Part 1 of 3 Parts
On a number of occasions, I have blogged about my fears that developing nations could be walking into a trap if they accepted offers of nuclear technology exporting nations such as Russia and China to build, fuel, operate, and dispose of spent fuel from nuclear power plants in those developing nations. The deals can look very attractive with the exporters offering big loans on generous terms and a complete package of services.
China announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. They are dedicating over a trillion dollars to projects in a swath of nations from China to Europe for the stated purpose of trade creation, economic development and renewable energy. However, concerns have grown over the possible military strategic benefits of the BRI which China has tried to soft-pedal.
The Chinese government has created several websites associated with the BRI. It is interesting and a little odd that none of those websites make any mention of nuclear power plant (NPP) projects although China has plans to build over thirty nuclear power plants as part of the BRI. Many of the countries where the Chinese intend to build NPPs are not members of any non-proliferation treaties and they do not have regulatory frameworks for safeguarding nuclear plants and materials.
Developing nations who are the target of the Chinese nuclear export business should be under no illusion that China is offering them these deals out of kindness. China has economic and geostrategic goals of its own that will be furthered by spreading around Chinese nuclear power reactors in developing nations whether or not they benefit the customers.
The vision statement for the BRI says that one of the goals is to advance nuclear power cooperation and the Belt and Road Energy Cooperation website does mention some bilateral nuclear agreements. Many of the countries that are considered as prospects for Chinese nuclear exports are part of the BRI initiative. However, as mentioned above, three main websites for the BRI make no mention of NPPs.
One of the reasons that China might not want to mention and publicize the NPPs is because many nuclear technologies are dual-use. This means that the same technology that can produce enriched uranium for nuclear fuel can also enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Keeping NPPs out of the publicity for the BRI reduces public concern about possible proliferation of nuclear weapons in the BRI countries.
A second reason for China to avoid publicizing BRI NPPs is the fact that China has been guilty of violating its obligations under the rules of the international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of which it is a member. It has provided nuclear materials to countries including Pakistan who are not members of the NSG and are not entitled to receive such materials under the rules of the NSG. Pakistan has not agreed to employ International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or to slow down its nuclear weapons program. In spite of this, China is involved in six NPP projects in Pakistan.
Please read Part 2