The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
In late 2006, the Israelis became aware of a construction site in a remote area of northeastern Syria under a huge roof to conceal whatever was being built. Israeli intelligence decided that the Syrians were trying to construct a nuclear reactor. They had a policy since 1976 that they would not allow any enemy to have nuclear weapons.
In February of 2007, a high ranking Iranian military officer defected to the United States. When he was debriefed, he gave details of the Syrian nuclear program including the fact that Iran had provided money and North Korea had provided expertise. They were constructing a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor at the remote construction site that was intended to produce plutonium for nuclear warheads.
In March of 2007, the Israelis searched a hotel room in Vienna occupied by the head of the Syrian nuclear energy commissions. From a laptop left in the room, Israeli intelligence obtained detailed information and images from the remote construction site that confirmed beyond doubt that the Syrians were building a nuclear reactor. They also learned that the reactor was within months of completion. If Israel waited for the reactor to be finished and put into operation, any airstrike would risk spreading nuclear fallout.
In April of 2007, the Israelis briefed U.S. military officials. The Bush administration was leery of acting quickly because of the debacle with missing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq during the U.S. war there. While U.S. CIA agreed with Israel, other U.S. officials and foreign governments were skeptical and afraid of escalation of Middle East conflicts.
In June of 2007, the Israeli Prime Minister visited the White House and told the President that Israel might act alone against Syria if the U.S. refused to be involved. The President responded by suggesting that he would not interfere if Israel decided to attack Syria by itself.
The Israeli military began gathering information for an attack on the Syrian reactor site while the Israeli politicians debated the wisdom of such an attack. The mission to destroy the Syrian reactor was called Operation Orchard. On September 5th of 2007, the Israeli military received permission to attack Syria.
That night ten F-15 and F16 Israeli fighters took off from the Ramat David airbase in Israel. They flew north along the coast and then turned inland along the Syrian-Turkish border. They deployed electronic countermeasures and destroyed a radar station as they entered Syrian airspace. The planes successfully destroyed the Syrian reactor under construction and returned home.
The next day, the Syrians announced that Israeli planes had penetrated Syrian airspace but had been detected and had retreated without attacking Syrian targets. The Syrian president denied all reports of any Syrian work on a nuclear reactor. Israel kept silent because they did not want to admit their successful attack. Eventually the whole story was made public.
Now Israel is worried that Iran may be working on the development of a nuclear arsenal. Given the facts of the Iraqi and Syrian attacks, it is probable that Israel might attempt an attack on Iran. Unfortunately for Israel, Iran is equipped with sophisticated radar and anti-aircraft missiles from Russia. They have also buried a number of military facilities deep underground. If Israel does attempt an attack, they might not reach their targets and, even if they do, they might not be able to destroy them. Iran has a lot of conventional missiles and any attack by Israel could prompt an attack on Israel by conventional weapons. It is a volatile situation and, hopefully, cooler heads can prevail in Israel and Iran to prevent a violent conflict.
U.S. Government photo of destroyed Syrian reactor:
Part 1 of 2 Parts
It is widely assumed that Israel has about a hundred nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them. I have written before that I believe that if Israel was attacked and felt that they were on the brink of defeat, they would unleash their nuclear arsenal against their attackers. In any case, in the late 1970s, their Prime Minister promoted the policy that no enemy state should be allowed to acquire nuclear arms.
In 1976, Iraq attempted to buy a gas cooled graphite- moderated plutonium-producing reactor and plutonium reprocessing plant but the French had turned them down. Next, they tried to buy a heavy water moderated Cirene reactor from Italy but that request was also denied. Finally, they managed to convince the French to sell them an Osiris-class research reactor. A small Isis class reactor, about thirty pounds of ninety three percent enriched uranium and training were also part of the deal. The Iraqis claimed that the French reactor which was named Osirak was for peaceful scientific research but the Israeli were suspicious and counter-claimed that it was intended for the production of nuclear weapons.
The Iran-Iraq war began in September of 1980. Eight days after the war started, the Iranians attacked the Iraqi reactor in their Operation Scorched Sword. Four F-4E Iranian Phantom Jets flew into Iraq and proceeded to the town of Tuwaitha where the Osirak reactor was located and proceed to bomb the reactor. There was minimal damage done to the reactor and the attack did not slow down the Iraqi nuclear program.
The Israelis were very concerned about the construction of the Osirak reactor in Iraqi. They had been debating taking action while the sale was being finalized. In 1977, the new Israeli Prime Minister stepped up planning and had a full-scale model of the reactor built to practice bombing.
The Israelis also carried out a series of covert operations to try to slow down construction of the reactor. In April of 1979, the Israelis destroyed the first set of core structures for the Osirak reactor by planting a bomb in France before the structures could be shipped to Iraq. Later in the year, the Prime Minister decided that it was time to authorize a full out attack on the reactor which was referred to Operation Opera. Following that decision, Israel carried out an assassination and more bombing to slow down the Osirak project.
Although it was an enemy of Israel, Iran was so concerned about Iraq completing their reactor, that they cooperated with the Israelis. They provided valuable information about the site and their earlier failed attack. They staged a major strike at the Iraqi air force to help Israel.
On June 7 of 1981, eight Israeli F-16 fighter-bomber jets left Israel’s Etzion Airbase and flew though Jordanian and Saudi airspace without challenge. During their flight, they crossed over the Gulf of Aqaba where King Hussein of Jorden was sailing his yacht. The King recognized the planes as Israeli and sent a message to his government to warn Iraq. Fortunately for the Israelis, the warning was never received. Within two minutes, the Osirak reactor was bombed into rubble.
The U.N. condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor and demanded that Israel pay reparations to Iraq which Israel refused to do. There was some talk of starting up the project again but eventually France withdrew and the Iraqis gave up. The remains of the Osirak were ultimately pulverized in the 1991 Gulf War.
Please read Part 2
Israeli F-16 used in attack on Osirak reactor.
When the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, it bought itself a whole lot of problems. As a member of the E.U. the U.K. was automatically included in Europeans associations such as the ones that dealt specifically with nuclear matters such as obtaining nuclear fuel and other nuclear components as well as regulating the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. Now that the U.K. is leaving the E.U., it will have to negotiate a whole series of new arrangements with respect to nuclear power.
Last month, the Nuclear Safeguard Bill was published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategies (BEIS). The BEIS is dedicated to developing a domestic safeguards program as a necessary part of the exit of the U.K. from the European Atomic Energy Community (Euroatom). Euroatom is a 1957 treaty governing the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the E.U. Technically, Euroatom is a separate legal entity from the E.U. but the same institutions that govern the E.U. govern Euroatom. Now the U.K. Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has issued two “clarifications” of the impact assessment of the BEIS.
The first clarification sounds like it ought to be a basis assumption that does not need to be explicitly stated. It says that ONR regulates the nuclear industry; it does not provide services to it. The second clarification is that the ONR intends to create a regulator framework which is robust and comprehensive as the Euroatom framework. They say that they are not concerned with assessing efficiencies at this time. When they develop secondary legislation for BEIS, they will provide “advice to the government to inform the anticipated impact assessment for nuclear safeguards regulation.”
The impact assessment last month stated that the civil nuclear sector is subject to strict international non-proliferation regulations including nuclear safeguards. These are required to allow the U.K. to carry out civil nuclear trade which will allow nuclear power to play a major role in energy security for the U.K. as well as lowering U.K. carbon emissions. The primary objective, of course, is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
The current U.K. nuclear safeguard obligations are part of its membership in the E.U. and a new set of safeguards will be needed to meet international standards as the U.K. leaves the E.U. The statement from ONR said, “There are no precedents for a non-EU Member State being a Member State of Euratom, so when we formally notified our intention to leave the EU we also commenced the process for leaving Euratom.”
There are two options for the U.K. to carry out the necessary process of creation new regulations. The preferred option is to adopt domestic nuclear safeguards that are equivalent to the Euroatom safeguards to insure that the U.K. would maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety.
The second option would be to create a domestic nuclear safeguards program that would not be a cloning of the current Euroatom nuclear safeguards. While all regulated facilities would receive vigorous oversight, there would still be a reduction in the frequency and intensity of inspections while still meeting the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Parliament is divided on the passage of the Nuclear Safeguard Bill at the moment. It is hoped that the BEIS will receive Royal Assent sometime this year.
