The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
One important reason for the U.S. participation in NATO was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In return for the promise of U.S. retaliation for any nuclear attacks, NATO members agreed not to build their own nuclear weapons. Now, with the U.S. President criticizing NATO and threatening to withdraw U.S. nuclear protection, European countries are rethinking their stance on developing their own nuclear weapons programs. They are also exploring the idea of collaborating with each other in the development and deployment of nuclear deterrence based on existing French nuclear weapons.
The German Parliament recently commissioned a study on the question of whether or not they could legally help finance a French nuclear weapons program in return for obtaining protection against nuclear attacks from such a program. The study reached the conclusion that Germany could legally participate in such a project. It would be legitimate for French nuclear weapons to be deployed on German soil. The study also found that the European Union could participate in such a program if they made changes to their budgeting rules.
Most analysts do not believe that any such arrangement is imminent. German officials generally oppose taking any such action. There is serious public opposition to nuclear weapons in Germany. There would be serious diplomatic problems that would have to be solved in order for any such project to proceed. On the other hand, statements by the U.S. President are forcing Germany to consider responses to the loss of U.S. nuclear protection. Recent Russian aggression in Eastern Europe is also putting pressure on Germany to reconsider their previous opposition to nuclear weapons.
The study concluded that Germany could have shared control of deployed foreign warheads under a “dual key” system. In a dual key system, two keys wielded by two different people have to be turned simultaneously in order to activate a device such as a missile launch system. Such a system in the present discussion would be having both a German technician and a French technician possess one of the required keys to launch nuclear warheads.
The study was originally requested by a member of the German Parliament last year. It has been suggested that the reason that the study was only carried out recently may be related to the election of Emmanuel Macron to the Presidency of France. Macron has advocated creating some sort of defensive cooperation between France and Germany.
Any pan-European nuclear defensive system would require the cooperation of France and Germany. France has an advanced nuclear weapons program and is well suited to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons that could be used against Russian aggression. Poland has also expressed support for German involvement in a European nuclear defense program.
Analysts say that exploring the legality of financing a European nuclear defense program is a small first step. It may very well be that Germany conducted the study as much to persuade the U.S. not to withdraw nuclear protection as to lay the ground work for such a program.
German Parliament building:
One of the big problems with nuclear weapons is a lack of transparency. While it is understandable that national security demands that certain facts about nuclear weapons be kept secret, too often agencies have deliberately kept information secret that should have been made available to U.S. citizens. Sometimes it is an attempt to keep obvious examples of oversight failures and agency incompetence from public view. Now the Pentagon has changed its policy on making reviews of safety and security of nuclear weapons operations public.
It has been the long-standing standard practice of withholding detained information about reviews of operations at U.S. nuclear weapons bases which is entirely understandable. However, previously, it had been the tradition that the bottom line findings of such reviews such as a “pass-fail” grade have been made public. Now such basic inspection results will no longer be revealed.
The stated reason for the change in policy is that potential enemies might learn too much about the vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons facilities. The spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the added secrecy was necessary. He also said, “We are comfortable with the secrecy. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile.”
The decision about reporting on basic inspections about how nuclear weapons are operated, maintained and guarded was based on a secret recommendation developed by detailed Pentagon reviews of problems with the weapons, workers and facilities in the nation’s nuclear force. However, the problems that led to the call for the reviews were not related to reporting inspection results. The problems included poor work performance, security lapses and flawed training. These shortcomings in the nuclear force were partly a result of a shortage of funding and poor leadership.
In 2013 and 2014, the Associated Press used the public results of nuclear weapons facility performance inspections to report on serious problems in the Air Force nuclear missile corps. The AP articles detailed security lapses, leadership and training failures, morale problems and other issues. The articles prompted the Pentagon to order an in-depth study by an independent group. The review found serious problems and made recommendations. There was also a parallel internal review of problems with the nuclear weapons programs whose findings were kept secret.
The Defense Secretary who ordered the reviews said, “Trust and confidence of the people is the coin of the realm for leaders and nations. That requires an openness even on sensitive issues. Certain specifics must always stay classified for national security reasons but should be classified only when absolutely necessary. When you close down information channels and stop the flow of information you invite questions, distrust and investigations.”
The recommendation to not publish the results of the inspections did not come from the independent report. The recommendation came from the internal report that was classified. So it is not possible for the press and public to see and understand the actual reasoning behind the recommendation to hide the basic results of inspections.
Critics are concerned that it national security may not be the reason for the restriction of reporting on inspections. A government security expert with the Federation of American Scientists said, “They’re acting like they have something to hide, and it’s not national security secrets. I think the new policy fails to distinguish between protecting valid secrets and shielding incompetence. Clearly, nuclear weapons technology secrets should be protected. But negligence or misconduct in handling nuclear weapons should not be insulated from public accountability.”
