And now for something completely different as the Monty Python crew liked to say. I usually try to be as accurate as I can in these posts. I welcome any feedback that will help me correct mistakes. There has been a massive die-off of sea life on the West Coast of the United States that some have attributed to radiation released from Fukushima. I have not reported on it because there has been no definitive proof that Fukushima is reponsible. However, sometimes you encounter what seems to be a really far out idea but a scientist is offering evidence for that idea. I just couldn’t resist mentioning the proposal that there were several huge devastating nuclear explosions on Mars that heavily impacted the surface of that planet.

      Dr. John Bradenburg is a senior propulsion scientist at Orbital Technologies Corporation. In a recent interview, he stated that, “The Martian surface is covered with a thin layer of radioactive substances including uranium, thorium and radioactive potassium — and this pattern radiates from a hot spot [on Mars]… A nuclear explosion could have sent debris all around the planet,” he said. “Maps of gamma rays on Mars show a big red spot that seems like a radiating debris pattern … on the opposite side of the planet there is another red spot.”

 

     Bradenburg is suggesting that there was a natural nuclear explosion on Mars that was equivalent to a terraton of TNT (One terraton equals one million megatons) in the northern part of the Mare Acidalium region of Mars where there is a lot of radioactivity. The explosion would have thrown up the radio-isotopes which have been detected by gammar ray spectrometry. Xenon 129 is present in the Martian atmosphere. This isotope has been seen on Earth where there was a nuclear explosion or meltdown.

        Skeptics say that the evidence presented by Bradenburg is ambiguous and could be accounted for by natural non-nuclear processes that took millions of years. Even if there was a natural nuclear explosion in the remote past on Mars, researching it would not take precedence over many of the current Mars projects such as the search for life.

       In response, Bradenburg says that he has talked to defense specialists who agree with him that there is evidence on Mars for a massive nuclear explosion. He points out that there was a natural nuclear reactor on Earth. About two billion years ago, a water soaked uranium rich ore deposit in Gabon, Africa actually started a self-sustaining nuclear reaction.

       Critics point out that any such enormous nuclear explosion on Mars would leave huge craters that should be visible today. Bradenburg says that the craters from a two hundred million year old explosion could have been completely filled with sand in the intervening years. On the other hand, if the explosion occurred above the ground like the Tunguska event in Russia about, a huge crater may not have been created.

      Currently, Bradenburg is leaving the question of what could have caused such an explosion open. In the past, he has suggested that there could have been an ancient civilization on Mars that was responsible for the big nuclear explosions. Needless to say, this idea did not find a great deal of support even among scientists who say that Bradenburg has raised some valid questions about Martian surface radioactivity. 

Government experts say that  “astounding” levels of radiation from Fukushima have been measured in U.S. enenews.com

A shape-changing robot has today begun surveying conditions within the primary containment vessel (PCV) of the damaged unit 1 of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. world-nuclear-news.org

South Korean conglomerate Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction said Thursday the company was celebrating the delivery of nuclear reactors designated for the United Arab Emirates’ future generating station in Barakah. nuclearstreet.com

A federal agent who ferries nuclear bombs around the U.S. allegedly threatened to kill a co-worker and got into physical fights with others—and bosses weren’t informed, an audit finds. thedailybeast.com

              I have been blogging lately about the “framework” negotiated between the U.N. Security Council members (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China) and Iran with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. The framework will be the basis of a final agreement to be drafted by June. Unfortunately, there are already contentious issues being raised by Iran over a U.S. fact sheet on the negotiated framework released last Tuesday. The next day, Iran publicly rejected concessions that it had made according to the White House document.

       Top Iranian officials are denouncing the W.H. fact sheet as a “lie.” They say that they never agreed to let U.N. inspectors into any Iranian military sites. “The country’s (Iran’s) military officials are not permitted at all to allow the foreigners to cross these boundaries or stop the country’s defensive development under the pretext of supervision and inspection.” A U.S. State Department representative said that access to military sites was critical and that details were still being worked out.

        Iran says that the Iranian nuclear research program will continue under any agreement. They also expressed the intent to inject uranium gas into the most advanced centrifuges that they possess when any deal is finalized.

        Iran says that all sanctions must be immediately lifted upon the signing of any final agreement based on the framework. The U.S. stance on sanctions says that they will be lifted over time based on Iran’s continued compliance with the final agreement. It will take months for Iran to comply with any final deal and the U.S. intends for some sanctions to continue until Iran has carried out requirements such as reducing uranium stockpiles and decommissioning and storing about two thirds of their centrifuges. There is some wiggle room in the distinction between the date that a final agreement is signed and the date that a final agreement goes into effect.

       In any case, suspending sanctions could be a complex and time-consuming process. The U.S. President can sign an international  agreement with the rest of the U.N. Security Council and Iran without Congressional approval. He can also drop some U.S. sanctions with executive action. However, there are other sanctions that will require Congressional approval to remove and, in this political environment with serious Republican opposition, that may prove difficult. The U.N. Security Council may remove existing sanctions but draft new ones.

