The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Ambient office = 136 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 125 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 122 nanosieverts per hour
Roma tomato from Central Market = 114 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 59 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 46 nanosieverts per hour
Dover sole – Caught in USA = 115 nanosieverts per hour
There have been a few false alarms that almost triggered a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and decided to wait for confirmation before launching an all-out nuclear war. Although some of the false alarms were cases of human error, others were related to design issues of the detection systems being employed. There has also been concern that natural phenomena such as meteors could trigger the early warning systems.
On July 25, a meteor exploded in a fireball twenty-six miles above Thule Airbase in Greenland with a force of about two kilotons. Thule hosts a Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site which is one of the early warning radar bases built primarily to detect a Russian nuclear attack.
Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. He said, “We’re still here, so they correctly concluded it was not a Russian first strike. There are nearly 2,000 nukes on alert, ready to launch. A freak incident like this could potentially trigger an alert that caused the United States to overreact, although such an event is unlikely.”
“The potential risks are about what could happen in a tense crisis where two nuclear powers were at each other’s throats and a conventional shooting war had broken out and part of the command and control system degraded. The early warning systems are supposed to be able to differentiate and in most cases probably would be able to do so. But with large number of nuclear weapons on high alert, the concern would be that an overreaction could trigger a series of events that escalated the conflict significantly. There have been cases during the Cold War where atmospheric events caused early warning systems to falsely report nuclear attacks. Fortunately, military officers figured out that they were false alarms.”
He pointed out that tensions were low between the U.S. and Russia at this time, so it is unlikely that something like a meteor could trigger a nuclear war between the two nations. He said, “I don’t think there is any risk that such an event could trigger a nuclear launch under normal circumstances. There are no other indicators that nuclear adversaries at this point are about to launch nuclear weapons against the United States.”
Most of the nations on Earth that do not have nuclear weapons have signed a treaty to work for the elimination of all nuclear weapons on Earth. It is not surprising that the nations with nuclear weapons did not sign the treaty. The possibility of an accidental nuclear war that would end human civilization is a powerful argument for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, it would be very difficult to prove that a particular nation did not have nuclear weapons hidden somewhere. The nations who have nuclear weapons offer this as a reason that it would be unwise to give up all their nuclear weapons. They believe that their nuclear weapons will continue to act as a deterrent against nuclear attacks by other nations. The best we can do is try to reduce nuclear stockpiles, reduce tensions between nuclear armed nations and improve remote early detection systems for missile launches.
Ambient office = 115 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 134 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 132 nanosieverts per hour
Beefsteak tomato from Central Market = 113 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 79 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 73 nanosieverts per hour
Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
A temporary storage site was proposed for Bull Creek, Utah around the year 2000. In a lawsuit filed in 2003, Utah argued that when the Yucca Mountain site was selected, the authority of the NRC to designate temporary storage sites was ended under the terms of the NWPA. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was sympathetic to the environmental and safety concerns of Utah, but it confirmed that the federal government has the final say about nuclear storage facility siting.
After the first Bull Creek decision, the Court of Appeals in the 10th Circuit issued an opinion in the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson case that also involved the Bull Creek site. Utah argued that the state’s constitution clearly stated that any nuclear facility should be regulated by the Utah Department of Environmental Quality. In addition, state law called for the counties to have oversite of facilities and rail transportation of nuclear waste. The decision issue by the Court of Appeals in the 10th Circuit affirmed the first Bull bCreek decision that the federal government had the final word with respect to the siting of nuclear waste facilities.
The decision read, “In holding the Utah statutes preempted, we do not denigrate the serious concerns of Utah’s citizens and lawmakers regarding spent nuclear fuel, a matter with presents complex technological, economic and political challenges to those seeking effective solutions. However, in the matter of nuclear safety, Congress has determined that it is the federal government, not the states that must address the problem.”
