Nuclear Weapons 38 - US Nuclear Plant Security Report 2 - Design Basis Threat
Yesterday, I blogged about a new report on U.S. reactor security by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas. In the report, the authors said that they were concerned that the U.S. reactors and other nuclear facilities were not secure against a major terrorist attack on the scale of 911. Reactor security is currently based on something called “design basis threats.(DBT)” Today, I am going to dig into what that means. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines DBT as “a basis for designing safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material” based on the perceived capabilities of adversaries.
The first concern mentioned in the official definition of DBT is “radiological sabotage.” Here the issue is the possibility that attackers might be able to reach and disable or destroy critical equipment in a nuclear facility that might result in the release of massive amounts of radiation.
To prevent sabotage, facilities must be protected against one or more attackers attempting entry by violence or stealth at one or more points. The attackers are assumed to be well trained, ready to kill or be killed and knowledgeable enough to recognize equipment and facilities that are important targets. They may have assistance from staff inside the plant in the form of information or active assistance in gaining entry. They could have both short range and long range automatic weapons. They will probably be carrying tools and explosive that will allow them to breach internal barriers. They will have land and/or water vehicles to carry them and their supplies.
There is also danger of internal sabotage by staff, land vehicle bomb attacks, waterborne vehicle bomb attacks and/or cyber attacks on the facilities’ computer systems. These other threats may or may not be coordinated with an external assault.
The other primary concern of the DBT definition has to do with the possibility that attackers could breach facility security, obtain and carry off quantities of radioactive materials sufficient to create a dirty bomb or an actual nuclear bomb. The attackers are assumed to have the same set of capabilities, equipment, knowledge and vehicles detailed above in the section on sabotage.
The next portion of the definition deals with facilities such as reactors, laboratories and waste storage facilities that are covered by the security required in the DBT definition. Also included is specification of the types of nuclear materials covered by the DBT definition such as nuclear fuel, medical isotopes, and nuclear waste. Quantities that are significant and transportation issues are then mentioned.
Finally, the definition includes reference to the transfer and protection of DBT information to relevant parties, required notification of import and export of nuclear materials and the process of issuing certification of compliance with DBT regulations.
The DBT framework is a step in the right direction for nuclear reactors, laboratories and waste storage site security but a major attack involving hijacked planes, hijacked drones, cruise missiles, heavy artillery and/or other types of heavy weapons would not be stopped by the DBT framework. Of additional concern is the fact that the National Institute of Standards in Washington, D.C. which is only twenty five miles from the White House is not subject to DBT security.
