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The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Part 2 of 2 parts (Please read Part 1 first)
The study determined the number of W76 warheads that would be needed to attack a Russian missile base with hardened missile silos. The W76 warhead of that time had a fixed height-of-burst fuze. This means that the fuze could not adjust its detonation for the best location if the missile were falling short of the target or overshooting the target. Because of this, missile launched from submarines were mainly targeted at Russian military bases which were large enough that accurate targeting was not as critical as that required for destroying a hardened missile silo.
The report stated that an enhanced Mk4A reentry body with a new fuze design that allowed adjustment of the height of the detonation as it approach the target would have much improved capability to destroy a hardened target such as a missile silo. This meant that a smaller number of W76 nuclear warheads could reliably destroy a Russian missile base as compared to the old style with fixed-fuzes. The U.S. would be able to reduce the number of warheads on a submarine while increasing the lethality of an attack launched from a submarine.
When considering the accuracy of a missile warhead, there is a factor called the “miss distance” measured by something called the “circular error probable” (CEP). The CEP is defined as the radius of a circle around the targeted point within which half of the warheads aimed at a target are expected to impact. For a W76-1 ballistic missile warhead, the lethal distance on the ground and the CEP are about equal. This means that about half of a group of warheads with the old fixed-fuze systems should land close enough to a target to be within the lethal distance.
The new super-fuze for the W76-1/Mk4A has the ability to detonate at any height within the lethal volume over a target. Even though the super-fuze equipped warhead has basically the same ballistic accuracy as the old fixed-fuze versions, the chances that the super-fuze warhead will destroy the target are much greater than the chances for a fixed-fuze version of the warhead.
The super-fuze measures its altitude when it is above the atmosphere over the target. If the altitude measured is the altitude expected from the launch trajectory, then the warhead is exactly on target. On the other hand, if the altitude measured is higher than expected, the warhead would hit beyond the target and if the altitude measured is lower than expected, the warhead would hit short of the target. Armed with the actual altitude, the super-fuze is able to adjust the detonation for maximum destructive effect on the target.
Armed with a super-fuze, the probability that a missile will achieve a successful hit on a target is about eighty-six percent. If the missiles were using a fixed-fuze, then it would require at least three missiles to insure an eighty-six percent probability of success. In other words, the number of warheads on a submarine could be reduced by two thirds without reducing the success of an attack.
This great improvement in the targeting ability of the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet has not been publicized, although it has serious implications with respect to strategic stability. If it were widely known exactly what the super-fuze device can do, it would have a powerful impact on perceptions of U.S. nuclear strategy and intentions.
With more killing power resulting from the super-fuze, the small warheads on submarine missiles could take out Russian missile silos and many other targets. This would allow the use of more powerful land-based U.S. missiles to be dedicated to other targets. All in all, potential adversaries of the U.S. have to consider that the super-fuze augmentation of U.S. submarine warheads greatly improves the chances that the U.S. could successfully destroy an enemy such as Russia in a first-strike surprise attack.
W76-1/Mk4A warhead:
Part 1 of 2 Parts
I have discussed some of the U.S. plans for “modernization” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in previous posts. The rationale offered the U.S. public is that these changes are needed to ensure the reliability and safety of U.S. nuclear warheads. However, some of these plans have caused Russia to accuse the U.S. of violating treaties meant to limit the number of nuclear warheads and the capabilities of nuclear delivery systems in both nations.
Critics of the modernization program claim that the U.S. is actually implementing advanced technologies that will result a great improvement in the targeting ability of U.S. ballistic missiles. Analysts say that these improvements would give U.S. nuclear missiles three times the killing power of the current missiles. It is further charged that the changes being made are exactly the type of changes that a nation would make if it were trying to develop the capability of disarming an enemy with a surprise first strike.
Improvements in the killing power of U.S. nuclear-armed submarines means that the U.S. fleet of deployed nuclear submarines are carrying three times the estimated number of warheads that would be required to destroy the entire arsenal of Russian land based ballistic missiles. Submarine-based missiles in the U.S. arsenal can carry multiple warheads and there are hundreds of warheads in storage that could be deployed to U.S. submarines to increase their firepower.
The great increase in the killing power of U.S. submarine missiles is the result of the development of what is called a “super-fuze” device. Since 2009, this new device has being incorporated into the W76-1/Mk4A warheads during a ten year long “life-extension” program for those warheads. Analysts believe that all the warheads currently deployed on U.S. ballistic missile submarines have this new device.
The innovations represented by the super-fuze device would appear to be minor when viewed by people without extensive technical knowledge of nuclear warheads. This means that most policy makers are simply not aware of how revolutionary the impact of the super-fuze is on the capabilities of the warheads that incorporate the device. This impact is not being taken into account in most discussions of the implications of changes in nuclear warheads for global security.
Before the creation and deployment of the super-fuze devices, even the most accurate ballistic missile warheads might not detonate close enough to a hardened target to destroy it. The super-fuze device is able to detonate a warhead above and around a fixed target in a much more destructive way. Even though the accuracy of the missile-warhead system itself has not been improved, the use of the super-fuze makes the probability of destroying a target much more likely. Before the deployment of the super-fuze device, only about one in five U.S. submarine warheads would reliably destroy a hardened target such as a Russian missile in its silo. Now all deployed nuclear warheads in the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet have this ability.
When a warhead detonates above a target, there is a zone where the detonation will destroy the target. This is known as the “lethal volume.” The idea of improving the killing power of a W76 warhead with a new type of fuze device was first suggested in a 1994 study by the U.S. Department of Defence and the U.S. Department of Energy.
Please read Part 2
USS Sam Rayburn (SSBN-635) – Ballistic missile submarine: