The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
I have blogged before about the deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Russia has been doing a lot of nuclear saber rattling in the past few years and the U.S. has responded with a little saber rattling of its own. The Russian seizure of Crimea and agitation in Eastern Ukraine has increased tensions between NATO and Russia in Eastern Europe. The Syrian civil war and ISIS have raised tensions in the Middle East between the U.S. and Russia. Russia has mentioned the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in both Eastern Europe and Syria. Just a few day ago, plans for cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in Syria following the ceasefire have been cancelled.
In the interest of nuclear disarmament the U.S. has purchased nuclear fuel from Russia that was created by decommissioning Russian nuclear warheads. A lot of U.S. reactors have been burning this fuel for years. This particular program has ended and a new program was being put in place. Unfortunately, rising tensions between the U.S. and Russia have now prompted Russia to cancel a program to recycle more Russia nuclear weapons into nuclear fuel.
The US-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement was signed in the year 2000. It commits the U.S. and Russia to dispose of more than thirty four tons of weapons grade plutonium by converting it into mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel.
The plutonium removed from the warheads was to be mixed with uranium and then used for nuclear fuel in light water reactors. Once irradiated and used to generate electricity, the resulting spent fuel could not be used as a material for nuclear weapons manufacture, fulfilling the intent of the agreement.
The conversion was to be carried out with full transparency and verification to insure that the plutonium could never be used to construct nuclear weapons. There were problems with implementation because the first plans drafted did not take into account changes that were being made to the Russia program for the development of nuclear energy. The new Russian plans came out in 2006. Russian suggestions for disposal were presented in 2008. In 2010, the amended PMDA was signed by the U.S. and Russia. This amendment was referred to as the Plutonium Disposition Protocol. The Protocol details the rights, obligations, principles and procedures for monitoring and inspecting the disposition activities of the two countries. The two countries were going to start the disposal program in 2018.
The U.S. MOX fuel fabrication facility is being constructed at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site. Russia already has facilities for producing MOX fuel. They will be expanding and upgrading their MOX plant to comply with the PMDA. The U.S. committed to paying three hundred million dollars for development and construction in Russia. The U.S. has agreed to spend one hundred million dollars in fixed price payments for tons of MOX fuel made from Russian plutonium.
Vladimir Putin, the Russian President has just announced that Russia is cancelling the PMDA because of “unfriendly actions” of the U.S. including sanctions following the Crimea seizure and the tension between NATO and Russia exacerbated by the movement of NATO troops near the Russian border in Eastern Europe. Putin also claimed that the terms of the PMDA would cause problems for Russia’s defense program.
A bill was submitted to the Russian Parliament by Putin that lays out terms for reinstatement of the PMDA. The U.S. must move NATO forces out of Eastern European countries that became NATO members after the year 2000, remove all the sanctions from the Crimea seizure and compensate Russia for the money lost due to the sanctions. It is unlikely that the U.S. will agree to these terms.
MOX plant under construction at Savannah River Site:
The final agreements enabling construction of two EPR units at Hinkley Point C to proceed were signed today in London by the UK government, EDF and China General Nuclear. world-nuclear-news.org
Russia’s R-30 Bulava submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) continues to be plagued with problems as a recent test failure shows. nationalinterest.org
The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station near San Diego on the California coast was permanently shut down in 2013. Recently installed turbines from a Japanese manufacturer caused vibrations that damaged the steam pipes in the plant after only two years of operation. South California Edison decided to shut down the plant after the damage was discovered.
Eventually, the U.S. will have a permanent geological repository for spent nuclear fuel but not before 2050 at the soonest. Both critics of the plant and the operators agree that it is imperative to move the fuel out of the reactor and cooling pool as soon as possible. If there is a loss of cooling water in the pool, the fuel rods will spontaneously burst into flames and spread radioactive materials far beyond the plant.
The question of where to put the nuclear fuel in the reactor and the spent nuclear fuel in the cooling pool has aroused controversy and debate. SCE has proposed a location near the reactors on land that it owns on the coast to store the three million six hundred thousand pounds of nuclear fuel in temporary dry casks. The proposed storage site is on bluffs owned by SCE above the San Onofre State Beach just north of the site of the closed reactors. About a third of the spent nuclear fuel from the plant is already stored on the bluffs in casks. SCE proposes to place the other two thirds of the fuel in dry casks on the bluffs in 2017. The location is between San Diego and Los Angeles, two major metropolitan areas that are home to over seventeen million people.
Critics of the site proposed by SCE say that it is just about the worst possible choice for storing nuclear materials. The proposed storage site is in an area prone to earthquakes and tsunamis. Early this year there was significant erosion of the beach and cliffs near San Onofre. Global climate change is causing sea levels to rise and this will potentially increase the dangers of erosion of the beach and cliffs near the proposed storage site. The United States Geological Service says that there is a serious danger of extreme bluff, cliff and beach erosion which will increase over time. There is also an increasing risk of severe flooding in the area which can undercut coastal cliffs and cause them to collapse. The critics say that SCE chose the site because it was cheap and gave no serious consideration to the dangers to the people in the area.
SCE says that its analysis of the proposed site and weather conditions indicate that there is no serious danger that the bluffs where the nuclear fuel will be stored are in any danger of collapse. They say that the dry casks are well designed and can withstand the condition on the bluff with little risk for at least eighty years by which time they expect there to be a permanent national repository available to take the fuel.
One major concern of critics of the storage plan is the fact that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has now issued exemptions to SCE that relieve it from being responsible to provide emergency response beyond the ground of the plant to any nuclear accident at the plant. The Federal Emergency Management Agency will no longer monitor the readiness of SCE to provide emergency response beyond the plant. This worries officials who will have to provide any emergency response to the area around the plant. The California Office of Emergency Services has requested that FEMA reconsider this policy but FEMA has refused.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in 2013 as seen from San Onofre State, photo D Ramey Logan:
