = 133 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 78 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 70 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient office  =  74 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 66 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 65 nanosieverts per hour

Carrot from Central Market = 114 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 70 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 63 nanosieverts per hour

Halibut – Caught in USA = 84 nanosieverts per hour

       A couple of days ago, I blogged about the San Onofre nuclear power plant where transfer of spent nuclear fuel into dry canisters for underground storage has been halted because there have been multiple violations of NRC regulations. One of the issues raised has been that the surface of some of the stainless-steel canisters have been scratched as they were being lowered into the Holtec International storage bunker. Critics fear that these scratches could result in corrosion and cracks which may release radioactive materials. The NRC has refused to allow the transfer of any more spent fuel into the storage bunker until the possible danger of the scratches can be properly assessed.
      The final safety analysis for the Holtec UMAX dry canisters said that when the transfer was carried out, “There will not be scratches on the canisters.” However, the NRC license issued to Southern California Edison, the owner of the San Onofre nuclear power plant, authorizing the use of the Holtec UMAX canisters only says that the system and process must comply with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers specifications. These specifications do permit some scratching on the canisters.
      Scott Morris is the Region IV administer for the NRC. He said that, “Clearly, there’s an inconsistency between these two documents that has to be rectified. Edison has to resolve this. But you can’t just say, ‘It’s OK to have scratches.’ There has to be a technical basis for it. You have to have an analysis that says why it is OK. Give me the calculations. Give me the data.”
      SCE and Holtec first tried to allay the NRC concerns by providing calculations that showed that the scratches were not a problem. After the NRC rejected that work, SCE and Holtec stress tested the metal of the shells of the canisters but this called into question the original calculations. Linda Howell is the deputy director of the NRC’s Division of Nuclear Materials Safety. She said, “How do you know what you have scratched? You have to actually look. Actually look at an actual canister, instead of at these surrogates.”
      Holtec speeded up the development of a robotic inspection system in order to comply with the NRC demands for seeing the actual scratches on the canisters. Last week, a flat square robot equipped with 3D cameras began crawling around on a few of the dry canister and inspecting the scratches to determine how deep and wide they are. So far, the robot has been able to inspect ninety five percent of the chosen canister exteriors. It checked the surface of three of the canisters that have already been loaded into the storage bunker. Two of the inspected canisters were involved in the problems covered in my previous post. The robot also inspected the surface of a random canister.
       The 3D camera on the robot can see scratches that are only one one thousandth of an inch deep. The robot has documented scratches that are twenty-six one thousandths of an inch deep. Morris says that if these are the deepest scratches, then they are well within acceptable tolerances. Tom Palmisano works for SCE. He said at a public panel that the deepest scratches are about the width of a credit card. He added that the oxide layer on the exterior of the canisters should reform quickly so there is no danger that there will be any corrosion.
      The NRC is waiting for SCE to provide the data on the robotic inspection. They will then decide if the work and analysis of the canister scratches are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the NRC. There are twenty-nine canisters in the Holtec storage bunker with forty-three more canisters waiting for NRC permission.

Ambient office  =  70 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 69 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 66 nanosieverts per hour

Beefsteak tomato from Central Market = 73 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 72 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 66 nanosieverts per hour