The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

Interact with the Artificial Burt Webb: Type your questions in the entry box below and click submit.

Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb

Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • Nuclear Weapons 194 – UN Imposes New Sanctions on North Korea and North Korea Put Nuclear Arsenal on Alert

            The U.N. just passed a new set of more severe sanctions against North Korea in response to its recent underground nuclear test. The sanctions include ” mandatory inspections of cargo leaving and entering North Korea by land, sea or air; a ban on all sales or transfers of small arms and light weapons to the North; and the expulsion of North Korean diplomats who engage in any illicit activities.” Following the U.N. sanctions announcement, N.K. shot a few short range missiles into the sea.

            There have been sanctions against N.K. since the ceasefire that effectively ended the Korean War back in the mid-fifties. There never was an official treaty or agreement to end the Korean War. A state of hostility has continued between North Korea and South Korea since the Korean War. The people of N.K. have been fed a steady diet of propaganda and publicly declare solidarity with the regime of Kim Jong Un and claim that they can survive in spite of the sanctions.

             It has been widely reported in the international press that the Premier of North Korea, Kim Jong Un, has just ordered his military to have their nuclear weapons ready for immediate use. This announcement was obviously prompted partly by the new sanctions imposed by the U.N.

           A dispatch from North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said “The only way for defending the sovereignty of our nation and its right to existence under the present extreme situation is to bolster up nuclear force both in quality and quantity.” The dispatch reported that Kim stressed “the need to get the nuclear warheads deployed for national defense always on standby so as to be fired any moment.”

           Kim has often claimed that the U.S. and South Korea intend to invade N.K. and destroy his regime. He has threatened to invade S.K. and/or deploy nuclear weapons against S.K. He has also threatened to send nuclear missiles to the U.S. N.K. does have a huge army and at least a few nuclear warheads. There is a great deal of analysis and speculation about the actual nuclear arsenal and delivery systems that N.K. possesses. N.K. could get their nuclear warheads to S.K, by truck if their short ranges missiles can’t do the job. It is possible that they could send missiles carrying nuclear warheads to attack Japan which has also been a target of their hostility and propaganda. However, most analysts doubt that N.K. has the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads and send them all the way to the U.S. mainland.

           The U.S. and South Korea are scheduled to hold a massive joint military exercise in the near future. N.K. claims that this is actually a cover for an invasion of N.K. This is probably also part of the reason that N.K. issued the dispatch about getting all of its nuclear missiles ready. Sort of the equivalent of a angry dog making its hair stand up so it will look bigger and bearing its fangs to make it look more dangerous. Kim Jong Un may be a psychopathic dictator but I don’t think that he is suicidal. Any detonation of an N.K. nuclear warhead in a neighboring country would be suicidal for N.K. and, no matter how much they bluster and threaten, I don’t think they will pull the trigger.

    Range of various North Korean missiles:

  • Geiger Readings for Mar 04, 2015

    Ambient office = 100 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Ambient outside = 97 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Soil exposed to rain water = 128 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Crimini mushroom from Central Market = 119 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Tap water = 83 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Filtered water = 73 nanosieverts per hour
     
  • Nuclear Weapons 193 – Dirty Bombs are Possible but May Not Be Probable

            I have often mentioned “dirty bombs” in my blog posts. In a dirty bomb, radioactive materials are packed around a core of conventional explosives. The idea is that when the bomb explodes, the blast will spread the radioactive material over a wide area. The extent of the area covered will depend on the type and amount of conventional explosives in the core. The danger will be related to how much of a particular radioactive isotope or isotopes are in the shell around the core. Radioactive isotopes vary in the type and amount of radiation they emit and how long they emit radiation. A dirty bomb exploded in the core of a major metropolitan area could cause chaos and cost billions of dollars.

            Although dirty bombs do not require much in the way of technical expertise and there is a lot of radioactive material around the world that is poorly secured, so far no one has built and exploded a dirty bomb. There have been plenty of stories of thieves and smugglers trying to sell stolen radioactive isotopes to terrorists. Moldavia in Easter Europe appears to be a marketplace for such transactions. Sting operations there over several years involving some U.S. law enforcement people uncovered attempts by Middle Eastern buyers to purchase radioactive materials for Al Queda and ISIS.