The N.M. A.G. said that the state would have “some recourse” if NRC regulations were violated at the facility or the facility failed after it began operation. While the site is in operation, Holtec would have the sole responsibility for the dry casks which would store the spent nuclear fuel thirty feet underground. While there is no NRC regulation or judicial precedent with respect to the possible storage of spent nuclear fuel in dry casks past their licensed life span, Holtec alone is responsible for safe operation of the site. NRC regulations do specifically require that a decommissioning plan and funding be part of license requirements for any temporary storage site. This would appear to prevent spent nuclear fuel from being stored at a
site permanently.
The A.G. wrote, “Because interim storage facilities are not intended to be permanent repositories for nuclear waste, NRC regulations provide that all applications for a license to operate an interim storage facility must include a plan for the future decommissioning.”
During the licensed period, the licensee has to periodically update decommissioning plans and estimates of cost. The licensee of a site must submit final decommissioning plans when a temporary site ends operations. The A.G. wrote, “The NRC’s licensing and regulatory requirements should provide some assurance that Holtec would be unable to simply abandon the site, given the that the NRC requires financial assurances to cover the cost of decommissioning the site.” Unfortunately, there is no recourse for the state if the federal government fails to create a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel.
The A.G. wrote “The simple answer is that federal law does not appear to afford the state any legal recourse. And, as demonstrated by the fact that interim storage facilities are currently licensed and operated in a majority of states, the absence of a permanent facility does not appear to preclude the NRC from issuing licenses for interim storage facilities.” Regardless of how long it takes for the federal government to create a permanent repository, the state of N.M. has no power to speed up the process.
Ambient office = 99 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 89 nanosieverts per hour
Soil exposed to rain water = 93 nanosieverts per hour
Crimini mushroom from Central Market = 127 nanosieverts per hour
Tap water = 110 nanosieverts per hour
Filter water = 90 nanosieverts per hour
Part 1 of 2 Parts
The U.S. does not have a permanent underground repository for spent nuclear fuel. Until such a repository is constructed, there is a need for temporary storage of spent fuel. The search is on for temporary sites but can encounter resistance from local citizens and politicians.
Holtec International has proposed a temporary repository for up to one hundred thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel rods at a site near the Eddy-Lea county line in New Mexico. The repository is scheduled to begin accepting shipments of spent nuclear fuel in 2022. Holtec applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license in 2017. The application was officially accepted in 2018 which began a public feedback process that will include an NRC environmental impact statement. If all requirements are satisfied, a federal license for Holtec will be the result.
Both houses of the New Mexico legislature have collaborated in the creation of the N.M. Radioactive and Hazarrdous Materials Committed. State Senator Jeff Steinborn is the Chair of the Committee. He sent a list of fifty-seven questions to various state departments last months. Most of those departments forwarded the questions to the NRC.
In mid-July, the Attorney General of New Mexico (A.G.) responded to six of the questions posed by Steinborn. In answer to one question, the A.G. said that the federal government alone can regulate such sites before they go into operation. States can only “indirectly” regulate such sites once they are in operation. He said, “While it is abundantly clear that the state cannot license or otherwise directly regulate interim storage facilities, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that state tort law can provide a remedy for injuries suffered as a result of nuclear plant operation.”
Most nuclear activities in the U.S. are regulated by two federal laws: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA). The NWPA directed the Department of Energy to create a permanent geological repository for nuclear waste including spent nuclear fuel. The NWPA was amended in 2008 to direct the DoE to construct a repository for spent nuclear fuel under Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The project was halted in 2009 because of opposition from Nevada state lawmakers and because of budget cuts by the Obama administration. In 2010, the DoE cancelled its application for the site. Recently, the Trump administration has called for resuming the project at Yucca Mountain.
In the meantime, the NRC does have the authority to license “privately-owned, away-from-reactor” storage facilities to hold spent nuclear fuel temporarily before a permanent repository is constructed. Opposition from states chosen by the NRC for temporary spent fuel storage cannot overrule this NRC authority.
Please read Part 2