The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Part 1 of 2 parts
I have blogged about many accidents at nuclear power plants from minor problems to major disasters. Sometimes the problems are handled professionally and other times there are serious issues with the responses of the operators of the nuclear power plants. I have often complained of incompetence and dishonesty on the part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the nuclear industry and the owners of nuclear power plants. Today I am going to talk about a problem with valves in emergency cooling systems and the response of various groups to those problems.
The two reactors at LaSalle are boiling water reactors (BWRs) which were put into operation in the early 1980s. The LaSalle reactors were an evolution of BWR/4 that had what is referred to as Mark I containment systems. The new reactors at LaSalle are known as BWR/5 with Mark II containment systems. In BWR/4 reactors utilize steam-driven high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) to supply “makeup” cooling water to the core in case a spall pipe connected to the reactor vessel breaks, the BWR/5 reactors use a high pressure core spray system (HPCS) powered by a motor to supply such makeup cooling water in case a pipe breaks.
The HPCS is not normally operating. It stays in standby mode as long as reactor operations are normal. The system has a motor driven pump that can pump water into the reactor vessel at a rate of seven thousand gallons per minute if necessary. There is a “suppression” pool inside the containment vessel that supplies water to the pump. In the event of a major drop in pressure in the reactor vessel, there are low pressure emergency systems such as the residual head removal and low pressure core spray pumps. However, if a small pipe breaks and leaks, the drop in pressure is not enough to trigger the low pressure emergency systems. When a small pipe breaks, the water drains into the suppression pool that supplies the HPSC pump. The motor for the HPCS can either be powered from the electrical grid outside the power plant or from onsite emergency diesel generators.
In January of 2013, the Tennessee Valley Authority turned a report in to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 21 concerning a defect in an Anchor Darling double disk gate valve in the HPCI system at their Browns Ferry nuclear power plant. The next month, Anchor Darling, the manufacturer of the valve, turned in their own report under 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 21 which stated that there was a design problems in their valve that could cause the lower disk to separate from the valve stem.
In April of 2013, the Boiling Water Reactor Owners’ Group (BWROG) sent a report to their members about the problems with the gate valve. The report suggested what could be done to monitor the valve and insure that it was operating correctly. In 2015, operators at LaSalle carried out the recommended monitoring of their gate valves operations and found not problems. In 2016, the (BWROG) sent out a revision of their 2013 report on the gate valves based on the work of a nuclear plant owner. Workers at the plant had disassembled twenty six gate valves and found problems in twenty four of them. In February of 2017, LaSalle workers tested the HPCS gate valve in Unit 2 and found no problems.
(Please read Part 2)