Nuclear Weapons 821 - Recent Announcements May Indicate That Pakistan Is Changing Its Nuclear Policy - Part 1 of 2 Parts

Part 1 of 2 Parts
     Pakistan celebrated the twenty fifth anniversary of its first nuclear test last month. It also shared more details than usual about its current nuclear posture. Retired Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai recently spoke at a seminar hosted by the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad on May 24. He provided new details of Pakistan’s otherwise ambiguous nuclear doctrine. Kidwai’s comments were relevant because he is currently an advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA controls research and development and all other policy matters concerning nuclear weapons. Kidwai is also the former director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). The SPD is responsible for formulating nuclear policy and strategy as well as the security of nuclear assets.
     During his address at the seminar, Kidwai reiterated some of the long-standing positions of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. This included the strength of its nuclear triad based on land, air and sea-based capabilities to deter India. Pakistan is concerned about India’s Cold Start doctrine which envisions a limited war though quick mobilization of unified battle groups to conduct operations inside Pakistani territory without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Kidwai also discussed what’s known as a full-spectrum deterrence which is a policy aimed at responding to a range of threats for India. However, he went further than previous discussions of Pakistan’s nuclear posture.
     Kidwai expanded the scope of this doctrine by explaining what he referred to as the vertical and horizontal dimensions. He said that that full spectrum deterrence “comprises horizontally of a robust tri-services inventory of a variety of nuclear weapons … [that] is held on land with the Army Strategic Force Command, the ASFC; at sea with the Naval Strategic Force Command, the NSFC; and in the air with the Air Force Strategic Command, the AFSC.”
     Kidwai most surprising statement was that “vertically the spectrum encapsulates adequate range coverage from 0 meters to 2,750 kilometers [about 1,700 miles] as well as nuclear weapons destructive yields at three tiers—strategic, operational, and tactical.” Reducing the minimum range to zero yards is unprecedented. If this is implemented, it points to a major shift in Pakistan’s nuclear policy thinking.
     By mentioning zero-range weapons, Pakistan is suggesting that it is may be going to develop artillery shells as the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom did during the Cold War. The U.S. developed the M28/M29 Davy Crockett (DC) recoilless rifle system during the 1950s. The DC was the smallest weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and was intended as a front-line weapon with yields as low as a fraction of a kiloton. On the other hand, Pakistan may possibly deploy nuclear land mines across the Indian-Pakistan border to stop Indian advances into Pakistan. Observers, especially in India, are wondering whether this statement is based on some existing scientific research and design testing and necessary doctrinal thought processes. Kidwai’s statement does not provide any such details. In the spirit of ambiguity that Pakistan seems to have benefited from, it is unlikely that there will be any follow-up in the near future to further clarify the details of Pakistani nuclear policy.
Please read Part 2 next