Nuclear Weapons 39 - US Nuclear Plant Security Report 3 - the Backlash
In my last two posts, I talked about a new report from the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas that claimed that United States nuclear power plants are not safe from the threat of serious terrorist attacks. As might be expected, the reaction of the nuclear industry and its supporters was swift and negative.
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the nuclear industry trade association, quickly responded to the NPPP report. The NEI states that U.S. agencies such as the FBI and DHS agree that US nuclear power plants are the best defended facilities among the critical infrastructure of our country. They mention that the security staffing for nuclear power plants has grown by sixty percent since 911. Regular drills are held where mock attacks are staged to test nuclear power plant security. The NEI questions how terrorists could possibly remove fuel rods from a reactor or spent fuel pool and make off with them. A final point is made that a major terrorist incursion into the United States is the responsibility of the U.S. military forces and not something that an electrical power plant can be expected to deal with. These are all valid points.
In response to the NEI statements, it sounds good to say that they are the best defended of the U.S. critical infrastructure but that does not address how well defended other infrastructure is. If the general level of infrastructure security is poor, then just because the nuclear power plant security is better does not mean that it is adequate. They also fail to mention that not all plants have equal protection. In addition, while they stage mock attacks to test security, it is impossible to stage real severe attacks that could overwhelm defenses. While they discount the threat of theft of nuclear materials, they pass over the point in the report that sabotage of a nuclear power plant could endanger millions of people in the surrounding area.
A Forbes blogger named Jim Conca soon added his opinion to the conversation about the NPPP report. He attacks the report itself by criticizing the source materials for the study and the lack of any contradictory points of view in the report. He also says that the press on the NPPP report implies that the Department of Defense requested this report when, in fact, the DoD just funds the NPPP at the University of Texas and does not get involved in the specifics of NPPP work such as the report. Conca says that there was no peer review and that the report relies on speculations of the principle author. He says that the authors confuse nuclear weapons with nuclear energy and have no direct knowledge of the actual security measures at such plants because that information is highly classified. These are all valid points.
On the one hand, Conca criticizes the report for lacking sufficient source material and on the other hand he says that they could not possibly know about details of plant security because all that information is classified. If the details of plant security are so difficult to access, then how do Conca and the NEI really know that it is so good? Of course a report on possible attacks will have to include speculation. This report was generated by a group that is dedicated to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I don’t think that they are necessarily bound by peer review requirements and the need for a thorough review of contradictory positions. There are certainly many individuals and groups ready and willing to tell us how great nuclear plant security is.
