The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Part One of Two parts
In the year 2000, the U.S. Federal Government computer networks were attacked by foreign entities. In reaction to these intrusions, Congress created the Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC) at the General Services Administration. The FedCIRC was designed to be central hub to coordinate and share information between federal organizations.
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2002, the duties of the FedCIRC were transferred to the DHS. In 2003, FedCIRC changed its name to U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team or US-Cert. Its mission was enlarged to provide boundary protection for the federal civilian executive computers and leadership in the field of cybersecurity. With the passage of time, US-CERT has become a trusted agency and reliable source of information about cyberspace for the Federal government, state and local governments, private businesses and international organizations.
One of the main things that US-CERT does is to receive reports of computer security incidents within the U.S. Federal Government. An incident is considered to be a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies or standard security practices. After collecting incident reports, studies are conducted, and conclusions reported. The US-CERT publishes Weekly Vulnerability Bulletins, Technical Alerts, Current Activities entries and Tips.
Yesterday, US-CERT published an alert that said that Russia had hacked into the computers of many government agencies and U.S. companies in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and critical manufacturing sectors – in summary, they have infiltrated a lot of our critical national infrastructure. The Russians have been doing this for years including the massive attack on our 2016 elections, but we have done little to respond or stop these intrusions to date.
Our national electrical grid is system of systems. It is managed by thousands of people, computers and manual control systems. Data is supplied by thousands of sensors connected by a variety of communication networks. Over the next twenty years, especially with the much-publicized Internet of Things, there will be a great deal more data traveling over the national grid than electricity.
MIT recently published report in which they said that it will be impossible to completely protect the national grid from cyberattacks or accidents. In view of this reality, MIT said that we need to have mechanisms in place to quickly respond to intrusions and quickly restore the security and operation of the grid. These mechanisms should be spread to every entity connected to critical grid infrastructure.
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Working Group has identified one hundred and thirty-seven types of interconnections between different systems in the national grid. It is assumed that eventually every smart meter and most sensors and critical pieces of equipment will be equipped with their own communication modules. Components and software will be supplied from hundreds of different companies. The North American Electric Reliability AInfrastructure Protection standards covering the national power system, but no organization presently has responsibility for overseeing grid cybersecurity across all aspects of our energy systems.
Please read Part 2
Every year, an estimated two thousand six hundred tons of spent nuclear fuel is generated by nuclear power reactors in the U.S. Roughly fifty thousand tons of spent nuclear fuel are currently stored in cooling pools at reactor sites around the U.S. Many cooling pools are reaching their limit. Another fifteen thousand tons of spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in dry casks onsite and at interim storage facilities. Without a permanent geological repository for spent nuclear fuel in the U.S., a great deal more of the spent nuclear fuel in the cooling pools will have to be moved to dry cask storage. While some of these casks will be stored onsite, many more will be moved to interim facilities. This will require the transport of thousands of metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from reactor sites to interim storage facilities.
Sandia National Laboratories recently completed with they are calling a nuclear “triathlon” to improve the safety of spent nuclear fuel transport. This exercise consisted of moving a simulated cargo of spent nuclear fuel rods over fourteen thousand miles. The purpose of the “triathlon” was to monitor the stresses and jolts that such a fuel experiences while being transported. Transportation of spent nuclear fuel involves packaging the fuel rods with strict adherence to regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition to regulatory satisfaction, the public must be confident that every precaution has been taken in transporting spent nuclear fuel.
For over thirty years, spent nuclear fuel has been stored in what are referred to as Type B casks. Each of these casks weights about one hundred and twenty-five tons. Each can carry twenty-four tons of spent nuclear fuel. The spent nuclear fuel is in the form of rectangular bundles (called assemblies) of long, thin zirconium rods. The rods contain pellets of either enriched uranium or plutonium. The casks are forged from solid steel and have steel hatches with gaskets. The special reinforced pins that attach the hatches can survive one hundred tons of force. When the casks are loaded and sealed, they are so strong that they could survive the impact of a one-thousand-ton diesel locomotive going one hundred miles an hour.
The fuel rods themselves are very fragile. After being in a hot, high radiation environment for a few years, the zirconium shells, called cladding, are very brittle. If extreme care is not use when handling the fuel rod assemblies, they may shatter.
SNL partnered with Spanish and South Korean partners. They also worked with Pacific Northwest and Argonne national laboratories. A new dry cask was loaded with three dummy fuel rod assemblies. The rods were made of lead and contained lead pellets. The casks are designed to carry up to thirty-two complete fuel rod assemblies but the test cast only had three fuel rod assemblies. Additional space was take up by accelerometers and strain gauges to measure everything that each of the fuel rod assemblies experienced during their trip. A custom monitoring system tracked shocks and vibrations that the cask and the fuel rod assemblies were subjected to during the trip.
SNL has conducted other tests in the past including simulating the transport of fuel rod assemblies over city streets and rough roads. They also simulated a journey by rail of fuel rod assemblies.
The new test or triathlon used a Spanish dry cask which traveled by heavy truck over highways in Spain two hundred and fifty miles to a seaport. The cask was then transferred to a barge where it traveled a thousand miles along the coast to Belgium. Next it was placed on a cargo ship and spent two weeks traveling four thousand miles to Baltimore in the U.S. After arriving in the U.S., the cask was put on flatbed railway car. It then traveled over two thousand miles through twelve states before it arrived in at the Transportation Technology Center Inc facility near Pueblo, Colorado. At the Center, the cask engaged in some experiments on a fifty-mile test track. Finally, the cask reversed its route back to Spain. Over eight terabytes of data were acquired which will require at least a year to analyze.