Ambient office  = 116 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 79 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 78 nanosieverts per hour

White onion from Central Market = 171 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 102 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 94 nanosieverts per hour

Dover sole – Caught in USA = 89 nanosieverts per hour

Trace Life Sciences (TLS) owned and operated two plants in Denton, Texas where medical radioisotopes were manufactured for diagnosing disease and treating cancer. When the financial backers of the company went into receivership, TLS closed the Denton plants in 2009.
      A linear accelerator was purchased by TLS to use in the manufacture of medical radioisotopes. The accelerator was originally built for the failed Superconductor Super Collider project by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. It currently resides in an underground concrete tunnel. To date, inspectors who visit the Denton facilities regularly have found no signs of outside radiation. It will be most expensive part of the facilities to clean up. 
       NuView Life Sciences (NLS) pulled the Denton plants out of receivership and created US Radiopharmaceuticals (USR), a wholly owned subsidiary of NuView, in an attempt to reopen the Denton facilities and begin manufacturing medical radioisotopes again.
       USR formally applied to the Texas Department of State Health Services (TDSHS) for a new manufacturing license for the Denton facilities in 2012. Investors were sought to support reopening the facility. The new license application that was filed by USR included a requirement that USR have sufficient funds to clean up the radioactive waste when the plants was closed permanently. Special insurance is also available to satisfy the licensing requirements for covering the cost of cleanup. To date, USR has not been able to obtain sufficient investment to reopen the Denton facility.
       While USR has been searching for investors, the state of Texas has allowed USR to store low-level radioactive waste in drums at the Denton plants. The equipment used to make the radioisotopes is also radioactive but has been deemed to pose no threat to the surround area for the time being.
       There was a special hearing held in February where a state administrative judge, USR and state health officials estimated that it would cost from two million to two and a half million dollars to clear up the radioactive waste that is stored at the Denton facilities.
       On July 16th, the TDSHS instructed USR to decommission its two plants in Denton and clean up the radioactive waste stored at the two plants by August of 2019. If they fail to meet that deadline, the job will have to be done by the state health official with the cost being born by the taxpayers.
        Texas does have a special fund for the clean up of low-level radioactive waste. Last year, the fund contained about twenty-seven million dollars. A new audit of the fund will be completed by the Texas comptroller’s office this August. The TDSHS is authorized by Texas state law to attempt to recover the cost of the cleanup from USR, if they fail to meet the deadline for cleaning up the site.
       Medical radioisotopes are critical for some diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Recently there have been global shortages of important medical radioisotopes and countries and companies have been scrambling to find new ways to manufacture medical isotopes and open new facilities to meet the global demand for medical radioisotopes. Unfortunately, the Denton facilities will not be participating in this radiopharmaceuticals renaissance.

Ambient office  = 116 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 79 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 78 nanosieverts per hour

Crimini mushroom from Central Market = 171 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 102 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 94 nanosieverts per hour

Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
        Mark Hibbs, a nuclear expert, also says that Turkey lacks the necessary technology. Turkey also does not have the IAEA safeguards. The IAEA says that they found no evidence of clandestine nuclear activities during its reporting processes. While Hibbs may have documented his conclusions well, the difference in the international climate brought about by the election of Donald Trump between 2015 when Hibbs was researching the Turkish nuclear ambitions and 2018 are very significant.
       Currently, NATO appears fractured following the recent disastrous NATO conference where Trump challenged the funding and very existence of NATO. Russia has been assertive and confrontational since it annexed the Crimea. With respect to nuclear issues, Iran signed a nuclear treaty called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany. Trump has unilaterally withdrawn the U.S. from the treaty and it appears that the whole agreement is collapsing. On the other hand, Trump has rewarded North Korea for its nuclear program and threats by sitting down with the N.K. leader and claiming that N.K. was no longer a nuclear threat.
       Given this international situation, the possibility of nuclear proliferation has increased. There is talk of a nuclear “domino effect” as more and more countries seem to be interested in nuclear weapons programs. The probability seems to be that one country in the Middle East will begin developing nuclear weapons and other states will quickly follow. The prime candidates for such a move are Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Turkey.
        It is clear that the internal situation in Turkey is more conducive to nuclear proliferation than some of the other candidates. President Erdogan was granted new powers to rule by decree after the 2017 referendum and his 2018 re-election. The 2016 attempt at a coup gave him an excuse to purge the military and defense agencies of people who might disagree with and resist dramatic domestic strategic changes.
       Taken together, the new centralized political system, future access to a nuclear fuel cycle, a big investment in delivery systems such as missiles, and the current international situation where proliferation is rewarded makes it much more likely that Turkey will begin its own domestic nuclear weapons program. International security is mainly a matter of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence. It seems probable that Turkey is at least considering, if not actually planning, the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
       Erdogan is playing a dangerous game walking a tightrope between being allied with the U.S. and being allied with Russia. It has recently had confrontations with both and has reached out to both. It is obvious that Turkey aspires to be one of the “great” powers in the Middle East and that nuclear weapons would definitely support that ambition. The political situation in Turkey is unstable with Erdogan working on creating a dictatorship and opposition forces taking to the streets in against Erdogan’s ambitions. Introducing Turkish nuclear weapons into the volatile situation in the Middle East would only increase the danger of war.

