No one knows what to do with Fukushima’s endless tanks of radioactive water. nautil.us
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Geiger Readings for June 11, 2015
Ambient office = 100 nanosieverts per hour
Ambient outside = 151 nanosieverts per hourSoil exposed to rain water = 132 nanosieverts per hourCrimini mushroom from Central Market = 93 nanosieverts per hourTap water = 119 nanosieverts per hourFiltered water = 106 nanosieverts per hour -
Nuclear Fusion 19 – Management Problems At The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
I have done several blog posts on nuclear fusion research. I posted one article on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project. ITER is a huge project to build a tokamak nuclear fusion reactor in order to move from purely experimental fusion research to an actual system to generate electricity that could be a prototype for commercial power reactors. Today, I am going to delve into some of the management issues that have slowed progress at ITER.
Ten years ago, a group of nations selected a site in the south of France to build ITER. China, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Russia, the United States and India were involved in the project. About four and a half billion dollars were awarded in construction contracts and about three and a third billion dollars in manufacturing contracts. Construction at St-Paul-lez-Durance in France began five years ago. Over two thousand people are working on the project. Some buildings have been completed and the first big components are being delivered.
There have been many problems and delays in the project. Tens of millions of dollars have been wasted by an inadequate management process. The seven members of the project are each designing and building components. When one member does not deliver a critical component on time, there is a domino effect that causes delays for the completion of other components by other members. There are arguments over who should pay for the delays and cost overruns.
Recently, the new director-general of the ITER Organization, Bernard Bigot, published an article about the problems plaguing ITER. It is his opinion that one of the major problems is the lack of a “clearly defined authority to manage the entire project.” Successful projects need a manager that has the power to make critical decisions. Bigot says that it is obvious that the management structure for ITER is “poorly adapted to the challenge of building a large, complex research facility.” A 2013 ITER internal report said that the ITER Organization was “ill-defined and poorly implemented.”
According to Bigot, “The management structure has proved incapable of solving issues and responding to the project’s needs, so accumulating technical difficulties have led to stalemates, misunderstandings and tension between staff around the world. These problems stem from how the organization was set up through an international treaty in 2007.”
“The deputy director-general from each of the participating members have responsibility for one technical of administrative department and they are official representative for the members. The procurement of components, systems and buildings was divided between the member states. Work is allocated on the basis of the industrial capacity of each member. Forty five percent of the cost is borne by the European Union and nine percent is covered by the other members outside of the E.U. “
The ITER Organization is “responsible for validating the design of the facility; compliance with safety regulations; coordination of manufacturing and quality control of the numerous components; their on-site assembly; and later, the operation of the facility.” Each member has a procurement agency that receives designs from the ITER Organization and then farms out the work to their contractors. While there are benefits to each of the members from this system, the paperwork and confusion of so many different semi-independent agencies is proving to out weight those benefits.
Bigot proposes radical changes in the ITER Organization. The director-general will now have full authority over the whole project. The procurement agencies in the member nations will be brought under the direct control of the ITER Organization. There will be monthly meetings of a new executive board comprised of different departments to accelerate dispute resolution and decision making. There will have to be team building efforts so that all actors feel responsibility for the whole project and not just their specific departments. Bigot has asked for a new discretionary fund under his control. He will submit a new schedule along with new cost and risk analysis by the end of this year. While fully aware that there will be future problems, delays and unexpected costs, Bigot is confident that he can improve on the past management process.
Meanwhile, in the U.S., there are interesting fusion projects going onat private companies exploring alternative approaches to generating electricity by fusing lighter elements into heavier elements. All of these projects are aimed at creating fusion power reactors that are not as big, complex or expensive as ITER. It may very well be the case that other better approaches to nuclear fusion will be developed and commercialized before ITER is completed.
Artist’s concept of ITER:
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Geiger Readings for June 10, 2015
Ambient office = 95 nanosieverts per hourAmbient outside = 106 nanosieverts per hourSoil exposed to rain water = 104 nanosieverts per hourAvacado from Central Market = 94 nanosieverts per hourTap water = 92 nanosieverts per hourFiltered water = 85 nanosieverts per hour -
Nuclear Reactors 253 – Arguments Over Rechartering the U.S. Export-Import Bank to Aid Nuclear Exports
The U.S. Export-Import Bank was created in 1934 by an executive order of the President. Its purpose is “financing and insuring foreign purchases of United States goods for customers unable or unwilling to accept credit risk. The mission of the Bank is to create and sustain U.S. jobs by financing sales of U.S. exports to international buyers.” Its charter was last extended to June 30th, 2015. If Congress does not act quickly, the charter will expire.
Supporters of the U.S. nuclear industry claim that the Ex-Im Bank must be rechartered in order for the U.S. to be able to compete in the international nuclear marketplace. They say that without the support of the Ex-Im Bank, U.S. nuclear companies cannot compete with the aggressive Russian marketing of nuclear technology because the Russian nuclear industry is heavily supported by the Russian government. Critics of these claims say that extending the Ex-Im Bank charter will just encourage corruption and make the U.S. taxpayers liable for corporate losses. They recommend that the U.S. government streamline export regulations for countries that want to purchase U.S. nuclear technology. They also say that U.S. companies must offer superior products and services at competitive prices.
