The U.S. Administration is putting out mixed signals with respect to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The “skinny budget” of the U.S. President states that it will maintain “a strong, credible nuclear deterrent for the security of the Nation and U.S. allies.” On the other hand, his interim National Security Strategy Guidance claims “We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.”
Those steps may include cutting the nuclear modernization budget. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Leonor Tomero recently stressed that “some plans are very expensive.” However, reducing the nuclear modernization budget is incompatible with maintaining a “strong, credible nuclear deterrent.” Cuts to modernization programs would likely weaken deterrence in the face of increasing nuclear threats.
The idea that the U.S. can maintain a strong deterrent while cutting the nuclear modernization budget flies in the face of repeated warnings such as those expressed by both Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten and Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Adm. Charles Richard, that nuclear modernization is already “late-to-need.”
After many years of putting off the recapitalization of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has no choice but to provide the necessary funding or face delays in key delivery schedules. Cost savings based on engineering or manufacturing efficiencies would be welcome. Making reductions that would delay or harm programs for the sake of saving money would ignore the current reality.
Last year, the former Pentagon acquisition chief Ellen Lord testified that even minor cuts to the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) would result in schedule delays for the replacement for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). With late-to-need delays, the U.S. could be stuck with Cold War capabilities whose deterrence value decreases as they age.
The current Minuteman III missiles are fifty years old and are increasingly vulnerable to cyberattack. Admiral Richard said, “Just to pace the cyber threat alone, GBSD is a necessary step forward.” If U.S. adversaries think that they can defeat our four hundred ICBM with a cyberattack, it may become an attractive strategy. U.S. adversaries continue to expand their nuclear forces so it would not be a good idea to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the current situation.
Russia is expected to expand its unconstrained stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons which already outnumbers the U.S. inventory of such weapons by ten to one. It is also building entirely new nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, China is expected to at least double its nuclear stockpile which will make it a peer nuclear competitor with the U.S. by the end of the decade.
Never before has the U.S. had to face two peer adversaries and deter them differently at the same time. If anything, the U.S. should be working hard to improve nuclear deterrence rather than trying to cut down nuclear modernization as much as possible without impacting national security.
Critics like to quote that nuclear modernization will cost four hundred billion dollars. This is a lot of money, but it will be spread out over thirty years. It is misleading to talk about the life-cycle costs of thirty years when one-to five-year budgets are being discusses.
President Biden says that he is committed to both addressing growing global threats and maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, but the needs of the budget will speak louder. A budget that does not fully support modernization while nuclear threats are growing would be considered irresponsible by many.