The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
One concern about nuclear weapons does not get a lot of press. Nuclear weapons have to be transported around countries that possess nuclear arsenals. The convoy of trucks that moves nuclear weapons around are vulnerable to highway accidents and tempting targets for terrorists. There is currently a debate over security of nuclear weapons transportation in Scotland.
The United Kingdom transports nuclear weapons across Scotland at least eight times a year from the nuclear weapons factory at Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire to the Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, northwest of Glasgow. The routes pass through fifteen local jurisdictions. Claims are being made that none of them have studied the potential for problems with such shipment nor have any of them warned communities along the route about the potential dangers.
Nukewatch UK monitors the convoys that carry the nuclear weapons. They have just produced a report titled Unready Scotland. In the report, they accuse the local councils along the route of failing to carry out their obligations under the 2004 Civil Contingencies Scotland Act. This law requires the local councils to carry out risk assessment studies to identify threats to public safety and then warn the public of the dangers that are found. Nukewatch UK also said the report that Scottish members of Parliament did not provide any assistance in the study. The conclusion of the report says “Local authorities are failing in their duties under the Act in respect of nuclear weapon convoys and the Scottish Government is in turn failing to ensure compliance.”
In case there was an accident on one of the convoys, the U.K. Ministry of Defense would have responsibility to deal with the immediate impact at the site of the accident. The Scottish government would have the responsibility of dealing with the repercussions of the accident away from the exact site of the accident. The Nukewatch UK report says that Scottish ministers are “wholly unprepared to discharge that responsibility.”
The convoys move their dangerous cargo hundreds of miles through dense urban areas in Scotland but even the police officers along the way do not know about the convoys and their cargo. The Nuclear UK report says “We have now reached the point where concerns about the public safety implications of the UK’s transport of nuclear warheads across Scotland can no longer be waved away. The MoD seems to be more ready to acknowledge the risks of this transport than are the civil authorities in Scotland. The MoD seems to be more ready to acknowledge the risks of this transport than are the civil authorities in Scotland. Oversight of the effectiveness of the civil authority response rests squarely with the Scottish Government and a thorough review of that response is urgently required.”
The Scottish Green Party has commented that “there is a huge and critical gap in our emergency planning and that action was essential to rebuild public trust. It was disturbing that councils had not examined bomb convoy risks. Councils have not assessed the impact of a release of radioactive material from these convoys yet they have assessed the risk from incidents such as flooding and explosions at industrial sites.”
Representatives for local Scottish councils reject the accusation that they are not prepared for accidents involving such convoys. They claim that they have assessed the risks of accidents involving hazardous materials shipment and necessary precautions and warnings. They also say that primary responsibility for dealing with any accidents involving the convoys lies with the MoD has the primary responsibility.
The MoD claims that the Nuclear UK report is “highly speculative and scaremongering.” They say that “Public safety is our absolute priority and robust arrangements are in place to ensure the safety and security of all these convoys. There has never been an incident posing a radiation hazard.”
It is fortunate that concerns about local and national government readiness to deal with any accidents of nuclear weapons convoys in Scotland are being debated. It appears that there is a serious disagreement about such readiness and it needs to be addressed to find the actual truth of the matter.
By the end of 2017, solar PV capacity will rival nuclear. By 2022, it could more than double nuclear capacity. Greentechmedia.com
Colonel Albert Bachmann decided that the West Cork area of Ireland was one of the least likely places in the world to suffer from nuclear fall-out. Irishexaminer.com
There have been a lot of stories in the news lately about the possibility of nuclear war. Threats and counter threats have flowed to and from North Korea. One big question that has gotten a lot of ink is how exactly how a nuclear strike would be authorized for the Unites States military.
Our current system allows the President of the U.S. to unilaterally call for the launch of nuclear weapons against other nations. The window for deciding whether the U.S. should launch nuclear weapons in case another country launched a nuclear weapon against the U.S. is on the order of a few minutes.
The President would convene senior military leaders in the War Room if he were in residence at the White House. Otherwise, there is a special procedure to verify the President’s identity if he is calling from a remote location. They would have a few minutes to discuss it and try to change his mind if they did not believe that a launch was necessary to protect the country. Regardless of anything that they said, if the President was not convinced to stop, they would be duty bound to communicate the order to launch to our triad of delivery system.
There has been a lot of discussion in the media lately because some question the mental stability of our current President. Many believe that a decision to participate in a nuclear exchange that could destroy our civilization should never rest with just one man. Bills are being written in Congress to require more checks and more people in any decision to launch our nuclear weapons.
It turns out that this is not a new problem. Once before in the history of our country, the mental stability of a U.S. President was in question when he ordered the launch of nuclear weapons.
Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States in the fall of 1968. He was very anti-Communist and had spoken harshly about communist governments including North Korea during the campaign. In early 1969, N.K. shot down an U.S. EC-121 spy plane over the Sea of Japan. This infuriated Nixon and he called on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft plans for a nuclear strike on N.K. and suggest targets. It turns out that he was drunk the evening that he made the call.
An Air Force pilot who was stationed in South Korea at the time of the downing of the EC-121 recalls receiving orders to prepare to drop a three hundred and thirty pound nuclear bomb on an air strip in N.K. He was relieved when the order to stand down came the next day.
Henry Kissinger recounts that he called the Joint Chiefs following Nixon’s call and requested that they wait until morning when the President was sober and could reconsider his plan to nuke N.K. In the morning, Nixon did reconsider and the plan was cancelled. Kissinger later remarked that Nixon seemed to be eager to engage in nuclear war on a number of occasions. Fortunately for the U.S. and the rest of the world, cooler heads prevailed and he never did unleash the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
This story highlights the danger of putting the control the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the hands of one man.
Richard Nixon, 37th President of the United States:
