The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
I have blogged about the plan to build a permanent geological repository for spent nuclear fuel under Yucca Mountain in Nevada before. The U.S. began working on siting such a repository in 1982. A possible site under Yucca Mountain in Nevada was selected in 1987. For various reasons, the final decision to construct the repository at Yucca Mountain was only formally approved by the U.S. Congress in 2002 and money was appropriated.
Work proceeded on preparations for the repository such as environmental impact statements and licenses until 2011 when the project was officially canceled. Part of the reason for the cancellation was the furious opposition to the repository by the citizens and government officials of the state of Nevada as well as the opposition of Barack Obama, the U.S. President. At this point, it is estimated that there will not be a permanent repository for U.S. spent nuclear fuel until 2050 at the earliest.
The current Secretary of Energy who will resign on January 20th recently said in a speech that the effort by the federal government to dictate where the repository would be located had been a failure. He said that the only realistic approach to siting a repository would be to get support and signoff from federal, state and local governments as well as local citizens for a particular site to build a repository.
The DoE Secretary said that the DoE had been working with states and communities that had expressed an interest in hosting a repository but that there was no comprehensive plan at present. Some states including Texas and New Mexico have expressed an interest in hosting an interim repository where spent nuclear fuel could be temporarily stored in dry casks.
Now that a new U.S. President has been elected and will be inaugurated on January 20th, there are calls for reconsideration of the Yucca Mountain site to reduce the time necessary to site and build a permanent repository. Donald Trump, the new President, has pledged to ramp up domestic energy production and that include nuclear energy. However, he has not taken a formal position on Yucca Mountain. His pick for Secretary of Energy has also not voiced support for Yucca Mountain.
Although there has been no official position stated, the Trump transition team does have supporters for the restart of the Yucca Mountain repository. They have asked the U.S. Department of Energy if there are any legal barriers to moving ahead on a repository at Yucca Mountain. The DoE was also asked if it had any plans for restarting the proceedings necessary to obtain the needed licenses for the project.
Five members of the six member Nevada Congressional delegation have introduced legislation in the U.S. House and Senate to require that the DoE obtain written consent from a state’s governor, local government and any relevant Indian tribes before a particular site for a spent nuclear fuel repository could be chosen. This move is a response to the Trump transition team support for proceeding to build a repository under Yucca Mountain.
Artist’s concept of proposed Yucca Mountain repository:
“The National Nuclear Security administration (NNSA) is the U.S. agency responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing; works to reduce the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. Established by the United States Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the United States Department of Energy.” (Wikipedia)
We are currently in the midst of a transfer of power from one Presidential administration to another of a different party. It is common practice for an incoming administration to replace the Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of agencies with their own people. Incoming Secretaries must be confirmed by the Senate and this process can take some time to find, vet and confirm an acceptable individual. Usually this is accomplished with minimum publicity unless there is a controversial nominee for a high level post such as Secretary of State. It is rare for there to be a controversy with the transfer of an agency such as the NNSA. Unfortunately, there is just such a controversy now.
In the current deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Russia, the other nation with a huge nuclear arsenal, it is obvious that the NNSA is an extremely important agency. In addition, there are threats from nuclear-armed China and North Korea. It would not be wise for the post of Secretary of the NNSA to go unoccupied for an extended period of time. Usually, the current Secretary and his Assistant Secretary would be asked to remain at their posts until suitable replacements were installed. This could easily take months.
It was recently reported that the current Secretary of the NNSA and his Assistant Secretary had been told by the Trump transition team to “clear out their desks” and be gone by January 20, the date of the incoming President’s inauguration. This generated a lot of commentary in the press as being “unprecedented” and a threat to national security if the post should remain unoccupied for an extended period of time.
When reporters checked with the Trump transition team, they said that they had made no such request and that the stories in the media were “inaccurate.” The reporters checked with the staff of the NNSA and were told that there had been no discussion with respect to the timing of the departure of the Secretary and his Assistant with the Trump transition team.
So it would appear that nothing ordinary had happened at the NNSA as far as the transfer of power is concerned. However, that would not be exactly accurate. Further probing by reporters revealed that the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the NNSA had provided letters of resignation to the Trump transition team dated January 20th as is traditional. However, they also said that they would be willing to stay on until their replacements were available.
Normally, this offer to remain at their posts would be accepted. But, the Trump transition team did not contact the NNSA to accept the offer to stay. And, to date, the Trump transition team has not answered any of the requests for communication about the issue from the NNSA staff.
So the bottom line appears to be that through intent to depart from tradition or incompetence, the Trump transition team is going to let the office of Secretary and Assistant Secretary of NNSA go unfilled for an undetermined period. This is an unacceptable situation in the world of nuclear threats that we find ourselves in.
I have grave concerns about the ambitious Chinese program to expand their use of nuclear power by building more nuclear power reactors. Their record for regulation of corporate behavior in the nuclear sector has not been stellar. A lot of the Chinese people share my concerns and major nuclear construction projects have already been blocked by public protests.
In the past year, there have been a series of incidents on nuclear construction projects. The Chinese National Nuclear Safety Administration (CNNSA) released information on sixteen incidents that occurred in 2016 at eight nuclear power stations. The information was made public in the Global Times newspaper which is closely associated with the Chinese Communist Party. That means that the release of the information was sanctioned at the highest levels of the Chinese government.
Six of the reported incidents involved failure of staff to observe operational guidelines. Four of the incidents were attributed to the failure of communications. The final six incidents happened because staff pushed the wrong buttons. It is claimed that none of the incidents resulted in the release of radioactive materials or any other threat to the public. Such accidents and incidents have also been reported for previous years.
Experts who reviewed the reported incidents concluded that the poor public safety record was related to the country’s political culture. One of the main problems with the system is that the individuals who are charged with inspecting and regulating the nuclear industry have a lower rank in the Communist Party than the officials in control of the state-owned nuclear companies. It is politically risky for lower-ranking officials to criticize higher ranking officials.
Currently, the Chinese technicians who construct and operate the nuclear power reactors are under enormous pressure to produce results. Like the nuclear regulators, they are also at a lower rank in the Communist Party than the men who run the state-owned companies. This means that they fear for their party positions if they don’t deliver results on schedule and in budget. The technicians are also compensated at a lower level than the administrators. This results in more people wanting to climb in rank in the party in administrative positions than wanting to train as nuclear technicians.
Up until very recently, the Chinese nuclear industry operated at a high level of secrecy because of the connection of nuclear technology to nuclear weapons and national security. Because of this blanket of secrecy, people were afraid to publicly discuss problems in the nuclear industry. This secrecy is at odds with the kind of transparency needed to safely construct and operate nuclear power plants.
While China has strict regulations and guidelines for the nuclear industry, analysts say that often these rules are only for show and officials will ignore violations as long as projects are on schedule and in budget. Any official who really drills down into serious problems in the industry risks offending entrenched vested interest groups. The fact that there are deep problems with the Chinese system of corporate governance virtually guarantees that the will be serious incidents and accidents in the future.
A former member of Taiwan’s doomed nuclear weapons development project, Chang Hsien-yi (張憲義), disclosed Monday that his fear of ambitious politicians using such weapons was the reason behind his decision to flee to the United States 29 years ago. focustaiwan.tw
Addressing the threat challenge of climate change will require greater use of nuclear power plants in addition to wind and solar energy sources, US Secretary of State John Kerry told guests at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on Monday. sputniknews.com
