Part 2 of 2 Parts (Please read Part 1 first)
Over the past decade, the NRC has become the favorite whipping boy of zealots beholden to a stagnant nuclear industry. Nuclear industry lobbyists have persistently chipped away at the structural pillars of safety and independence at the NRC while justifying the restructuring — i.e., weakening — of the NRC as needed for nuclear power’s survival.
The Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act (NEICA) of 2017, Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) of 2019, and Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act (ADVANCE Act) of 2024 have all been critical tools in the legislative toolbox. These bills were passed with bipartisan support, further eroding safety and the NRC’s independence.
The ADVANCE Act proved to be particularly damaging, because it required the NRC to change its mission statement to ensure licensing “does not unnecessarily limit the benefits of civilian use of radioactive materials and nuclear energy technology to society.” This represents a fundamental departure from the agency’s original safety-first mandate, introducing promotional language that echoes the very conflicts of interest that led to the AEC’s dissolution in 1974.
Many former NRC commissioners have sounded the alarm about these dangerous trends. Allison Macfarlane served as NRC chair under President Obama. She warned, “An independent regulator is one who is free from industry and political influence. Once the White House enters into the process, there is no independent regulator anymore.” Three former NRC chairs together warned that recent changes “serve to weaken protections for those who work in or live near reactors.”
The irony of this situation is profound. Just as the nuclear industry seeks to expand deployment of advanced reactor designs involving technologies that are largely unproven and require more rigorous safety review, not less, the regulatory framework is being systematically weakened. These new reactor designs, from small modular reactors to advanced fast reactors, represent significant changes from existing light-water reactor technology. They require intensive safety analysis precisely because they lack the many decades of operational experience that inform current safety protocols.
This regulatory erosion threatens to undermine the critical public confidence the nuclear industry desperately needs to expand. Edwin Lyman is with the Union of Concerned Scientists. He warned that the Trump administration’s approach could “take talent and resources away from oversight and inspections and put them into licensing,” calling the strategy “totally misdirected.”
Former NRC officials noted that the potential consequences extend beyond U.S. borders. “If it becomes clear that the NRC has been forced to cut corners on safety and operate less transparently, U.S. reactor vendors will be hurt” internationally, because “a design licensed in the United States now carries a stamp of approval that can facilitate licensing elsewhere.”
As Trump returned to the White House pontificating about a “golden era” and “energy dominance in America,” the die was cast for the NRC. After DOGE staff infested the NRC and the DoE, Trump’s May nuclear executive orders solidified the collapse of the NRC’s safety role and independence. Adam Blake’s “rubber stamp” comment was just the silent part said out loud. The structural pillars that have protected Americans from nuclear accidents for five decades are crumbling under the weight of industry pressure and political interference.
The ultimate tragedy is that weakening safety oversight just when unproven reactor technologies need the most rigorous review sets the stage for the kind of serious accident that could devastate public confidence in nuclear power for generations. This is the very outcome the nuclear industry claims to want to avoid.