       The top Iranian negotiator on the framework was treated to a “hero’s” welcome when he returned to Iran following the announcement of the framework. International sanctions and isolation have been a serious burden for Iranians and many Iranians hailed the framework as the beginning of the return of Iran to the international community of nations.

       A former U.S. Pentagon advisor said that the schism emerging between the U.S. and the Iranians was “startling.” He thinks that the U.S. and Iran have entirely different ideas about what the negotiated framework says. He claims that Obama is asking the American people to accept an Iranian deal that “Obama now asks the United States to embrace a deal that according to the Iranians doesn’t permit full inspections, doesn’t eliminate plutonium production, provides sanctions relief based on Iranian promises and not behavior, and doesn’t eliminate Iran’s path to a bomb,” Rubin said.

       In spite of some harsh comments by Iranian officials, most of the Iranian leadership has endorsed the framework. It will take a lot of hard work on the part of all parties involved to draft a final agreement that is acceptable to all parties. Without a deal, many international Iranian sanctions will be removed regardless of U.S. actions and Iran would be free to proceed with its nuclear program, including development of nuclear weapons if it desires. 

The Foreign Ministry secretly conducted a simulation in 1984 to assess damage from a hypothetical attack on a nuclear power plant in a war and concluded that up to 18,000 people would be killed with acute symptoms from radiation exposure, it emerged Wednesday. japantimes.co.jp

A recent Japanese food mislabeling scandal in Taiwan showed the differing levels of oversight between countries when it comes to food imports. fukuleaks.org

Heads of state from Russia and Vietnam agreed to further cooperation on nuclear power plant projects in Vietnam, which has set its sights on having 13 reactors in commercial operation by 2030. nuclearstreet.com

EDF Energy says it has almost completed early site preparation works for the planned Hinkley Point C project. However, pending a final investment decision (FID), some 400 jobs at the site are at risk. world-nuclear-news

              I have been blogging lately about the “framework” negotiated between the U.N. Security Council members (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China) and Iran with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. The framework will be the basis of a final agreement to be drafted by June. The Israeli Prime Minister has been very skeptical about the negotiations and has been expressing his concerns in speeches and interviews in the international media. He has repeatedly said that Iran cannot be trusted and that this framework will not prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. Recently, a member of the Israeli legislative body shared ten questions that he says should be answered before any agreement with Iran is signed.

1).  “Why are sanctions that took years to put in place being removed immediately (as the Iranians claim)?” Actually, the specific timing of the removal of sanctions was not detailed in the framework despite what the Iranian government has been telling its own people.

2) “Given Iran’s track record of concealing illicit nuclear activities, why does the framework not explicitly require Iran to accept inspections of all installations where suspected nuclear weapons development has been conducted?” The monitoring program covered in the framework is very thorough and does target all known research facilities in Iran.

3) “Will Iran ever be forced to come clean about its past nuclear weaponization activity?” This is really ironic coming from Israel when it has steadfastly refused to even admit that it has the nuclear warheads. Western intelligence says that Iran halted work on nuclear weapons in 2003 and has not resumed it since.

4) “What will be the fate of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium.” Reduction of stockpiles of enriched uranium are specifically mentioned in the framework. It can either be shipped out of Iran or mixed with uranium ore to dilute the enrichment. Exactly what is to be done with the existing stockpile will be part of the final agreement.

5) “Why will Iran be allowed to continue R&D on centrifuges far more advanced than those currently in its possession?” Iran’s nuclear research facilities will concentrate on nuclear power and nuclear medicine which they are entitled to do as a sovereign nation. Enrichment is part of nuclear research. Any attempt to create the “cascades” of thousands of centrifuges to enrich enough uranium for a bomb would be easily detected by the monitoring regime in the framework.

6) “Why does the framework not address Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, whose sole purpose is to carry nuclear payloads?” As a sovereign nation, Iran has the right to develop missile launch systems regardless of what other countries think they might be used for. The knowledge gained could be used for space exploration.

7) “Following Iranian violations of the framework, how effective will be the mechanism to reinstitute sanctions?” The framework is very clear that if Iran does not comply with the agreement, the sanctions can be easily and quickly put back into place.

8) “What message does the framework send to states in the region and around the world when it gives such far-reaching concessions to a regime that for years has defied UNSC resolutions?” Defying a resolution that you disagree with is not the same as failing to comply with an agreement that you accept. If the sanctions are removed and Iran complies, other countries will see that cooperation works. If Iran fails to comply, other countries will see that non-compliance is met with international economic retaliation. Either way, Israel’s fear that the framework would encourage nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is unfounded.

9) “The framework agreement appears to have much in common with the nuclear agreement reached with North Korea.” N.K. eventually developed nuclear bombs after the agreement Israel is talking fell apart. However, the agreement did delay N.K. work on nuclear weapons for ten years. If this is all that the negotiated framework accomplishes in Iran, it will be worth the effort. And Iran is NOT N.K.

