Ambient office  = 100 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 165 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 158 nanosieverts per hour

Crimini mushroom from Central Market = 115 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 115 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 107 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient office  = 67 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 90 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 95 nanosieverts per hour

Carrot from Central Market = 89 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 73 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 66 nanosieverts per hour

Dover sole – Caught in USA = 100 nanosieverts per hour

Part 2 of 3 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
       A third reason that China does not want to talk about NPPs in the BRI context is the fact that China intends to build NPPs in countries with lax regulatory environments. This constitutes a major risk to the security of the global community of nations. For example, Sudan is an important part of the BRI. When the Institute for Science and International Security ranked two hundred nations with respect to their ability to limit the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, Sudan was near the bottom of the list. Sudan has not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol which improves the ability of the IAEA to verify that nuclear fuel is only used for civil energy purposes.
      China is locked in a battle with Russia to corner the market on nuclear technology exports. The export of NPPs to developing nations is part of their strategic plan whether or not it makes sense for the nations accepting the Chinese deals. Nuclear energy costs too much money, too much time and is too risky to be a good choice for these countries. And, renewable energy is rapidly dropping below the cost of fossil fuels and nuclear power. They do not need Chinese nuclear power reactors.
       Nuclear power supporters like to point out that the comparable levelized cost of nuclear power is about the same as it is for solar photovoltaics. The problem is that this is based on estimates of the cost of the power source over its lifetime. The cost of solar is dropping but the cost of nuclear is not. Instead of getting cheaper when a country expands it nuclear sophistication and infrastructure, the cost of constructing and operating nuclear reactors usually rises. In addition, the cost of nuclear plant construction almost always rises sharply during construction and the schedule for completion almost always slips seriously. On the other hand, the cost of additional wind and solar installations falls with experience.
       China boasts of being at the forefront of the development of advanced nuclear reactor designs. They like to point to their internally designed Hualong-One reactor as an example of their inventiveness that is competitive with other reactor designs. They are planning to build copies of this reactor design in at least five countries at widely separated locations. There are no Hualong-One reactors currently in operation anywhere. Based on the evidence to date, innovation and experience in nuclear technololgy may not lead to cost reduction.
      In addition to the new Hualong-One design, the European Union is working on the new European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) and Westinghouse in the U.S. is touting the new AP1000 reactor design. In December of 2017, the first EPR reactor ever build was coming on line in China. During a test, a boiler cracked and the schedule for completion slipped. This was the third delay in two years and it cost the project seven hundred and seventy million dollars. Meanwhile, an AP1000 reactor also being built in China had to be delayed a month after the EPR problem. Delays are common on NPPs. Currently, fifty-five nuclear power plants are under construction. So far, two thirds of these projects are behind schedule, so delays are more common than not.
      The is also the threat of terrorism to worry about. In the three years between 2013 and 2016, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies reports that there were almost seven hundred incidents where radioactive materials were stolen or lost in forty-six countries. In that time, there have been nine thefts of highly radioactive materials in Mexico alone.

Please read Part 3

Ambient office  = 80 nanosieverts per hour

Ambient outside = 126 nanosieverts per hour

Soil exposed to rain water = 129 nanosieverts per hour

Beefsteak tomato from Central Market = 123 nanosieverts per hour

Tap water = 143 nanosieverts per hour

Filter water = 129 nanosieverts per hour

Part 1 of 3 Parts 
       On a number of occasions, I have blogged about my fears that developing nations could be walking into a trap if they accepted offers of nuclear technology exporting nations such as Russia and China to build, fuel, operate, and dispose of spent fuel from nuclear power plants in those developing nations. The deals can look very attractive with the exporters offering big loans on generous terms and a complete package of services.
       China announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. They are dedicating over a trillion dollars to projects in a swath of nations from China to Europe for the stated purpose of trade creation, economic development and renewable energy. However, concerns have grown over the possible military strategic benefits of the BRI which China has tried to soft-pedal.
       The Chinese government has created several websites associated with the BRI. It is interesting and a little odd that none of those websites make any mention of nuclear power plant (NPP) projects although China has plans to build over thirty nuclear power plants as part of the BRI. Many of the countries where the Chinese intend to build NPPs are not members of any non-proliferation treaties and they do not have regulatory frameworks for safeguarding nuclear plants and materials.
       Developing nations who are the target of the Chinese nuclear export business should be under no illusion that China is offering them these deals out of kindness. China has economic and geostrategic goals of its own that will be furthered by spreading around Chinese nuclear power reactors in developing nations whether or not they benefit the customers.
       The vision statement for the BRI says that one of the goals is to advance nuclear power cooperation and the Belt and Road Energy Cooperation website does mention some bilateral nuclear agreements. Many of the countries that are considered as prospects for Chinese nuclear exports are part of the BRI initiative. However, as mentioned above, three main websites for the BRI make no mention of NPPs.
      One of the reasons that China might not want to mention and publicize the NPPs is because many nuclear technologies are dual-use. This means that the same technology that can produce enriched uranium for nuclear fuel can also enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Keeping NPPs out of the publicity for the BRI reduces public concern about possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the BRI countries.
       A second reason for China to avoid publicizing BRI NPPs is the fact that China has been guilty of violating its obligations under the rules of the international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of which it is a member. It has provided nuclear materials to countries including Pakistan who are not members of the NSG and are not entitled to receive such materials under the rules of the NSG. Pakistan has not agreed to employ International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or to slow down its nuclear weapons program. In spite of this, China is involved in six NPP projects in Pakistan.

Please read Part 2