Another claim made by the supporters of rechartering the Ex-Im Bank is that an export credit agency like the Ex-Im Bank is often made a requirement for bidding on international nuclear contracts. The say that if the U.S. does not have such an agency, then U.S. companies cannot bid for these contract. Opponents of the rechartering say that foreign buyers ask for such credit support just because it is available. U.S. companies, backed by private financing, already compete successfully for foreign nuclear business against government-supported companies of other nations.
Ex-Im Bank supporters say that uncertainty over the future of the Bank will make potentials buyers less confident about the purchase of U.S. nuclear technology. Critics point out that U.S. nuclear products and services are the world’s “gold standard” for the global nuclear market and they are not worried about the disappearance of the Bank hurting U.S. competitiveness. The critics say that it would be better for the U.S. nuclear industry to proceed on its own merits without be tied to the turbulence and uncertainty of political disputes over funding and chartering of government agencies.
Critics of the renewal of the Ex-Im Bank charter say that far from being critical to the flourishing of the U.S. nuclear export business, the U.S. government may, in fact, be an obstacle to the industry. They say that the current “commercial nuclear export regime is convoluted and burdensome and spread between three different federal agencies—all of which increases costs, imposes delays, and limits innovation.” They say that government subsidies create dependency in subsidized industries that actually undermines competitiveness.
Ultimately, the U.S. nuclear industry should be able to stand on its own without the need for taxpayer support which may disappear as political currents shift. The fears about other governments subsidizing their nuclear industries may be overblown. The Russian government is poised to substantially reduce its support for nuclear exporting companies in the near future. France’s nuclear export company, Areva, is in serious financial trouble. And Japan’s nuclear industry is still reeling from the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
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Radiation News Roundup June 09, 2015
Japan to restart nuclear reactors, despite political opposition. csmonitor.com
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission said Monday that it had approved the first step of “Project Aim,” a plan to downsize the agency to “meet the demands of an evolving work load, while maintaining its ability to project public health and safety.” nuclearstreet.com
In Iran nuclear negotiations, diplomats at odds over how to keep tabs on so-called undeclared facilities. latimes.com
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Geiger Readings for June 09, 2015
Ambient office = 97 nanosieverts per hourAmbient outside = 70 nanosieverts per hourSoil exposed to rain water = 71 nanosieverts per hourAvacado from Central Market = 127 nanosieverts per hourTap water = 89 nanosieverts per hourFiltered water = 67 nanosieverts per hour -
Nuclear Reactors 252 – Selecting Reactor Designs for Australia
John Quiggin is an Australian economics professor at the University of Queensland. He recently posted an article on his blog that he intends to ultimately submit to the Southern Royal Commission considering the nuclear fuel cycle. The proposed submission contains his analysis of the best choices for nuclear reactor technology if Australia wants to add nuclear reactors to the national grid. The main question his article asks is whether there are commercial nuclear reactors currently on the market or projected to be available in the next twenty years that can be constructed and integrated into the Australian national electrical market as a good source of electric power generation.
Quiggin states that for a developed country like Australia, obsolete Generation II and early Generation III reactor designs are not appropriate. He also rules out reactors from ” middle-income and less developed countries with inadequate safety standards.” He explicitly mentions Russia and China by name as examples.
Quiggin focuses on Generation III + or the most recent Generation III nuclear reactor designs from the United States, European or Japanese companies. He says that any reactor design being considered should have “a substantial record of safe and economical operation.” He warns against Australia considering the purchase of any “leading edge” or “first of a kind” designs because it is impossible to estimate the risks and Australia has no experience at all in operating and regulating a nuclear power plant.
Quiggin thinks that any reactor design under consideration should be able to document at least one hundred “reactor years of operation”. This means adding up the years of operation of all reactors with the same design to arrive at a crude estimation of the risks associated with that design. He points out that one hundred reactor years of operation is actually quite modest. If Australia builds ten reactors with licensed life spans of forty years, then the reactor years for all ten over forty years would be four hundred reactor years. If there was one accident for the one hundred reactors years that he is calling for, then Australia could expect four accidents in forty years with ten reactors.
Quiggin states that there are no Generation III+ reactor designs commercially available that can satisfy even these modest requirements. He does go on to say that the Westinghouse AP-1000 reactor design might be able to qualify within a few decades. It is projected that under current plans there should be eight AP-1000 reactors operating by 2020. If these plans are carried out successfully in spite of the usual cost overruns and scheduling delays common for nuclear reactor construction, then more AP-1000s will be built and brought online. Hopefully, the one hundred reactor hours required by Quiggin could be achieved for the AP-1000 design “sometime after 2030.”
The only possible competitors with the AP-1000 design are the EPR design from France’s Areva and the Candu Canadian design. However, with only a few EPRs under currently construction and no Candus, they would take so long to reach the one hundred reactor hours benchmark that they cannot be seriously considered by Australia. Any totally new reactor design would take decades to be developed, tested, licensed, sold and operated for the required one hundred reactor years and is not even worth considering.
Quiggin points out that the development of regulatory agencies and rules as well as process of site selection will impose serious delays in licensing and construction of Australian power reactors. Even a very aggressive construction program by Australia could not bring nuclear power online before 2040 and that is an optimistic estimate.
I think that Australian time and money could be much better spent on developing alternative energy sources. Wind power currently provides over a quarter of the electricity for the state of South Australia and use of wind power is rapidly expanding. Solar power utilization has only recently taken off in Australia but its potential is huge. Australia has been exploiting hydro power for decades with much room for expansion. Geothermal power could provide as much as 9% of Australia’s electricity by 2030. All things considered, it would be a waste of money and time to develop nuclear power in Australia.