            Last year there was an incident in Belgium that brought this concern back into the headlines. Belgium police discovered that a Belgian scientist who worked a plant that produced a lot of radioisotopes for global use was under surveillance by a Mohamed Bakkali. Bakkali was arrested last November for his part in the terrorist shootings in Paris. Tapes of the surveillance of the Belgian scientist and his family were found in Bakkali’s home. A spokesman for Belgium’s Federal Agency for Nuclear Control said that they feared that the intent was to kidnap the scientist or a member of his family to gain access to radioisotopes in order to make a dirty bomb.

            U.S. authorities and analysts believe that a dirty bomb attack is virtually inevitable. An internal U.S. Department of Energy report suggested that a single individual with little expertise might be able to construct a dirty bomb. The ease of the creation of such a bomb makes it very difficult to insure that it does not happen. Detonation of such a bomb would cause such a panic that law enforcement would be overwhelmed which might provide cover for other terrorist activities in the same area.

           So, the question is, why has it not happened? I believe that one of the reasons lies in the fact that, although such a bomb could wreck havoc in a major city, the actual damage would be minor and it would take years for health problems to manifest. Terrorists tend to want something that is spectacular and results in a lot of immediate deaths and as much destruction as possible.  Dirty bombs just aren’t spectacular enough. And, while playing around with conventional explosives is certainly dangerous, handling nuclear materials can result in injury and death for the terrorists themselves. So the idea of a dirty bomb may seem attractive to terrorists but, actually, it does not seem to be attractive enough to any terrorists to create one.

     

     

  • Geiger Readings for Mar 03, 2015

    Ambient office = 98 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Ambient outside = 72 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Soil exposed to rain water = 88 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Vine ripened tomato from Central Market = 137 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Tap water = 125 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Filtered water = 116 nanosieverts per hour
     
  • U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cancelled Needed Nuclear Plant Health Risk Study in 2015

             There is widespread public distrust of nuclear power. Major accidents such as Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and Fukushima have frightened the public. Radiation is invisible and health problems from radiation exposure can take decades to develop. Governments have been reluctant to share real information about the public dangers of nuclear power for political and economic reasons. Corporations in the nuclear industry have been caught ignoring regulations, dragging their feet on maintenance, lying about problems at nuclear plants and other behaviors that have abused public trust. There has not been sufficient research into the dangers posed by nuclear power plants to determine just what the risk is for people living around the power plant, especially in the long term.

          There have been some studies to determine if there is a health risk from living near a power plant. But many of these have been challenged on a number of grounds including small sample size, accusations of bias, sloppy methodology, etc.

           Some studies have found no evidence of risk such as a 1991 study of cancer deaths in over one hundred counties in the U.S. near a power plant. The NRC often cites the 1991 study in discussions of the risks of nuclear power plants. Many of these studies have been challenged by critics of nuclear power.

           Some studies have found risk of cancer and other health problems from living near a nuclear plant such as a 2009 study that concluded that an increase in the rate of thyroid cancers in an area of New England is connected to radioactive iodine emissions from sixteen nuclear power plants within ninety miles of this area. Many of these studies have been challenged by supporters of nuclear power.

          What is needed is a very thorough epidemiological study by a neutral and reputable research organization. Such a study was commissioned and tentatively funded by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2010. The new study was to be done by the National Academy of Sciences which has a good reputation for objective research.

          For Phase 1, the NAS recommended two studies to assess risk and a pilot project that would study seven nuclear power plants. This pilot study would lay the ground work for a comprehensive study of all nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel facilities in the U.S. as  Phase 2. Some of the problems that would be studied in  Phase 1 were the need for very large sample sizes, the lack of uniformity in the availability and reliability of cancer data for any area smaller than a county and the problem with obtaining data on a variety of factors that could may understanding the data more complex.

