The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.

Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.

Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.

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Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?

The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.

What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?

“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.

Blog

  • Peaceful Atomic Bombs 1 – Operation Plowshare

                  The primary use of nuclear bombs is as weapons. They are compact and extremely powerful. However, conventional explosives find use in civilian applications such as excavations for mining and construction. Early in the history of nuclear explosives, the suggestion was made that they might have use for such peaceful purposes.

                  The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had worked during the 1950s to convince the American public that atomic research and development was important for many civilian uses such as nuclear medicine and nuclear power generation. However, the Korean War and the Cold War had created an atmosphere of fear around nuclear science because of the threat of nuclear annihilation. The U.S. government wanted to counter that fear by encouraging the public to believe that the use of atomic bombs could be valuable for civilian projects. They needed to maintain the public’s confidence and support for pouring money into nuclear research much of which aided nuclear weapon research.

                 Operation Plowshare (or Project Plowshare) was a child of Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. The project was formally launched in 1957. In 1960, Eisenhower’s Vice President delivered a speech in which he discussed the new. He touted the great possibilities of what he called “atomic dynamite” for moving mountains and digging harbors and canals.

                  In 1961, Operation Plowshare began testing nuclear bombs for the purpose of earth moving by underground detonation. The idea was to control the placement and size of craters to enabled controlled earthmoving for such things as harbors and canals, mountain passes, earth dams and underground storage caves for water or natural gas. Potential projects were brought forward such as carving a harbor into the coastline of Alaska and digging an alternative to the Panama Canal between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. Another possible idea was that nuclear blasts underground could release natural gas locked in the rock or “atomic” fracking. Between 1961 to 1973, 27 atomic bombs were exploded as part of Operation Plowshare, most of them at the Nevada Test site.

                 Unfortunately, it turned out that even underground explosions resulted in release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. Exact control of the dimensions of the craters were difficult. Underground nuclear explosions to extract natural gas were not as productive as anticipated and residual radioactivity contaminated the gas released. Underground explosions can contaminate underground water threatening supplies for human consumptions and irrigation. Underground nuclear explosions could also aggravate faults lines causing earthquakes.

                 Operation Plowshare failed to produce useful results and there was a public backlash against the use nuclear bombs within the borders of the United States, especially near concentrations of population. The last test explosion was in 1973 and all funding ended in 1977. It is estimated that over seven hundred and seventy million dollars was spent during the life of the project. To date, the U.S government has not made public any consideration of further use of atomic bombs for civilian purposes.

    Operation Plowshare test crater:

  • Nulcear Treaties – 9 – New START

              In 2008, right after the election of Barack Obama as President of the U.S., the Russian President Medvedev announced that the Russian Federation would deploy new sort-range missiles on their western border as a counter to the announced intention of the U.S. to place anti-ballistic missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic on the Russian border. The Bush administration claimed that the new missiles were being deployed to counter Iranian missiles The Russian President stated that any negotiations on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the original which was going to expire at the end of 2009 would have to be legally binding with lower maximums on nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

               In early 2009, the Russian President said that the Russian Federation was going to start a major rearmament project including upgrading their nuclear arsenal. He said that since NATO was moving aggressively in Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation would increase their army, navel and nuclear capabilities as a response and that they would begin in 2011.

              In May of 2009, the U.S. and the Russians began working on a new start agreement and agreed to abide by the terms of the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) after it expired in December of 2009 until a new treaty was signed. The new treaty would reduce the number of warheads they deployed to under one thousand five hundred each.

              In July of 2009, U.S. President Obama and Russian Federation President Medvedev signed the “Joint understanding for a follow-on agreement to START I in Moscow, Russia. The agreement requires that each side reduce its warheads to between one thousand five hundred and one thousand six hundred seventy five. The delivery systems were to be reduced to between five hundred and one thousand one hundred. This was only an interim agreement and the intention was to see a new treaty negotiated and signed before December of 2009 when START I expired.