Ambient office  = 116 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 79 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 78 nanosieverts per hour

Carrot from Central Market = 171 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 102 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 94 nanosieverts per hour

Part 1 of 2 Parts
       In the past, Turkey has been uninterested in developing nuclear weapons because the U.S. has stationed missiles with nuclear warheads in Turkey since 1959 as part of NATO agreements. It is estimated that there are fifty U.S. B61 nuclear bombs at the Turkish Incirlik Air Base to serve as a deterrent.
       A 2015 report from the Carnegie Institute assessed Turkey’s nuclear posture. The report said that the most probable scenario in which Turkey would seek to acquire nuclear weapons would be if the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. and NATO deteriorated. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. relationship with Turkey has, in fact, deteriorated.
       There are nations in the Middle East and elsewhere who would like to see Turkey lose its place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Russia has signed defense treaties with Turkey including the sale of the S-400 Russian air defense which makes Turkey less dependent on NATO for self-defense. Iran and Syria would both like to see nuclear weapons removed from Turkey. This would reduce the U.S. security presence in the Middle East.
        Turkey has recently been pursuing what is called nuclear latency which consists of acquiring the materials, equipment and technical expertise needed to develop nuclear weapons.
        Turkey’s has shown a strong interest in developing nuclear power plants. While these plants would be generating electricity for Turkey’s energy marketplace, some of the technologies involved could also be used for a nuclear weapons program. This is referred to as “dual use.”
       Turkey first began to work on commercial nuclear power in the 1970s. These initial efforts were abandoned after a Pakistani nuclear test in 1998. Turkey wanted to join the EU and was concerned when Pakistan suffered international condemnation for the nuclear test. They were afraid any involvement in even nuclear power might make it more difficult for them to join the EU.
        Currently, the Akkuyu nuclear power station is being constructed on Turkey’s Mediterranean Coast. The project has awakened the interest of international security analysts for several reasons.
        First, the schedule for its construction is about five years whereas most nuclear builds require from ten to fifteen years as recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It will also be the first nuclear power station ever built under the Russian “Buy Own Operate” (BOO) model. Rosatom, the Russian nuclear company, is building the Akkuyu nuclear power station. Since this is a unique situation it is not clear exact who is responsible for operations, ownership of processes and inspections.
        Second, Turkey is ramping up its indigenous ballistic missile program and other related defense products. Turkey launched its first fully indigenous missile in the spring of 2017. Domestic defense spending increased almost forty percent from 2016 to 2017.
        It has been suggested by some analysts that Turkey appears to have a strong desire for nuclear weapons. One response to this is that Turkey does not have the capability or the equipment necessary to start a nuclear weapons program and that the claim that they are working on nuclear weapons is propaganda for domestic consumption. A former Turkish parliamentarian said, “Erdogan has a strong desire to make Turkey into a nuclear power, but not the capacity,” and that the “pro–government media often exaggerate the strength of the military to increase morale in Turkey”.
Please read Part 2