10) “Why is the lifting of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in about a decade not linked to a change in Iran’s behavior?” Israel criticizes Iran for support of terrorist activities but Iran criticizes Israel for abuse of Palestinians. It is critical that Iran be dissuaded from obtaining nuclear weapons. Other countries concerns over Iranian “misbehavior” in foreign relations are free to negotiate or retaliate as they see fit but the negotiated framework only deals with the Iranian nuclear program and that is sufficient.

      In the end, an agreement with Iran based on the negotiated framework will benefit all the countries in the Middle East including Israel.

French nuclear power giant Areva has found a high-carbon anomaly in the steel used for portions of the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel bottom at the Flamanville 3 project in Normandy, France, the French regulator, the Authority of Nuclear Safety (ASN) said Tuesday. Nuclearstreet.com

The Britain’s Conservatives’ manifesto will have a commitment to build four new nuclear missile-armed submarines, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon has said. bbc.com

Electrabel has described as “confiscatory” the tax Belgium seeks to levy on nuclear power plant operators based on new calculations by the country’s electricity and gas market regulator.  world-nuclear-news.com

Nuclear is likely to be one of the big areas of cooperation with France, Germany and Canada during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit starting on Thursday.  timeseofIndia.indiatimes.com

              I have been blogging lately about the “framework” negotiated between the U.N. Security Council members (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China) and Iran with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. The framework will be the basis of a final agreement to be drafted by June. The Israeli Prime Minister has been very skeptical about the negotiations and has been expressing his concerns in speeches and interviews in the international media. He has repeatedly said that Iran cannot be trusted and that this framework will not prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb. Recently, a member of the Israeli legislative body shared ten questions that he says should be answered before any agreement with Iran is signed.

1).  “Why are sanctions that took years to put in place being removed immediately (as the Iranians claim)?” Actually, the specific timing of the removal of sanctions was not detailed in the framework despite what the Iranian government has been telling its own people.

2) “Given Iran’s track record of concealing illicit nuclear activities, why does the framework not explicitly require Iran to accept inspections of all installations where suspected nuclear weapons development has been conducted?” The monitoring program covered in the framework is very thorough and does target all known research facilities in Iran.

3) “Will Iran ever be forced to come clean about its past nuclear weaponization activity?” This is really ironic coming from Israel when it has steadfastly refused to even admit that it has the nuclear warheads. Western intelligence says that Iran halted work on nuclear weapons in 2003 and has not resumed it since.

4) “What will be the fate of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium.” Reduction of stockpiles of enriched uranium are specifically mentioned in the framework. It can either be shipped out of Iran or mixed with uranium ore to dilute the enrichment. Exactly what is to be done with the existing stockpile will be part of the final agreement.

5) “Why will Iran be allowed to continue R&D on centrifuges far more advanced than those currently in its possession?” Iran’s nuclear research facilities will concentrate on nuclear power and nuclear medicine which they are entitled to do as a sovereign nation. Enrichment is part of nuclear research. Any attempt to create the “cascades” of thousands of centrifuges to enrich enough uranium for a bomb would be easily detected by the monitoring regime in the framework.

6) “Why does the framework not address Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, whose sole purpose is to carry nuclear payloads?” As a sovereign nation, Iran has the right to develop missile launch systems regardless of what other countries think they might be used for. The knowledge gained could be used for space exploration.

7) “Following Iranian violations of the framework, how effective will be the mechanism to reinstitute sanctions?” The framework is very clear that if Iran does not comply with the agreement, the sanctions can be easily and quickly put back into place.

8) “What message does the framework send to states in the region and around the world when it gives such far-reaching concessions to a regime that for years has defied UNSC resolutions?” Defying a resolution that you disagree with is not the same as failing to comply with an agreement that you accept. If the sanctions are removed and Iran complies, other countries will see that cooperation works. If Iran fails to comply, other countries will see that non-compliance is met with international economic retaliation. Either way, Israel’s fear that the framework would encourage nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is unfounded.

9) “The framework agreement appears to have much in common with the nuclear agreement reached with North Korea.” N.K. eventually developed nuclear bombs after the agreement Israel is talking fell apart. However, the agreement did delay N.K. work on nuclear weapons for ten years. If this is all that the negotiated framework accomplishes in Iran, it will be worth the effort. And Iran is NOT N.K.

10) “Why is the lifting of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in about a decade not linked to a change in Iran’s behavior?” Israel criticizes Iran for support of terrorist activities but Iran criticizes Israel for abuse of Palestinians. It is critical that Iran be dissuaded from obtaining nuclear weapons. Other countries concerns over Iranian “misbehavior” in foreign relations are free to negotiate or retaliate as they see fit but the negotiated framework only deals with the Iranian nuclear program and that is sufficient.

      In the end, an agreement with Iran based on the negotiated framework will benefit all the countries in the Middle East including Israel.