             Despite the intent to replace START I before it expired in December of 2009, negotiations dragged on into 2010. Finally in April of 2010, the successor to START I, Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed by U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev. It replaced the proposed START II treaty which was signed but never implemented and the unfinished negotiations for a START III treaty. The treaty was ratified and entered into force in February 2011. Each side will have seven years to comply and the treaty will remain in force until 2021.

              New START requires that deployed warheads on both sides be reduced by 50%. This would be around one thousand five hundred. Total intercontinental missiles launchers, submarine missiles launchers and heavy bombers could not exceed eight hundred with only seven hundred of those being deployed. Stockpiled warheads are not covered by the treaty and each side still has thousands of inactive warheads in storage. A new inspection system with eighteen inspections per year will be developed to verify compliance. (There was a report from the U.S. State Department in 2009 that the Russians were not in full compliance with the previous START I treaty.)

    Signing of New START:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 8 – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

                 Following the use of atomic bombs on Japan, the U.S. was soon joined by other nations in developing and testing nuclear weapons. Over five hundred nuclear devices were exploded in atmospheric and ground tests in the decade after the end of World War II. The world became concerned about the health effects of the fallout from all the tests. The Prime minister of India called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide in 1953. However, the Cold War between the U.S., Russia and Red China made progress on nuclear disarmament very difficult.

              Almost another decade passed before the Partial Test Ban Treaty was drafted and signed in 1963. It banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater or in space but did not ban underground testing which could still result in the release of radioactive materials. France and China did not sign this Treaty.

              After further negotiation, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968. Nations that did not have nuclear weapons agreed not to manufacture, purchase or otherwise obtain them. All nations who signed the treaty whether or not they had nuclear weapons agreed to work towards nuclear disarmament. India, Pakistan and Israel did not sign this treaty.

              During the next two decades, the world remained in the grip of the Cold War with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France against the Soviets and the Chinese. Pakistan and India developed their nuclear arsenals as did Israel. Finally with the end of the Cold War on the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation improved for nuclear disarmament. In 1993, under the auspices of the United Nations, the signatories of the Partial Test Ban Treaty began discussing the possibility of expanding the original Treaty to cover a ban on all nuclear weapons testing.

               Despite three years of hard debate on the proposed treaty, the negotiators could not reach a consensus. The text resulting from the negotiations was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly as a draft resolution in 1996. In September of that year, more than two thirds of the U.N. General Assembly voted in favor of what was called the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. Since the U.N. vote, only India, Pakistan and North Korea have carried out nuclear tests.

               The United States has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty but it has not been ratified by Congress. Ratification will ultimately depend on the U.S. maintaining nuclear laboratories and a reliable nuclear weapons inventory as well as monitoring capability to verify compliance by other states. The U.S. also reserves the right to begin testing again after withdrawing from the Treaty if it proves impossible to maintain a reliable nuclear arsenal without testing.

                Despite fail of all signatory nations to ratify the Treaty, they refrain from testing and monitor the environment constantly for signs of any nuclear testing by any state. The debate over ratification in the U.S. and other nations continue.

     Annex 2 refers to a list of 44 countries which participated in the original treaty negotiations:

        

  • Nulcear Treaties – 7 – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I

                  During the early 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a series of talks about strategic arms reduction. Although the U.S. President Reagan had repeatedly accused the Soviets of violating the terms of the SALT II treaty, he was still willing to propose a reduction in all warheads at Geneva in 1982. The discussions that followed were originally referred to as SALT III but ultimately came to be called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or START I. IN the first phase, Reagan called a limit of all warheads on missiles to five thousand and a limit of warheads on ICBMs of two thousand five hundred. Only eight hundred and fifty ICBMs would be allowed per side and a limit of about one hundred of the heaviest class of ICBMS. In the second phase, there would be negotiations on the number of warheads carried by heavy bombers.

