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       The three major nuclear armed powers are the U.S., Russia and China. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union built up huge stockpiles of nuclear warheads which were then reduced by disarmament treaties to a few thousand warheads each, China only has a few hundred warheads. They have a policy of not being the first to use nuclear weapons in a war. Their nuclear weapons exist only for the purpose of deterrence.
       In the past few years, there has been an escalation of tensions between Russia and the U.S. that has prompted both countries to develop new nuclear weapons and expand their nuclear arsenals. Because of this, China has been reconsidering its nuclear policy and arsenal. China is working on expanding their nuclear deterrence.
       There are three main delivery systems for nuclear weapons; bombers, ICBMs and nuclear submarines. China has bombers and ICBMs but does not have many nuclear submarines. They have been working to develop a reliable nuclear submarine fleet for decades with limited success. Analysts think that a reliable and effective Chinese nuclear missile submarine fleet would ultimately have a stabilizing influence on the balance of nuclear weapons in the world. However, there is fear that in the short term, it could be destabilizing.
       China did not actual finish its first nuclear missile submarine until the late 1980s. It was called the Type 092 SSBN but it was never dispatched on any operational patrols because it was noisy and unreliable. In addition, the missiles it carries were very short range.
       The current generation of Chinese nuclear missile submarines is called the Type 094 SSBN. They were put into service in 2006 but only started deterrent patrols in 2015. Each one carries twelve JL-2 missiles with nuclear warheads which have much longer ranges than the first missiles that China put on submarines. There are only four Type 094 submarines in existence. They have been operating in the South China Sea recently. U.S. military analysts believe that China will be building from five to eight more Type 094. The U.S. is working on enhancing its anti-submarine capabilities in response to this expectation.
       Tong Zhao is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. He recently issued a report on Chinese nuclear missile submarines. He said, “A fleet of survivable nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would reduce China’s concerns about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent and lessen the country’s incentives to further expand its arsenal. Such benefits, however, will be tempered by vulnerabilities associated with Beijing’s current generation of SSBNs.”
       In the near to mid-term, developing an SSBN fleet will require China to substantially enlarge its previously small stockpile of strategic ballistic missiles, possibly exacerbating the threat perceptions of potential adversaries and causing them to take countermeasures that might eventually intensify an emerging arms competition. China has obtained, for the first time, a demonstrably operational underwater nuclear capability. This represents the start of a new era for China’s sea-based nuclear forces.”
      The nuclear missiles in China’s current and planned nuclear missile submarines represent about half of China’s long-range nuclear missiles. As they build and deploy more nuclear missile submarines, the proportion of long-range nuclear missiles that can be delivered by a Chinese submarine will rise. In case of a surprise nuclear attack, Chinese submarine missiles have more potential to survive than nuclear warheads delivered by land-based ICBMs or nuclear warheads on bombers.
       Tong wrote that “If China’s SSBNs significantly contribute to the credibility of its overall nuclear deterrent, China would have less of an incentive to further enlarge its nuclear arsenal. China has a few unilateral steps that it should take to ensure that the growth of its SSBN fleet is as undisruptive as possible to regional security dynamics and to its own security interests. If China allows nationalistic sentiments to induce it to build a massive sea-based nuclear capability beyond any practical security needs, this could raise doubts in foreign countries about Beijing’s strategic intentions and contribute to an unnecessary, damaging strategic arms competition.”