Part 1 of 2 Parts
     The recent Russian attack on Ukraine rekindle an old debate about whether Europe needs its own nuclear arsenal to deter a possible Russian nuclear attack. During most of the Cold War and the years since, the debate seemed to have been settled. The European NATO members are meant to be covered by the nuclear “umbrella” of the United States. The U.S. established “nuclear sharing” with five partner countries. These include Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. Altogether, these five countries host about one hundred U.S. nuclear weapons. If Russia attacked, these five countries could retaliate by employing these warheads.
      Aside from those “shared nuclear weapons,” France and the U.K. also have their own nuclear arsenals. France has always keept its nuclear weapons outside of the joint strategizing of the Western alliance. It is the only country among NATO’s thirty members to not participate in the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.
     Before Russia’s attack on Ukraine this year, some Europoean nations were concerned that the U.S. nuclear umbrella was becoming less reliable. By definition, this makes it less of a deterrent. The U.S. has shifted its geopolitical focus from the Atlantic theater to the Pacific theater. The main concern is to contain China which is currently expanding their nuclear arsenal and delivery systems.
      The U.S. has to hold up two nuclear umbrellas and plan for two simultaneous wars. Maximilian Terhalle in Germany and Francois Heisbourg in France are two nuclear analysts who have been warning that if the U.S. is forced to choose between the two theaters, it would probably give top priority to its commitments in Asia including allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
     To make matters worse, former U.S. president Trump caused Europeans great concern when he questioned NATO’s mutual-defense clause. He even considered taking the U.S. out of the alliance. Trump is gone from the Whitehouse but he or someone like him could become president in the future. In the long run, the U.S. seems to be less dependable as a protector than it used to be.
     In addition to all these issues, Russian President Putin has been dropping direct threats that he might use nukes in the Ukrainian war or against Western nations who send aid to Ukraine. For now, the consensus is that Putin is bluffing. If he is not, Europeans would like to have a fallback plan if they cannot rely on the U.S.
     One scenario that is being discussed is to have France extend its nuclear umbrella to the whole of the European Union. French President Macro often talks about achieving European “autonomy” by which he appears to mean independence for the U.S. This indicates that he should be amenable to the extension of the French nuclear umbrella.
      Unfortunately, in practice, the French are neither willing or able to extend their umbrella. Since the time of Charles de Gaulle, France has been adamant about total sovereignty over its nuclear arsenal and all decisions pertaining to it. Visions of a Europeanized “force de frappe” as the French call their nuclear arsenal suffer from the same problem as ideas about a European Army. Without a United States of Europe, it is not clear who would be in command, where and how.
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