A couple of days ago I blogged about some problems with the U.S. nuclear missile force. One recent report revealed that thirty four members of the nuclear missile force have been suspended because they were directly or indirectly implicated in a cheating scandal. Today I want to drill down into that particular issue. The officers in the missile force were caught cheating or tolerating the cheating of others on the routine exams that test their knowledge of the highly classified and strict procedures that are required to launch U.S. nuclear missiles under emergency war orders. All of them have had their security clearances suspended and are not allowed to perform launch duties.
Apparently some of the cheaters were transmitting answers to other cheaters via text messaging. This is a blatant violation of security protocols for handling classified information in addition to showing a clear lack of personal integrity. Seventeen officers cheated and another seventeen knew about the cheating but did not report it. A commander at one of the six bases involved in the cheating investigation said that he thought that this was one manifestation of a deeper and broader cultural problem of ignoring problems rather than dealing with them.
In response to the cheating revelations, every available ICBM launch control officer at Malmstrom AFB in Montana, F.E. Warren AFB in Wyoming and Minot AFB in North Dakota were retested by the Air Force. Out of four hundred and seventy two officers, twenty one failed their tests and will receive new training and be retested before they are allowed to resume their duties. An additional twenty seven were not available for the tests.
Adding up the cheaters, the failed and the unavailable, the total number of launch control officers who are not authorized for duty comes to eighty two. This accounts for seventeen percent of the launch control officers. Although the Air Force admitted that this was going to have an “impact” on the missile forces, they stated that it would not affect the 24/7 readiness of the all the U.S. ICBMs. The Air Force assured the public that “the trouble is episodic, correctible and not cause for public worry.”
The new Air Force Secretary said that this was a failure of some of our airmen, not a failure of the nuclear mission. “Just because there are issues with individuals it does not mean that the entirety of the mission is compromised.” She said that she was confident that the check and balances in place and the regular inspections of our ICBM bases were sufficient to insure the security of the nuclear missiles.
The question I have is exactly what the “nuclear mission” is. Is it to assure any potential enemy that we will destroy the world if attacked or is it to actually be ready to finish the task of bringing down human civilization if we are attacked? The goal of the first mission is to never need to launch which means that the missile forces are engaged in an endless and boring job of babysitting nuclear missiles which will never be launched. If the mission is to actually launch the missiles even with the knowledge that no one will win the final war, then every launch control officer in the missile forces must sometime ask themselves if they would actually launch the missiles if commanded. Either mission is a particularly stressful burden and it is not surprising that the some of the launch control officers are succumbing to severe stress.
Malmstrom Air Force Base: