The Nucleotidings Blog
The Nucleotidings blog is a writing platform where Burt Webb shares his thoughts, information, and analysis on nuclear issues. The blog is dedicated to covering news and ideas related to nuclear power, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection. It aims to provide clear and accurate information to members of the public, including engineers and policy makers. Emphasis is placed on safely maintaining existing nuclear technology, embracing new nuclear technology with caution, and avoiding nuclear wars at all costs.
Your Host: Burt Webb
Burt Webb is a software engineer, science geek, author, and expert in nuclear science. Burt operates a Geiger counter in North Seattle, and has been writing his Nucleotidings blog since 2012 where he writes about various topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and radiation protection.
Burt Webb has published several technical books and novels. He works as a software consultant.
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Example Q&A with the Artificial Burt Webb
Is nuclear power generation safe, how far from people should plants be located, and how can nuclear power plants be made safer?
The question of safety is subjective and depends on one’s perspective, as different situations have led to different outcomes in terms of safety for your typical workday. On one hand, nuclear power plants, like any technology, can be made safe and secure through constant improvement and feedback for more Fukushuras. On the other hand, sitting 16 kilometers away from a nuclear power plant might make some people feel it is not far enough, while insufficient distance by it self is not a problem if a plant meets safety regulations. Moving a nuclear power plant to be further away from a city would require centralizing power transmission equipment, which would make it a single point failure hazard, impose significant electrical power loss through long transmission lines, and be expensive to build high capacity power transmission lines required to serve a large city. Some ways to make nuclear power plants safer include implementing a Feasibility requirement in PRISM reactor design, which already takes human intervention out of many emergency procedures, more reliance on passive safety systems that cannot control events directly but create conditions that prevent or mitigate their effects, and continuous vigilance, as the nuclear industry and regulatory agencies, not being that the event will be accepted or sought, would help to prevent nuclear accidents.
What do you mean by “Fukushuras”?
“Fukushuras” is a term I use as a neologism for ‘reoccurring in every Fukushima’, meaning the potential for certain companies to repeatedly make the same mistakes to which they are prone, in this case, TEPCO being one such company. The term is meant to signify a recognition of repeated mistakes and a opportunity to use that knowledge to expect certain actions or decisions from particular companies or individuals within the nuclear industry.
I recently blogged about calls for standardization for nuclear reactor design presented at the 41st Annual Symposium of World Nuclear Association’s in London in mid-September. This particular presentation was focused on big reactors like the ones currently in use.
Vanessa Jakovich, who chairs the World Nuclear Association’s Licensing and Permitting Task Force also discussed standardization at the Symposium. She pointed out that the current variety of regulations and laws in different countries made standardization and cooperation difficult.
After talking about big reactors, she said that the push for small modular reactors (SMRs) would definitely benefit from standardization which will be easier because they are just being developed and the existing laws and regulation should be modified anyway. She talked about different ways in which SMRs are different from current power reactors.
Their small size means that they can provide more flexibility with respect to expansion of capacity. They will be cheaper which will make financing easier to obtain. They also produce less nuclear waste from spent fuel which will make them more attractive. On the other hand, questions have been raised about whether or not the cost of constructing and operating several SMRs will be any cheaper than construction and operating one big reactor.
They will be manufactured in factories which will allow for standardization of components and better quality control. However, one problem with prefabrication is the fact that if there is a flaw in the design, every reactor from that particular batch will share the flaw. There will also be a separation between the manufacturers and operators.
Many SMR designs have passive safety systems that allow the plant to shut itself down in an emergency where all power to the plant is shut off. This will it easier to operate such nuclear power reactors. On the other hand, the passive safety systems better work exactly as planned or there could be problems.
SMRs are small enough to consider putting underground. That would reduce seismic risk and the risk of releasing nuclear materials into the environment. There will also be a reduced demand for cooling water.
The SMRs will be small enough to move from their operational site to a special facility for decommissioning. This will be more efficient than the current practice of decommissing every reactor on site. On the other hand, this will require the transportation of the reactor to the decommissioning site with attendant risks of accidents or theft.
On the one hand, SMRs are new and unproven. On the other hand, because they are smaller and made in factories, they can be more easily modified during manufacturing than is currently the case for onsite conventional reactors.
If new international standards could be drafted for SMRs, then they could be easily manufactured in one country and transported to another country for installation and use.
One possible impediment to the widespread use of SMRs concerns the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Convention on Nuclear Safety. Article 9 demands that the operators take primary responsibility for the reactor. However, due to the fact that the reactor will have be built offsite at a factory, the operators will have less oversight in construction than they currently do for conventional reactors. Article 18 says that reactors must be operated according to well established and well tested procedures. Because the SMRs are so new, the existing recognized procedures may not be appropriate for their operation.
There will definitely have to be major changes to licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants in order for SMRs to widely accepted and adopted.
North Korea has been in the news a lot lately. They recently conducted a nuclear test, the fifth in series, in their quest to miniaturize nuclear warheads to attach to missiles. Recent military exercises by the U.S. and South Korea on the Korean peninsula have enraged the N.K. dictator and brought more threats of nuclear annihilation from him. There have been calls from conservatives inside and outside S.K. for S.K. to develop its own nuclear weapons.
There are international economic sanctions on N.K. to try to get them to abandon their nuclear weapons program. There have been attempts to pressure China to use their influence with N.K. to get them back to the bargaining table. Now S.K. has just announced that they have an elite military strike force that is ready to enter N.K. and assassinate the dictator if they feel that N.K. is getting ready to launch an attack against S.K.
The U.S. is basically working on two “tracks” to try to deal with the threats posed by N.K. and their nuclear weapons program. The first track or the “carrot” consists of offering to remove sanctions and resume trade with N.K. if they halt their nuclear weapons development and get rid of existing nuclear warheads and missiles. Unfortunately, this approach must be considered to be a failure since the sanctions have not stopped N.K. from working on nuclear weapons.
The U.S. recently constructed an anti-missile system in S.K. to protect it against N.K. missiles. This system was installed in S.K. over the strenuous objections of China who claim that it could also be used against Chinese missiles in case of military conflicts over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Since China has the most leverage over N.K., this dispute does not bode well for getting China to help get N.K. to the negotiating table.
The second track or “stick” consists of plans and preparations to deal with N.K. belligerency by any means necessary including the possibility of a preemptive nuclear attack against N.K. This approach does not appear to be a viable option because the U.S. is just not willing at this point to use preemptive military action against N.K. In addition, a nuclear attack on N.K. would spread fallout to S.K.
In view of the failure of both of these tracks to produce any positive results, there have been calls for developing a new policy towards N.K. One suggestion has been that economic sanctions be unilaterally removed. Lobby the U.N. to sign a formal peace treaty with N.K. ending the still existing state of war. Have the U.N. recognize N.K. as a member of the U.N and recognize the current regime as the legitimate government of N.K. This would all be accomplished without any mention of or action with respect to the N.K. nuclear weapons program or missile program.
If this could be accomplished, then N.K. could become a full member of the international family of nations. They could be offered economic and developmental assistance in return for signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and conforming to the current international standards with respect to their existing nuclear and missiles programs. This new approach offers a break from the past and the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the problems posed by a nuclear N.K.
Map of North Korea:
