Part 3 of 4 Parts (Please read Parts 1 and 2 first)
Novelty is often accompanied by uncertainty. While SMRs and conventional nuclear power reactors both fall under the umbrella of nuclear fission reactors, the similarities largely end there. The mechanical and electrical differences between these two concepts are significant. SMRs introduce a host of new engineering challenges that have not been thoroughly analyzed or experienced in traditional nuclear power plants. This potentially offsets any anticipated benefits and prolongs the path to reliable deployment.
Each of these changes introduces new opportunities for failure. None of them are well understood and all of them are expensive to fix. SMRs introduce a host of untested problems, including using close to weapons-grade higher-enriched uranium, raising proliferation and safety concerns.
If anything, their smaller size actually exacerbates some problems. The compact cores of SMRs can leak more neutrons than conventional reactor cores. This leads to more complex damage to the nuclear reactor itself and different radioactive waste streams. This radioactive waste is harder and more expensive to manage and dispose of.
Despite the “modular” promise, each SMR is still a massive piece of radioactive infrastructure, requiring the same level of security, emergency planning, and long-term waste management as any other commercial nuclear reactor.
SMRs present all the risk and complexity of a conventional power reactor, but at even higher costs per unit of energy, due to the loss of economies of scale. This is why nuclear power has never been financially viable. Every plant built in the U.S. required public subsidies. Every single attempt to reduce unit costs by increasing reactor size, designing the plant in factory modules, or eliminating safety features has ended in disaster or disappointment.
The industry’s new claim that mass-producing SMRs will lower costs ignores the harsh lessons of economies of scale. In the development of nuclear power, bigger was always supposed to be better. Now, suddenly, people are supposed to believe that smaller is the answer.
There is no better example of failed SMR promises than the much-publicized NuScale SMR project in Utah that was set to be the first SMR built in the U.S.? However, last November, citing soaring costs, the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) canceled the project. Since it was announced in 2015, the UAMPS project planned on building twelve reactors by 2023 for a cost of $3 billion. By the time it was canceled in November of last year, cost estimates had tripled.
Agencies like the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are supposed to be looking out for the public interest. However, the NRC has repeatedly weakened safety and staffing requirements at the behest of SMR vendors. This is called “regulatory capture”.
Dr. Edwin Lyman is with the Union of Concerned Scientists. He said, “The NRC is truly a captured agency… NEI complained that the agency’s proposed language for a new rule to weaken security for new nuclear reactors was too stringent. So, the NRC complied and completely eviscerated the draft. Pathetic.”
Please read Part 4 next