            Phase 1 would include a population study of cancer diagnosis and mortality rates for multiple types of cancer across all age groups and a targeted study of the occurrence of childhood cancers for children born within a specific distance of a nuclear power facility. There would be a planning project and an execution project in Phase 1. The planning part began in fall of 2013.

           Unfortunately, in report on the planning part of Phase 1, the NAS reported that it was unlikely that any solid and useful conclusions could be drawn from the pilot study in Phase 1 of the project that would be useful for Phase 2. Considering that it would take eight million dollars and three years to even complete the pilot study, the NRC cancelled the project in 2015.

           It would be to the interest of both the critics and supporters of nuclear power to have such a study carried out. Although, there are international research projects that could answer some of these questions, it would be best for the NRC to go ahead and do this study. It may take years to accomplish but the longer the delay, the longer it will take to get useful answers.

  • Geiger Readings for Mar 02, 2015

    Ambient office = 100 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Ambient outside = 119 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Soil exposed to rain water = 116 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Bartlett pear from Central Market = 91 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Tap water = 121 nanosieverts per hour
     
    Filtered water = 103 nanosieverts per hour
     
  • Nuclear Weapons 192 – Old Helicopters Cannot Protect U.S. Nuclear Missile Bases

            Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota and F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming are the primary locations of U.S. nuclear ICBMs. I have blogged about the sad condition of the U.S. nuclear missile force. There are problems with the command staff, the maintenance of the missiles and silos, the training of the officers that man the silos, etc. The missile force used to be one of the top postings for members of the military but now it is a dead end for a military career. The missile bases are targets for Russia nuclear weapon attacks, of course, but there is also concern about a possible ground attack by terrorists. In such a case, a rapidly deployable counter force of U.S. military personnel would have to be on hand to handle it and that may not be available.

           Recently, the chairman of panel of the House Armed Services committee that is responsible for the security of the missile bases, said that U.S. military personnel “are not capable of doing the job of responding to an alert” at one of the missile bases. The main problem seems to be that the helicopters that would carry security personnel to a missile base in the event of a security alert are UH-1N Huey models that date back to the Vietnam war. The chairman said “Listen, I don’t like talking about this publicly,” Rogers added in the interview with CQ. “This is a vulnerability that I don’t like being in the public domain. But I can’t get it fixed, apparently, without focusing some attention on this matter and how unacceptable it is. … You’re going to hear my language get more direct on this topic in the coming days and weeks in public. Our situation is completely unacceptable.”

           The first mention by the Air Force of the need for new helicopters to replace the old Hueys was in 2004. About thirty Hueys are currently assigned to provide security for the missile bases. There were plans to replace the Hueys but that replacement has been delayed several times. That need has also been mentioned in some Congressional hearings recently but the exact nature of the problem was not made public.

            The problem with the Hueys attracted increased attention when they failed to perform adequately in recent annual military exercises at the F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming. The commander of U.S. Strategic Command demanded the quick replacement of the Huey fleet soon after their failure during the exercises. While the details of the Huey failures is classified, it is known that they failed every time they were tested in the exercises. The Hueys do not have the range to fly the distance from their base to the missile bases, hover over the bases and engage in battles. They cannot lift sufficient weight to carry the required payloads, they cannot operate effectively at night and they can not handle some of the rough weather that occurs in that area.

           There is an argument going on in Congress about how to best handle the situation with the Huey fleet. Critics are saying that the fleet should have already been replaced. It has been suggested that the usual competition and bidding process for military hardware be circumvented to speed up acquisition of new helicopters. Up to a billion dollars may be spent in the next five years to accomplish this goal.

           Frankly, I am appalled that this situation was allowed to develop. This problem has been well-known for over a decade. The Hueys didn’t suddenly develop these deficiencies. They never had the capability to handle the job they were assigned. This is rank incompetence! Fortunately, they have not been needed to handle serious security needs at the missile bases for they surely would have failed. This situation needs to be remedied as quickly as possible. I am dead set against the use of and the very existence of nuclear weapons in the U.S. But, if we have them, then they should be well protected.

    Huey UH-N1 helicopter: