The future of nuclear power generation in Europe, North America and most of the developed world is being decided on an English coastal headland called Hinkley Point. theglobeandmail.com

The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
Part One of Two Parts:
One of the biggest problems with nuclear power is what to do with all the spent nuclear fuel that has been piling up for decades. When spent fuel is removed from a reactor, it is put in the cooling pool for a few years to allow the most intense radiation to dissipate. The pools are filling up at the hundred nuclear reactors in the U.S. and, if the spent fuel cannot be removed from the pools, some reactors may have to close. There is a temporary storage system called dry cask storage in which spent fuel assemblies are placed in concrete and steel containers at the reactor site or other sites. Current dry casks are not adequate because they do not monitor the buildup of gases that might explode.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) stated that a geological repository was the best solution for disposing of spent nuclear fuel in a permanent underground geological repository where they will be no threat for thousands of years. The NWPA established guidelines for the selection of a site for a repository and procedures for licensing and construction. The Department of Energy began collecting fees from the nuclear power industry for the storage of spent nuclear fuel that was supposed to begin in 1998.
In 1987, a salt mine under Yucca Mountain in Nevada was selected as a possible site and detailed studies through the 1990s were conducted. In 2002, the DoE confirmed that Yucca Mountain was an acceptable site for a repository. Over the objections of officials and citizens of Nevada, the Bush administration moved forward with the preparation of a license application for the site with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. After six years of dealing with many technical, regulatory and legal problems, the license application was submitted in mid 2008.
When Barack Obama was elected President in late 2008, he worked with Arizona Senator Harry Reid during 2009 to cancel the Yucca Mountain project. Part of the reason was political but part of the reason was that analyses raised the question of the possibility of ground water penetrating the repository. The project was official cancelled in 2010 and the DoE official withdrew its application from the NRC.
In August of 2013, the Federal Court of Appeals for The District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the NRC was legally bound to continue its review of the license for Yucca Mountain unless Congress intervened or allocated funds for the review ran out. Work that remained to be done included that completion of a final report on environmental and technical issues at Yucca Mountain. The last Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which was the final of five volumes of the NRC license review was completed and issued in January of 2015. The conclusion of the NRC review was that Yucca Mountain did satisfy all requirements for a geologically safe spent nuclear fuel repository. The report said that the repository should be able to safely isolate spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for up to one million years.
In March of 2015, the NRC Chairman told the U.S. Senate that an addition three hundred and thirty million dollars would be required in order to complete the Yucca Mountain used fuel repository construction licensing process. Work that remained included settling issues of the ownership and control of land around Yucca Mountain, the water rights in the area and a required environmental impact statement. The last SER also added fourteen conditions to the construction authorization. These conditions would require alterations in the design of the repository.
Please read Part Two
Yucca Mountain cutaway diagram:
I have blogged about the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad, New Mexico before. The nuclear weapons waste facility is located in an old salt mine. It has been operating for over fifteen years and the operators have gotten sloppy. The are huge rooms that have been hollowed out and filled with barrels of waste from nuclear weapons research and development. When the rooms were filled, they were supposed to be sealed with thick concrete and steel doors. As time went by, the operators decided that steel doors were sufficient. Eventually, they dispensed with the doors altogether.
Back in early 2014, there was an accident at the facility. A barrel of waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory exploded and released radioactive materials into one of the rooms that should have been sealed but wasn’t. The filtration system failed and particles of plutonium and americium were detected twenty miles from the facility. It turned out that the barrel exploded because at the LANL they changed the absorbent material in the barrel from inorganic to organic. Gases were generated which resulted in the explosion.
When records were checked it turned out the record keeping had also gotten sloppy. The exact contents of the barrels in the room where the explosion occured were not listed in detail as required by procedural guidelines. They were able to ascertain that there were about seventy more barrels in the room that had the new absorbent and were at risk for exploding. Time had to passed in order for the room to cool off enough for repairs to be undertaken.
While repairs were being made, the storage facility was closed. This resulted in a back log of barrels left at Los Alamos National Laboratory at risk for exploding. More barrels were sent to a low-level nuclear waste repository in Texas where they were monitored but not enclosed sufficiently to prevent the release of more radioactive materials if any of those barrels exploded.
The Department of Energy promised that the facility would be open back in March of 2016. An audit by the GAO says that the DoE knew when they made that promise that there was less than a one percent chance that they would be able to meet it. Pressure to repair the facility quickly led to poor safety standards for the recovery work. In 2015, the DoE admitted that they would not have the WIPP repairs done before December of 2016 at the soonest. As a result of errors and incompetence in the repair process, there has been nine month delay and an increased cost of over sixty four million dollars. The total estimate for clean up and additional operating costs at the WIPP is now over three hundred million dollars.
Skeptics are concerned, given what has happened to date, that the WIPP will not be able to open by December. If it does not open, further delays in the cleanup of contaminated sites will add millions of dollars to the ultimate cost.