The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
I just posted another update a few days ago about the situation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. They believe that they now understand what caused the release of plutonium and americium into the environment in February. A new type of absorbent was added to drums of waste from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This absorbent did not adequately lock up the ammonium nitrates in the liquid in the drums. The dried nitrate salts that resulted were unstable and caused one of the drums at Carlsbad to explode.
It was known at that time that there were at least two of the drums with the wrong absorbent at WIPP. After studying the drums brought to WIPP for storage from LANL it turns out that there are at about three hundred and seventy of the problem drums now at the WIPP. The operators have been ordered to immediately draw up plans to permanently seal off the rooms at the WIPP where the problem drums are stored before any more of them explode.
In my recent post, I mentioned that there were at least fifty seven of the problem drums with the new absorbent still at LANL. There are plans to move the drums under the cover of a dome to prevent radioactive release if they explode. The drums will be monitored constantly for any increase in their temperature.
When WIPP was shut down after the radiation release in February, drums of waste from LANL were shipped to a temporary storage site in Texas. The site is operated by Waste Control Specialists on the Texas – New Mexico border. The waste is stored in an air-conditioned building and monitored twenty four hours a day. Now it turns out that there are over a hundred of the problem drums from LANL at the Texas site. The drums are wrapped in clusters of seven and then placed in containers. If any explosions occur in those drums, it might result in the release of radioactive materials into the environment.
What began as an accidental release of radioactive particles into the atmosphere with unknown cause in February has now escalated into a full-blown crisis with over five hundred drums of unstable and potentially explosive nuclear waste in the LANL, the WIPP and the Texas sites. All of this as a result of the change of an absorbent added to the drums. Someone should have been responsible for determining that the new absorbent would perform the main function that it was intended for.
The nuclear industry spends a lot of money assuring the public that nuclear power is safe. They say that the Fukushima disaster was a case of old technology, poor planning and natural disaster. They assure us that new reactors will be much safer and reliable. Unfortunately, as the accident at the WIPP illustrates, there problems that arise because someone changes something in the nuclear fuel cycle without fully testing what they have changed. And here we are with another nuclear crisis.
Los Alamos National Laboratory:
Operators shut down unit 2 at FirstEnergy’s Beaver Valley nuclear plant this week after encountering an issue with a pump during startup. nuclearstreet.com
There have been many recent problems with the U.S. nuclear forces that have command of the United States nuclear arsenal. I have posted several times about some of the problems. More information keeps coming out all the time and I thought that it was time for a recap of problems since 2013.
In April of 2013, nineteen missile crew members of the 91st Missile Wing of Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota were found unfit to perform their duties. They were given remedial training and the officer in charge of training was fired.
Members of the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana failed an inspection for safety and security. They were unable to respond adequately to the simulated seizure of a missile silo by a mock hostile force. The officer in charge of security was relieved of his duty a few days later. The failing members successfully passed a second inspection after corrective measures to improve safety and security training are implemented.
Several different officers were punished in separate incidents where they opened blast doors while one of the two launch officers was asleep. According to regulations, the blast doors must be kept closed unless both launch officers are awake and on duty.
Three star Navy Admiral Timothy Giardina who was the second in command of the U.S. nuclear command was relieved of duty. He was caught passing counterfeit poker chips at a casino. He was also given a letter of reprimand and required to pay a four thousand dollar fine. He is allowed to continue to serve in the Navy as a staff officer.
A few days later, Major General Michael Carey was relieved of his command of the 20th Air Force which is responsible for the Minuteman 3 missile force. He attended a conference in Russia where he was often late for meetings, drunk and abrasive. There were also reports that he spent a lot of time drinking with “suspicious women” who might have been with Russian security agencies. Carey was allowed to continue as a staff officer at Air Force Space Command but will be retiring in June after being demoted in rank to brigadier general.
Three launch officers were investigated for drug abuse. In the investigation, widespread cheating on monthly certification exams is uncovered. Air Force missile launch officers are required to be recertified monthly to insure that they are clear on procedures. Dozens of missile officers at Malmstrom lose their certification because they are caught cheating on the monthly exams.
As I have said the past, the missile force are experiencing burnout because their job is “exhausting, unrewarding and stressful.” They are expected to be on hyper alert day after day often dreading the possibility of being asked to launch their missiles. There are high levels of misconduct including spousal abuse, substance abuse in the missile force. The rate of court-martials is declining but is still much higher than the average rate in the Air Force.
