Nuclear Fusion 19 - Management Problems At The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

Nuclear Fusion 19 - Management Problems At The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor

        I have done several blog posts on nuclear fusion research. I posted one article on the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project. ITER is a huge project to build a tokamak nuclear fusion reactor in order to move from purely experimental fusion research to an actual system to generate electricity that could be a prototype for commercial power reactors. Today, I am going to delve into some of the management issues that have slowed progress at ITER.

       Ten years ago, a group of nations selected a site in the south of France to build ITER. China, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Russia, the United States and India were involved in the project. About four and a half billion dollars were awarded in construction contracts and about three and a third billion dollars in manufacturing contracts. Construction at St-Paul-lez-Durance in France began five years ago. Over two thousand people are working on the project. Some buildings have been completed and the first big components are being delivered.

      There have been many problems and delays in the project. Tens of millions of dollars have been wasted by an inadequate management process. The seven members of the project are each designing and building components. When one member does not deliver a critical component on time, there is a domino effect that causes delays for the completion of other components by other members. There are arguments over who should pay for the delays and cost overruns.

       Recently, the new director-general of the ITER Organization, Bernard Bigot, published an article about the problems plaguing ITER. It is his opinion that one of the major problems is the lack of a "clearly defined authority to manage the entire project." Successful projects need a manager that has the power to make critical decisions. Bigot says that it is obvious that the management structure for ITER is "poorly adapted to the challenge of building a large, complex research facility."  A 2013 ITER internal report said that the ITER Organization was "ill-defined and poorly implemented."

       According to Bigot, "The management structure has proved incapable of solving issues and responding to the project's needs, so accumulating technical difficulties have led to stalemates, misunderstandings and tension between staff around the world. These problems stem from how the organization was set up through an international treaty in 2007."

      "The deputy director-general from each of the participating members have responsibility for one technical of administrative department and they are official representative for the members.  The procurement of components, systems and buildings was divided between the member states. Work is allocated on the basis of the industrial capacity of each member. Forty five percent of the cost is borne by the European Union and nine percent is covered by the other members outside of the E.U. "

      The ITER Organization is "responsible for validating the design of the facility; compliance with safety regulations; coordination of manufacturing and quality control of the numerous components; their on-site assembly; and later, the operation of the facility." Each member has a procurement agency that receives designs from the ITER Organization and then farms out the work to their contractors. While there are benefits to each of the members from this system, the paperwork and confusion of so many different semi-independent agencies is proving to out weight those benefits.

      Bigot proposes radical changes in the ITER Organization. The director-general will now have full authority over the whole project. The procurement agencies in the member nations will be brought under the direct control of the ITER Organization. There will be monthly meetings of a new executive board comprised of different departments to accelerate dispute resolution and decision making. There will have to be team building efforts so that all actors feel responsibility for the whole project and not just their specific departments. Bigot has asked for a new discretionary fund under his control. He will submit a new schedule along with new cost and risk analysis by the end of this year. While fully aware that there will be future problems, delays and unexpected costs, Bigot is confident that he can improve on the past management process.

      Meanwhile, in the U.S., there are interesting fusion projects going onat private companies exploring alternative approaches to generating electricity by fusing lighter elements into heavier elements. All of these projects are aimed at creating fusion power reactors that are not as big, complex or expensive as ITER. It may very well be the case that other better approaches to nuclear fusion will be developed and commercialized before ITER is completed.

Artist's concept of ITER: