I have blogged often about the Hinkley Point C nuclear power project at Somerset in the United Kingdom. The U.K. intends to build two new power reactors at the Hinkley Point nuclear power plant. They contracted with EDF, the French owned utility, to construct the reactors. EDF was not able to come up with its share of the estimated twenty four billion dollars required so other investors were sought. The Chinese state-owned nuclear power company, China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN), agreed to invest one third of the required funds on the condition that they be allowed to build a nuclear reactor of Chinese design at Bradwell in the U.K.
This project caused concern among trade unions because the Chinese intends to build the Bradwell reactor with Chinese workers. The U.K. security services were also upset at the thought of revealing critical security information about the U.K. nuclear power industry to a potential adversary.
The U.K. Office for Nuclear Regulation is currently involved in the mandatory four-year approval process for the Bradwell reactor. Earlier this year, the ONR visited the GCN in Shenzhen, China as part of the process. Approval of the ONR is very important for the Bradwell project. Bradwell would be the first Chinese-designed reactor to be built in an industrialized Western nation and it would be very beneficial to Chinese ambitions to sell reactors around the world.
CGN refused to provide the ONR with detailed information on security protocols that are in place to protect a nuclear plant in Fangchenggang, China which could be the model for the Bradwell reactor. “With regard to the sharing of information, such as the security plans for FCG [Fangchenggang] Unit 3, CGN stated that these were protected documents under Chinese regulations,” the ONR reported.
In the face of criticism of this withholding of security information at Fangchenggang, the ONR claimed that it was common for foreign nuclear companies to withhold sensitive security documents during the U.K. approval process which is known as the Generic Design Assessment (GDA). An ONR spokesperson said that “It is routine for site security plans to be protected, and is not unexpected. It will in no way restrict our assessment of the UK HPR100 [the Chinese reactor design].” The ONR told the Chinese that they would need to provide a “sufficient description of the design” of the Chinese reactor design so that safety claims being made for the design could be verified.
The U.K. said that the Chinese would have to promptly provide the required information if they wanted the approval process to proceed. The ONR issued a statement that “The purpose of the GDA process is to ensure that the design meets the robust safety and security standards required in the UK, and our regulatory focus is on the arrangements and design of the UK HPR1000, planned for Bradwell.”
A U.K. nuclear expert said, “The ONR clearly highlight to the Chinese partners that there are resource adequacy implications and risks, and I would be more blunt and say their ability to adequately do their job, if not being provided with sufficient material.”
The GCN said that it was committed to cooperating with the ONR in a fully transparent manner which would include providing all the information that was required. The GCN COO for the U.K. said, “This is no difference to the approach taken for any other would-be operator, whether it be American, Japanese, Chinese or British. As you would expect, all nuclear companies around the world protect sensitive information concerning the security of their own national nuclear sites, and regulators understand and support such essential precautions.”