                 At the time, the U.S. had a clear advantage in long range bombers which could reach Russia although the Soviet air space was well defended and the targets spread over the huge territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviet fleet of bomber were unable to reach the U.S. for the most part and were mainly intended for conflicts in Europe and Asia. The Soviets had a clear advantage in heavy ICBM so by starting with ICBM reduction, the U.S. would benefit more than the Soviets from the first phase of Reagan’s proposal.

                In 1983, Reagan announced the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was a shift of U.S. policy from the mutually assured destruction (MAD) of the prior decades when it was assumed that it was not possible to win a nuclear war with the Soviets and that if either side started one, both sides would be totally destroyed. The SDI was intended to shift U.S. policy to defending the U.S. against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union with land and space based defense systems. This shift in U.S. policy alarmed the Soviets because they realized that if the U.S. could possibly stage a first strike against the Soviet Union and withstand a retaliatory strike from the Soviets. The Soviets withdrew from negotiations during the mid 1980s and the strategic arms race accelerated. Although SDI was viewed by many experts as being an impossible plan, billions of dollars were squandered on it in the 1980s.

                By the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of the nuclear arms race of the 1980s, both sides had more than ten thousand nuclear warheads. The START I treaty was signed in 1991 by the U.S. President Bush and the Soviet Premier Gorbachev to halt the increase in warheads. There were also limits set for fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and attack helicopters. The U.S. destroyed three hundred and sixty five B-52 bombers to comply with the treaty. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the Russians inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the Treaty. Other countries that had been part of the Soviet Union sent their nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to become nuclear free countries. When the SALT I treaty expired in 2009, the U.S. State Department reported that the Russians were not in compliance with the terms of the Treaty but gave no specific details of violations.

    Signing of the START I in 1991 from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 6 – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

                   The NATO forces in Western Europe had enjoyed clear military dominance over the Soviet Union up to the late 1970s. The U.S. and other NATO forces bombers and missiles were clearly superior to the old Soviet missiles and bombers. The Soviets moved to balance the NATO arsenal by development and deployment of a new more power generation of mid-range nuclear missiles called SS-20 and Tu22M.

                   NATO countered with deployment of new nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing ballistic missiles. They also sought negotiations with the Soviet over the build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe. These discussions had begun in Geneva, Switzerland in 1980.

    During the first half of the 1980s, there was a chilling of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union with U.S. President Reagan repeatedly accusing the Soviets of violating the provisions of the SALT II Treaty which had been signed by both sides but never ratified in the U.S. Congress. In 1981, the U.S. had suggested the complete elimination of all intermediate range nuclear weapons on both sides. There was a disagreement over the inclusion or exclusion of British and French nuclear weapons and the Soviets withdrew from the negotiations in 1983. In 1984, the U.S. began deployment of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe despite public protests.

    Negotiations began again in 1986 with a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, including those in Europe by 2000. The U.S. declined this offer and instead counter-offered a staged reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons to zero by 1989. The British and French arsenals were not part of the discussions. Discussions continued in Reykjavik, Iceland between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev over nuclear disarmament. The final text of the treaty that was hammered out was influenced by the decision of the West German Chancellor to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany.

                The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed in Washington, D.C. in December of 1987. The Treaty set a deadline of 1991 and by that time, thousands of intermediate range nuclear weapons had been removed and destroyed from the European theater. Both sides were able to inspect the military installations of the other side.

                 The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and the Russian Federation inherited their nuclear arsenal. The Russian Federation abided by the Treaty that the Soviets had signed until 2007. In that year, The RF President Putin stated that he had decided that it was no longer in the interest of the RF to adhere to the INF Treaty. The Russians were concerned about U.S. plans to deploy missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic that would be aimed at Russia. They said that their decision to continue with the INF or to withdraw from it would be strongly influenced by the U.S: deployment of the planned missiles in Eastern Europe.  Ultimately the U.S. dropped the plans for Polish and Czech missile deployment.

    Signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from a U.S. Stated Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 5 – Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II

                  Following the success of the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, a second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was carried out between 1972 and 1979. In the Salt I agreement, the U.S. and the Soviets agreed to freeze the combined number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at the number they possessed in 1972 when the Interim Agreement was signed for a period of five years.

                The SALT II goal was to limit the total number of all categories of delivery vehicles on either side to only two thousand two hundred and fifty. This would include missile warheads launched from either land based facilities or submarines as well as bombs dropped by aircraft. The proposed SALT II treaty also required that both sides not develop any new missiles. The intention to ultimate reduce nuclear arsenals was also part of the conversation. Major provisions of the Interim Agreement were to be carried forward into the new agreement which was to last until 1985.

                 The two sides disagreed on many particulars of a possible agreement. The old problem of U.S. presence in Europe and Soviet mid-range weapons aimed at Europe was a major sticking point in the discussions.  A first draft of a possible agreement called the Vladivostok accord was made in 1975 where many of the points of dissention were ironed out. However, disagreement about U.S. cruise missiles and a new generation of Soviet bombers called Backfire were still a major problem.

                 At the start of the Carter Administration in 1977, a thorough review was made of the SALT II progress. Calls for additional reductions in nuclear weapons were added to the previous proposals and an offer to defer the cruise/Backfire problems to a third series of talks. The Soviets refused both of these new proposals by the U.S.

                 Eventually an agreement was reached that included several sections. The first part was a short term (3 year) agreement on cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs, and ICBM reductions. A framework was established for future negotiation. And, the Vladivostok accord was to be integrated into the final Treaty.

                 In mid-1979, U.S. President Carter and Soviet Premier Brezhnev signed the Treaty but the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the agreement. Neither leader was able to obtain the changes that Congress was demanding. Senator Joe Biden, now Vice President of the United States, managed to obtain the changes that were required.

                 Six months after the Treaty was signed but before it had been ratified by the U.S. Congress, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It was also made public that there was a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba. These actions and revelations angered the U.S. government and people so much that the Treaty was never formally ratified. However, in 1982, U.S. President said that he would abide by the SALT II terms even without ratification. The Soviet Premier agreed that he too would abide by SALT II. Reagan later accused the Soviets of deviating from the SALT II provisions but pledged that the U.S. would continue to follow the SALT II framework.

    SALT II signing photo from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties 7 – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I

                  During the early 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a series of talks about strategic arms reduction. Although the U.S. President Reagan had repeatedly accused the Soviets of violating the terms of the SALT II treaty, he was still willing to propose a reduction in all warheads at Geneva in 1982. The discussions that followed were originally referred to as SALT III but ultimately came to be called the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks or START I. IN the first phase, Reagan called a limit of all warheads on missiles to five thousand and a limit of warheads on ICBMs of two thousand five hundred. Only eight hundred and fifty ICBMs would be allowed per side and a limit of about one hundred of the heaviest class of ICBMS. In the second phase, there would be negotiations on the number of warheads carried by heavy bombers.

                 At the time, the U.S. had a clear advantage in long range bombers which could reach Russia although the Soviet air space was well defended and the targets spread over the huge territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviet fleet of bomber were unable to reach the U.S. for the most part and were mainly intended for conflicts in Europe and Asia. The Soviets had a clear advantage in heavy ICBM so by starting with ICBM reduction, the U.S. would benefit more than the Soviets from the first phase of Reagan’s proposal.

                In 1983, Reagan announced the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was a shift of U.S. policy from the mutually assured destruction (MAD) of the prior decades when it was assumed that it was not possible to win a nuclear war with the Soviets and that if either side started one, both sides would be totally destroyed. The SDI was intended to shift U.S. policy to defending the U.S. against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union with land and space based defense systems. This shift in U.S. policy alarmed the Soviets because they realized that if the U.S. could possibly stage a first strike against the Soviet Union and withstand a retaliatory strike from the Soviets. The Soviets withdrew from negotiations during the mid 1980s and the strategic arms race accelerated. Although SDI was viewed by many experts as being an impossible plan, billions of dollars were squandered on it in the 1980s.

