Nuclear Accidents 7 - Fukushima 3 - Unit 2

            On March 11, 2011 an earthquake and tsunami severely damaged four nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Number 1 power plant on the northeast coast of the Japanese island of Honshu.

            The Unit Two reactor is a boiling water design fueled with about eighty tons of uranium dioxide in zirconium alloy fuel rods. The primary concrete containment vessel surrounds the core of the reactor and the secondary concrete containment vessel included upper levels which contained pools for storing fuel rods and irradiated equipment.

            Around 3 PM Unit Two was shut down in response to the earthquake which shook the reactor and broke pipes. Around 5:30 PM all the electrical power generated by the reactor stopped. Emergency batteries were supposed to take over to provide power for monitoring and control systems but Unit 2's backup batteries were damaged when the tsunami struck and could not provide emergency power. Fifteen minutes later, TEPCO, the company that managed Fukushima Number 1, declared a Nuclear Emergency Situation because they could not confirm that emergency cooling systems were injecting coolant into the core of Unit 2. Radioactive steam was released into the secondary containment vessel to reduce pressure in the primary vessel.

            At first, after the quake, TEPCO used the isolation condenser system to cool Unit 2 but after ten minutes, they shut down the isolation condenser and turned on the emergency cooling injection system which sprayed coolant into the reactor core. After a half hour, the loss of electrical power to the reactor disabled the spray cooling system but the operators were able to manually activate the cooling system. At 5 PM on March 12th, the cooling system shut down and restarted again at 9 AM on March 13th. Some building pressure was vented around midnight on March 12th. The operators worked problems with the fuel rod storage pool of Unit 2.

            Around noon on March 13th there was an explosion in the Unit 3 reactor building next to Unit 2. The explosion blew holes in the wall of Unit 2 and damaged four of the five cooling pumps in Unit 2.  The fifth pump shut down when its fuel was exhausted.  By 9 PM on March 14th, the cooling system was still operating and power had been restored from a mobile generator.

Nuclear Accidents 6 - Fukushima 2 - Unit 1

            On March 11, 2011 an earthquake and tsunami severely damaged four nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Number 1 power plant on the northeast coast of the Japanese island of Honshu.

            The Unit One reactor is a boiling water design fueled with about eighty tons of uranium dioxide in zirconium alloy fuel rods. The primary concrete containment vessel surrounds the core of the reactor and the secondary concrete containment vessel included upper levels which contained pools for storing fuel rods and irradiated equipment.

            Around 3 PM Unit One was shut down in response to the earthquake which shook the reactor and broke pipes. Around 5:30 PM all the electrical power generated by the reactor stopped. Emergency batteries were supposed to take over to provide power for monitoring and control systems but Unit 1's backup batteries were damaged when the tsunami struck and could not provide emergency power. Fifteen minutes later, TEPCO, the company that managed Fukushima Number 1, declared a Nuclear Emergency Situation because they could not confirm that emergency cooling systems were injecting coolant into the core of Unit 1. Radioactive steam was released into the secondary containment vessel to reduce pressure in the primary vessel.

            At first, after the quake, TEPCO used the isolation condenser system to cool Unit 1 but after ten minutes, they shut down the isolation condenser and turned on the emergency cooling injection system which sprayed coolant into the reactor core. After a half hour, the loss of electrical power to the reactor disabled the spray cooling system. The operators were unable to restart the isolation condensers for a half hour and they functioned intermittently after that. The condensers should have been able to cool the core for eight hours but they failed to perform as expected. It was revealed later that TEPCO had changed the original arrangement of pipes feeding the isolation condensers without notifying government regulator. This may have contributed to the problems at Unit 1.

            By midnight, the core coolant levels were dropping and TEPCO announced that there might be a release of radioactivity from Unit 1. Early on March 12th radiation levels were rising in the Unit 1 turbine building. TEPCO said that they might need to relieve the pressure by venting the rising pressure which would release radioactivity into the environment. This was excused on the premise that there would be very little radioactivity and it would be blown out to sea by prevailing winds. During the night, the isolation cooling system failed and around noon on March 12th, the pressure was relieved by venting and water was injected into the system.

            The heat continued to rise in the core as the cooling water was boiled off and released as steam. The lost of electrical power interfered with the operation of coolant pumps and fans. Increasing radioactivity was detected outside the reactor complex including cesium-137 and idodine-131 which indicated that the coolant levels in the core had dropped so low that the fuel rods were exposed and were melting. Building pressure had to be relieved by manually opening the valves because of the loss of electrical power.

            At 3 PM on March 12th, there was an explosion in the Unit 1 reactor building which blew out the walls on the upper levels and collapsed the roof. The exposure of the zirconium alloy fuel rods to live steam resulted in a reaction that generated hydrogen which resulted in the explosion. The primary containment was not breached but significant radioactivity was released. There was concern that some of the fuel rods may have dropped through the bottom of the core.

Hanford 2 - The Tank Farm

            The Hanford nuclear facility contains fifty three million gallons of high-level radioactive and chemical waste. These wastes were generated when corrosive chemicals were used to dissolve spent fuel rods to retrieve plutonium. The result was hot radioactive corrosive liquid was. The waste is stored near the Columbia River in huge underground tanks in what is called the Hanford Tank Farm.

Hanford 1 - Overview

            In 1943 the US government established a nuclear research site in south-central Washington State at the town of Hanford on the Columbia River. That area had been used by Native American tribes for thousands of years and was the location for a reservation. The Yakima Indians were moved to another reservation west of the old reservation in 1943 to make way for the construction of the Hanford nuclear site.

Nuclear Accidents 5 - Fukushima 1 - Overview

            On March 11, 2011 a tsunami was triggered by a powerful earthquake off the northeast coast of the Japanese island of Honshu. The huge wave crashed into the coastal Fukushima Number 1 nuclear power plant in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture and caused a major nuclear disaster.

            The Daiichi plant contains six GE boiling water reactors operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company. The plant was started operation 1971 and ultimately generated almost five gigawatts of electrical power making it one of the fifteen biggest commercial nuclear power plants in the world.

            On March 11, 2011 reactors 5 and 6 were in what is called cold shutdown where the pressure of the coolant is at regular sea level atmospheric pressure and the temperature is under two hundred degrees Fahrenheit. Reactor 4 had been defueled (had its fuel removed.)

            Following the earthquake, reactors 1, 2 and 3 automatically shut down and emergency diesel generators switched on to provide electricity for reactors controls and coolant circulation pumps. The tsunami caused by the earthquake hit the site and flooded the rooms containing the emergency generators. It also severed the connection of the plant to the electrical power grid. Access to the site was inhibited by the flooding. Newer generators had been built above the flood zone but their connection to the reactors was not protected and was flooded, preventing their use. Attempts to bring in mobile generators failed because they could not be connected to the site power grid.

Nuclear Accidents 4 - Chernobyl

            In April of 1986 there was a major nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine about two miles Prypiat, a city of about fifty thousand people on the Dnieper river near border with Belarus   Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union at that time and the power plant was under the direct control of authorities in Moscow. As with Kyshtym, there was not enough attention paid to safety systems and procedures.

            The Chernobyl power plant contained 4 reactors built between 1970 and 1983 based on a unique Soviet boiling water reactor design. Ordinary water was used as a coolant with graphite acting as a neutron moderator. Control rods were raised or lowered to control the power output of the reactors.

            As the reactor heats up, bubbles or voids of steam reduce the density of the water in the core which causes a drop in neutron absorption and an increase in the reactivity of the core. In this particular reactor design, the amount of bubbles or the void coefficient has a very strong influence over reactor temperature and output.

            On April 25 the operators were preparing the reactor number 4 for a test of the turbines ability to continue to spin and drive the circulation pumps after main electrical power was shut off. Early on April 26 automatic shut down mechanisms were disabled before the test.

Nuclear Accidents 2 - Kyshtym

            In 1957, there was a serious nuclear accident in Ozyorsk, Russia at the Mayak nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. Ozyosk was one of the "closed cities" that the Soviet Union built to carry out for highly classified research and industry. Ozyorsk was not on any public maps so the disaster has been referred to under the name of the nearest town that was on public maps, Kyshtym.          

Nuclear Accidents 2 - Kyshtym

            In 1957, there was a serious nuclear accident in Ozyorsk, Russia at the Mayak nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. Ozyosk was one of the "closed cities" that the Soviet Union built to carry out for highly classified research and industry. Ozyorsk was not on any public maps so the disaster has been referred to under the name of the nearest town that was on public maps, Kyshtym.          

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