The United Arab Emirates has denied a report that Yemen’s Houthi rebels fired a cruise missile towards its airspace. Aljazeera.com
The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Part 1 of 4 parts
Saudi Arabia has been in the news a lot lately because of changes in the government. The Crown Prince who will soon be king has arrested a bunch of powerful Saudi government officials and businessmen and is talking about sweeping changes to the desert kingdom such as moving to a more moderate form of Islam and signing a cooperative agreement with Israel to oppose their common enemy, Iran. Now the U.S. Trump administration is considering providing sensitive nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia.
Although Saudi Arabia is very rich in oil, they want to build their own nuclear power reactors, so they can save their oil for export. They have their own reserves of uranium ore and want to extract and enrich it to fuel the reactors they want to build. It is believed that they want to have the ability to enrich uranium because Iran has that capability. If Iran does ever develop nuclear weapons, it is likely that Saudi Arabia would use their nuclear technology for the development of their own nuclear weapons as a counter
In response to questions about their interest in developing nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia issued a statement that said, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, hence is diversifying its energy mix to serve its domestic needs in accordance with international laws and standards. The Kingdom has been actively exploring diverse energy sources for nearly the last decade to meet growing domestic demand.”
While much of the technology used for nuclear weapons is different from that used in nuclear power plants, there is some overlap. In order to make nuclear fuel, it is necessary to enrich uranium to over four percent U-235. Nuclear weapons require enrichment to over ninety percent U-235. The same technology that can enrich uranium for fuel can also be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. In addition, the spent fuel produced by nuclear power reactors can be reprocessed to obtain uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. Nuclear non-proliferation organizations and treaties prefer that new members of the nuclear power club buy their fuel and dispose of their spent fuel on the international nuclear market to preclude enrichment and reprocessing.
Saudi Arabia needs permission from the U.S. government in order to receive sensitive U.S. nuclear technology. Previously, attempts to come to an agreement over access to U.S. technology had failed because Saudi Arabia refused to agree to safeguards to prevent the use of the technology for the creation of nuclear weapons. This is called the dual use problem because certain nuclear technologies can be used for either peaceful nuclear power development or for nuclear weapons development.
In 2008, the Saudi government made a nonbinding commitment to the U.S. that they would not pursue enrichment and reprocessing. Once that had been done, they began negotiations for an agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation called a 123 agreement after a section of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Such an agreement is a prerequisite for obtaining sensitive U.S. nuclear technology.
The U.S. government was afraid that there might be a domino effect if Saudi Arabia obtained sensitive U.S. nuclear technology. The U.S. has agreements with both the United Arab Emirates and Egypt that prevent their receipt of sensitive U.S. nuclear technology unless the U.S. provided such technology to another Middle Eastern country such as Saudi Arabia.
Please read Part 2
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a set of rules for where people should be evacuated in case of a nuclear accident in which radioactive materials are released. While the exact plan for emergency procedures is tailored to each site depending on geography, wind, and other conditions, there are general rules for considering evacuation. Everyone in a two-mile radius of the accident site should be evacuated. In addition, there should be an evacuation of everyone downwind of the accident out to five miles from the site. Some critics of the rules for evacuation are raising questions about its necessity.
Delving into the dangers of nuclear accidents that may affect the life expectancy of someone who may be exposed to radioactive materials, there is a measure called “Change of life expectancy from averting a radiation exposure” or CLEARE. This can tell you how much a specific amount of radiation will reduce your estimated lifespan on average. On the other hand, the costs of evacuations should be taken into account as well. In order to measure these costs, a method called the judgement or J-value has been developed. This basically tells you how much quality of life people are willing to sacrifice in order to increase their remaining life expectancy. Eventually everyone reaches a point where they are no longer willing to pay the cost of a longer life with reduced quality.
The J-value can be calculated for a particular country. First you find out what the average of the gross domestic product is per person. Then risk aversion can be computed based on information about work and life balance. When this information is entered in the J-value model, you wind up with the maximum amount that a person will be willing to pay for a longer life expectancy.
Following the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan, more than one hundred and ten thousand people were immediately evacuated. Another fifty thousand left voluntarily. Four and a half years later, eighty-five thousand had not returned. When the new J-value was applied to that evacuatioin, it was estimated that exposure to the radioactive emissions from the disaster would have reduced the life expectancies of the evacuees by about three months. This suggests that the cost of evacuation was much higher than any expected benefit for the evacuees. It turns out that the average loss of life expectancy in London, England due to the air pollution is about four and a half months but no one is suggesting that people evacuate the city because of it.
The J-value system was also used to assess the decision to evacuate people after the world worst nuclear accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in 1986. Over one hundred thousand people were permanently evacuated in 1986 and another two hundred and twenty thousand people were evacuated in 1990. The J-value model suggested that people should only have been evacuated if their radiation exposure reduced their average life expectancy by nine months. It turns out that only thirty-one thousand people out of the three hundred and thirty six thousand evacuees would have suffered such a reduction of life expectancy. That amounts to less than ten percent.
Researchers at the University of Manchester in England investigated the J-value model in application to hundreds of possible big nuclear reactor accidents all over the world. Their findings indicated that none of the cases they studied would benefit from evacuation.
In addition to questions of life expectancy, there are also psychological impacts. When the media is saturated with dire warnings in the aftermath of a nuclear accident, many people believe that they are in much greater danger than is really the case. All in all, the requirement for evacuation after a major nuclear accident needs to be reexamined and perhaps radically altered.