                By the beginning of the 1990s, as a result of the nuclear arms race of the 1980s, both sides had more than ten thousand nuclear warheads. The START I treaty was signed in 1991 by the U.S. President Bush and the Soviet Premier Gorbachev to halt the increase in warheads. There were also limits set for fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces and attack helicopters. The U.S. destroyed three hundred and sixty five B-52 bombers to comply with the treaty. When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the Russians inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the Treaty. Other countries that had been part of the Soviet Union sent their nuclear weapons to Russia and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to become nuclear free countries. When the SALT I treaty expired in 2009, the U.S. State Department reported that the Russians were not in compliance with the terms of the Treaty but gave no specific details of violations.

    Signing of the START I in 1991 from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 6 – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

                   The NATO forces in Western Europe had enjoyed clear military dominance over the Soviet Union up to the late 1970s. The U.S. and other NATO forces bombers and missiles were clearly superior to the old Soviet missiles and bombers. The Soviets moved to balance the NATO arsenal by development and deployment of a new more power generation of mid-range nuclear missiles called SS-20 and Tu22M.

                   NATO countered with deployment of new nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing ballistic missiles. They also sought negotiations with the Soviet over the build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe. These discussions had begun in Geneva, Switzerland in 1980.

    During the first half of the 1980s, there was a chilling of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union with U.S. President Reagan repeatedly accusing the Soviets of violating the provisions of the SALT II Treaty which had been signed by both sides but never ratified in the U.S. Congress. In 1981, the U.S. had suggested the complete elimination of all intermediate range nuclear weapons on both sides. There was a disagreement over the inclusion or exclusion of British and French nuclear weapons and the Soviets withdrew from the negotiations in 1983. In 1984, the U.S. began deployment of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe despite public protests.

    Negotiations began again in 1986 with a Soviet proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world, including those in Europe by 2000. The U.S. declined this offer and instead counter-offered a staged reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons to zero by 1989. The British and French arsenals were not part of the discussions. Discussions continued in Reykjavik, Iceland between U.S. President Reagan and Soviet Premier Gorbachev over nuclear disarmament. The final text of the treaty that was hammered out was influenced by the decision of the West German Chancellor to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany.

                The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed in Washington, D.C. in December of 1987. The Treaty set a deadline of 1991 and by that time, thousands of intermediate range nuclear weapons had been removed and destroyed from the European theater. Both sides were able to inspect the military installations of the other side.

                 The Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and the Russian Federation inherited their nuclear arsenal. The Russian Federation abided by the Treaty that the Soviets had signed until 2007. In that year, The RF President Putin stated that he had decided that it was no longer in the interest of the RF to adhere to the INF Treaty. The Russians were concerned about U.S. plans to deploy missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic that would be aimed at Russia. They said that their decision to continue with the INF or to withdraw from it would be strongly influenced by the U.S: deployment of the planned missiles in Eastern Europe.  Ultimately the U.S. dropped the plans for Polish and Czech missile deployment.

    Signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty from a U.S. Stated Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 5 – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II

                  Following the success of the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, a second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks was carried out between 1972 and 1979. In the Salt I agreement, the U.S. and the Soviets agreed to freeze the combined number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) at the number they possessed in 1972 when the Interim Agreement was signed for a period of five years.

                The SALT II goal was to limit the total number of all categories of delivery vehicles on either side to only two thousand two hundred and fifty. This would include missile warheads launched from either land based facilities or submarines as well as bombs dropped by aircraft. The proposed SALT II treaty also required that both sides not develop any new missiles. The intention to ultimate reduce nuclear arsenals was also part of the conversation. Major provisions of the Interim Agreement were to be carried forward into the new agreement which was to last until 1985.

                 The two sides disagreed on many particulars of a possible agreement. The old problem of U.S. presence in Europe and Soviet mid-range weapons aimed at Europe was a major sticking point in the discussions.  A first draft of a possible agreement called the Vladivostok accord was made in 1975 where many of the points of dissention were ironed out. However, disagreement about U.S. cruise missiles and a new generation of Soviet bombers called Backfire were still a major problem.

                 At the start of the Carter Administration in 1977, a thorough review was made of the SALT II progress. Calls for additional reductions in nuclear weapons were added to the previous proposals and an offer to defer the cruise/Backfire problems to a third series of talks. The Soviets refused both of these new proposals by the U.S.

                 Eventually an agreement was reached that included several sections. The first part was a short term (3 year) agreement on cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs, and ICBM reductions. A framework was established for future negotiation. And, the Vladivostok accord was to be integrated into the final Treaty.

                 In mid-1979, U.S. President Carter and Soviet Premier Brezhnev signed the Treaty but the U.S. Congress refused to ratify the agreement. Neither leader was able to obtain the changes that Congress was demanding. Senator Joe Biden, now Vice President of the United States, managed to obtain the changes that were required.

                 Six months after the Treaty was signed but before it had been ratified by the U.S. Congress, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It was also made public that there was a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba. These actions and revelations angered the U.S. government and people so much that the Treaty was never formally ratified. However, in 1982, U.S. President said that he would abide by the SALT II terms even without ratification. The Soviet Premier agreed that he too would abide by SALT II. Reagan later accused the Soviets of deviating from the SALT II provisions but pledged that the U.S. would continue to follow the SALT II framework.

    SALT II signing photo from U.S. State Department:

  • Nuclear Treaties – 4 – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I

                  One of the main points of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was the requirement that those states which currently possessed nuclear weapons work towards nuclear disarmament. The two world super powers at the time, the United States and the Soviet Union both possessed nuclear arsenals. The U.S. possessed about one thousand inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and about six hundred and fifty  submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) in 1969. The Soviets had around one thousand ICBMs as well hundreds of SLBMs in 1969.

                By that time, the Soviets had installed an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) around their capital, Moscow, Russia. The U.S. had announced plans to protect twelve sites but only built one ABM system to protect a missile base in North Dakota. The U.S. and the Soviets were also working on warheads that contained multiple nuclear bombs. These multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, referred to as MIRVs, were a response to the work on anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs).

                  These new developments in the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviets increased international pressures for work towards nuclear disarmament. The first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks known as SALT I began in Helsinki, Finland in late 1969. These bilateral disarmament talks between the U.S. and the Soviets went on for two years of hard negotiating at meetings which were held alternately in Helsinki, Finland and Vienna, Austria.

                    The Soviets wanted to negotiate over U.S. bombers in Europe while the U.S. wanted to negotiate over Soviet mid-range nuclear weapons aimed at Europe. Both sides dropped these positions in favor of only negotiating an interim agreement on ICBMs and ABMs.In May of 1972, Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed two agreements, one to deal with anti-ballistic missile systems and another dealing with limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

                    The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limited both sides to having only two site protected by ABM systems. The U.S. dismantled their single ABM system a few years later. The ABM system around Moscow is still in use.

                    The other treaty signed by the U.S. and the Soviets as a result of the talks was called the Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. This agreement was to be in force for five years. Strategic ICBMs were to be frozen at 1972 numbers. No new ICBM silos could be built. Signatories were allowed to build new SLBMs if their number was balanced by a equal reduction in the number ICBMs. Some allowance was made for modernizing launchers.

                    The U.S. had basically frozen its missile deployment program during the talks while the Soviets added 50% to their ICBM numbers and quadrupled their SLBMs.

    Start of the SALT I negotiations from NATO photo archive: